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CHAPTER IX
ESTIMATING SPILL FREQUENCY AND VOLUME
IN THE GULF OF MEXICO
Introduction
This Chapter focuses on the following variables from
the Chapter II methodology:
- V(i)/ the volume of oil spilled for a catastrophic
spill (V(l)) and for a significant spill (V(2));
- SPILL(i)/ the frequency of spills of size range
(i) occurring in the region;
- ACTIVITY, the level of the company's oil shipment
activity in the region as a fraction of the area
total oil shipments; and
- FACTOR, a representation of steps which a company
may undertake to either lower or raise the company's
likelihood of experiencing a major spill event. The
Chapter discusses of how these variables can be
selected, and focuses in particular on the Gulf of
Mexico test area.
Estimating Values for V(i)
V(1) and V(2), volumes representing a catastrophic
spill and a significant spill respectively, require a
company to make its first judgmental selection in
approaching the Chapter II methodology. As noted above,
because the present knowledge concerning oil spills does
not permit every volume to be considered (due to lack of
information about spill frequency and probability for
every volume), a company attempting to estimate its
exposure must select what for it would be a catastrophic
236
and a significant spill event. There are a number of
alternative approaches to making these estimates:
- Determine the designated geographic region's
average shipment volume, and use this volume for a
catastrophic spill and 50-66% for a significant
spill;
- Determine the designated geographic region1s
largest single shipment, and use this volume for a
catastrophic spill and use 50-66% for a significant
spill;
- Determine the company's average shipment volume,
and use this volume for a catastrophic spill and use
50-66% of this volume for a significant spill;
- Determine the company's largest single shipment,
and use this volume for a catastrophic spill and use
50-66% for a significant spill; or
- Some combination of the above alternatives.
Benefits and drawbacks exist for each alternative.
Use of the geographic region's average shipment has the
important limitation of possibly not being consistent
with the particular company's scale of activity. As an
example, the Gulf of Mexico average shipment volume for
1982 is approximately 50,000 tons (see Appendix J);
examining two companies operating in the Gulf for this
same time period, Charter Oil's company average shipment
is approximately 53,537 tons, while another company,
Mobil Oil, has an average shipment of 80,169 tons. While
use of a Gulfwide average would be a suitable
representation for Charter during this period, it would
clearly understate Mobil's scale of operations.
The second alternative, use of an individual company
average shipment volume, also contains a potential
limitation. Use of an average, even if it is an
individualized company average, may seriously understate
the company's true exposure to a "catastrophic" spill
event. Again referring to Charter and Mobil in the Gulf,
consider the variations between average volume and
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largest company vessel for these companies:
Company Lowest Highest
Shipment
Mobil Oil 18,471 tons
Charter Oil 27,618 tons
(See Appendix J)
Shipment
280,432 tons
77,041 tons
Average
Shipment
80,169 tons
53,538 tons
If Mobil Oil in particular were to use as its
definition of "catastrophic" the company average shipment
of 80,169 tons, the company has ignored all potential
spills of 80,170 - 280,432 tons, which could occur if its
largest shipment experienced a spill. Mobil's true
"catastrophic" spill is three times its company average
shipment level.
Considering the third alternative, use of a
company's largest shipment volume and 50-66% of this
volume as an estimate of "catastrophic" and "significant"
has the reverse problem of alternative two. Again
referring to the table above, if Mobil were to use
280,432 for V(l) and also were to use 185,085 tons (66%
of 280,432 tons) for V(2), then Mobil will have probably
overestimated its "significant" spill potential. Note
that while a company such as Mobil makes shipments in the
+250,000 ton range, it also makes extremely small
shipments, in the +18,000 range. To assign a value to
V(2) that focuses only on the company's largest spill may
generate too great an estimate of NET EXP.
The recommended solution to selecting values for
V(l) and V(2) is that a blending of company average
shipment and company largest single shipment be used. In
order to avoid the potential underestimation of a
company's exposure to a truly catastrophic spill event,
V(l) will be assigned the value of the company's largest
shipment. (A variation would be to examine the company's
top two or three shipments, and take this "top shipment"
average). In order to avoid the other problem of
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potentially overestimating the value of a "significant"
spill event, V(2) will be assigned the value of the
company's average shipment. Selection of the average
shipment may understate the exposure for large individual
shipments and overstate the exposure for small shipments,
but it should act to give the company a representative
scale of exposure.
Therefore, the two example companies above would
assign the following values to V(l) and V(2):
Mobil: V(1)= 280,432 tons; V(2)= 80,169 tons.
Charter: V(l)= 77,041 tons; V(2)= 53,538 tons.
Estimating Values for SPILLS(i)
As discussed in Chapter II, the variable SPILLS(i)
represents the number of major oil spills of volume (i)
in the described geographic area per year. Because the
frequency of large volume oil spills is low, it is not
feasible to determine a frequency for every (i) volume.
Therefore, two states of (i) are used, where SPILLS (1)
reflects a significant spill volume, and SPILLS(2) a
catastrophic spill event.
A question similar to that raised in the discussion
of variable V(i) also exists in estimating SPILLS(i):
how should spill volume ranges be determined in order to
generate a frequency value? Even if a fixed proxy value
for V(l) and V(2) were used (ex. - use of a fixed value
of 250,000 tons for V(l) and 50,000 tons for V(2)
regardless of the company involved) , it would still be
necessary for the variable SPILLS(i) to include as data
spills above and below the stated volumes. The list
below reflects the relatively few unintentional tanker
spills which fall into these ranges, even over a five
year period of 1976-1980:
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Volume Range Spills, Annual
+ 3.4 tons (+1,000 gallons)
1976-1980
53
Average
10.6
+ 143 tons (+42,000 gallons) 12 2.4
+ 340 tons (+100,000 gallons) 10 2.0
+1,701 tons (+500,000 gallons) 8 1.6
+3,401 tons (+1,000,000 gallons) 6 1.2
+20,408 tons (+6,000,000 gallons) 4 0.8
+34,014 tons (+9,999,999 gallons) 3 0.6
(1)
The problem is made still more complex by the
proposed valuation for V(i) discussed above making use of
a volume for V(l) and V(2) that varies for each company
in the Gulf.
Recognizing both the need for frequencies for
SPILLS(i) and also the limitations imposed by the low
number of large spill occurrences, the following approach
is applied to estimating SPILLS(i):
- 1. Obtain tanker unintentional spill data for the
designated geographic region for a substantial time
period; data for a period of at least 3-5 years
would appear to be advisable, in order to avoid
basing an estimate of annual spill frequency on a
single year which may be unusually high or unusually
low in terms of significant volume spills;
- 2. As part of estimating SPILLS (1) for a
significant spill, generate two types of information
about shipments in the areas
- the geographic area's average shipment volume;
and
- the range of company average shipment volumes
in the area;
- 3. Determine a frequency SPILLS(1) for the
geographic area for spills in the range represented
by the company and geographic area average shipment
volumes;
- 4. As part of estimating SPILLS(2) for a
catastrophic spill, determine the range of company
"largest" shipments, and determine a frequency
SPILLS (2) for spills falling within this range;
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- 5. Validation of both frequencies should focus on
whether the "correct" spills have been selected,
that is, spills which, even if they are at the low
end of the volume range, could have been larger
volume spills;
- 6. If either SPILLS(1) or SPILLS(2) cannot be
determined due to lack of spill occurrences in the
necessary volume range, use a proxy value by:
- reference to catastrophic spill data from
other locations; and/or
- projections of catastrophic spill frequency as
a fraction of significant spill frequency.
- 7. Finally, attempt to validate frequencies by
reference to worldwide or other regional spill
occurrence information.
Step 1, data on unintentional tanker spills for the
Gulf of Mexico, is presented for years 1976-1980 (2) at
Table 20, at page 241. Note that insignificant spills of
below 3.4 tons (less than 1,000 gallons) have been
excluded.
Step 2, determination of the Gulf of Mexico average
shipment volume and determination of company average
shipment volumes, is reflected in Table 21, at page 243.
The high end for this average is 111,739 tons (Marathon),
and the low end is 23,735 tons (Mobile Bay Refinery).
The distribution of company average shipments is found in
Table 22 at page 245. Note that the Gulfwide average of
48,216 tons falls within the heaviest concentration of
company average shipments, the 35,000-75,000 ton range.
Estimating SPILLS(2),
A Significant Spill Frequency
Examining the major Gulf spill occurrences during
1976-1980, there are four spills which fall within the
range of 20,000 tons and +34,000 tons (the Coast Guard's
spill recording system does not record spill volumes
beyond 9,999,999 gallons, or 34,000 tons, and so the
precise volume for these upper limit spills is not
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TABLE 20
GULF OF MEXICO UNINTENTIONAL TANKER SPILLS,
1976-1980, OF 3.4 TONS (= 1,000 GALLONS) AND ABOVE
Tanker Operation - "'Underway", "Unknown Operation",
or "No Operation Reported"
Volume Cause Tanker Operation Location:
(tons) (thous- (lat/long/)
and tons)
1976:
3.4 Corrosion T(.15-.3) Underway 2928/8913(off New Orleans LA)
714.3 Unknown T(10-20) Underway 2930/9453(Galveston Bay,TX)
14.3 Unknown T(10-20) Underway 2936/9423(Galveston/Pt. Arthur,TX)
21,428.6 PE-Hose Twist T(10-20) Underway 2750/8234(Tampa Bay,FL)
1977:
None
1978:
228.6 Collision T(0-.15) Underway 2943/9352(Pt. Arthur,TX)
8,571.4 Grounding T (20-35) Underway 2855/9517(off coast Freeport,TX)
34,014(*) Grounding T(20-35) Underway 2922/9448(Galveston Bay,TX)
5,128.6 PE-Unknown T (35-50 Underway 2929/9346(off Pt. Arthur,TX)
1979:
7.3 Grounding T(l-10) Underway 2751/9704(Corpus Christi,TX)
34,014(*) Grounding T(50-100) Underway 2920/9440(off Pt. Arthur,TX)
57.8 Grounding T(.5-1) Underway 3017/8826(off Mobile,AL)
40.8 Grounding T(10-20) Underway 3018/8814(off Mobile,AL)
2,857.1 Unknown T (35-50) None 2944/9508(Galveston/Houston,TX)
384.4 Unknown T(1-10) Underway 3000/9359(Beaumont,TX)
4.3 Unknown T(10-20) None 2958/9353(Beaumont,TX)
1980:
3,054.4 Collision T(l-10) None 3016/8915(Gulfport,LA)
34,014(*) Grounding T(50-100) Underway 2937/9246(LA coast, between
Pt. Arthur,TX and Lafayette,LA)
(*) The PIRS reporting system does not have storage capability for digits in
excess of 9,999,999 gallons (» 34,014 tons). Spills designated by (*) have
probably exceeded the level shown.
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TABLE 20, Continued
Tanker Operation - "All Other Operations”
Volume
(tons)
1976:
3.4
3.6
17,3
3.6
3.4
29.6
4.3
4.3
10.7
27.2
Cause Tanker Operation Location
(thous- (lat/Long/)
and toTTs)
Collision T(10-20)
PE-Inattent. T(35-50)
PE-Valve Op. T(10-20)
PE-Valve Op. T(35-50)
PE-Valve Op. T(35-50)
PE-Pipe Cut T(35-50)
PE-Valve Fail T(l-10)
PE-Loading T(10-20
PE-Overfill T(20-35)
PE-Unknown T(20-35)
Moored
Unloading
Unloading
Ballast
Unloading
Unloading
Loading
Loading
Loading
Loading
3004/9405(Pt. Arthur/Beaumont,TX)
3000/9359(Pt. Arthur,TX)
2737/8234(Tampa Bay,FL)
3000/9359(Pt. Arthur,TX)
3000/9350(Pt. Arthur,TX)
2749/9726(Corpus Christi,TX)
2750/9704(Corpus Christi,TX)
2950/9357(Pt. Arthur/Beaumont,TX)
2749/9726(Corpus Christi,TX)
2943/9508(Houston Channel,TX)
1977:
87.1
3.4
129.3
PE-Pressurize T(20-35)
PE-Loading T(10-20)
PE-Unknown T(20-35)
Loading 2749/9726(Corpus Christi,TX)
Loading 3004/9404(Beaumont,TX)
Unloading 2943/9512(Houston Channel,TX)
1978:
5.7
5.7
4.3
14.3
5.7
5.7
3.4
Unknown
PE-Inattent.
PE-Valve Op.
PE-Valve Op.
PE-Valve Op.
PE-Valve Fail
PE-Overfill
T(20-35)
T (35-50)
T(1-10)
T(10-20)
T(10-20)
T(35-50)
T(50-100)
Unloading
Other Op.
Loading
Ballast
Loading
Ballast
Fueling
2922/9453(Galveston,TX)
2749/9726(Corpus Christi,TX)
2943/9512(Galveston/Houston,TX)
3005/9401(Pt. Arthur/Beaumont,TX)
2951/9358(Pt. Arthur/Beaumont,TX)
2922/9453(Galveston,TX)
2740/9726(Corpus Christi,TX)
1979:
162.9
14.3
5.7
3.4
4.3
7.1
7.3
89.1
3.1
7.1
Collision
Collision
Weather/Seas
Unknown
Unknown
PE-Inattent.
PE-Valve Op.
PE-Valve Op.
PE-Overfill
PE-Overfill
T (35-50)
T( .5-1)
T(50-100)
T(1-10)
T (10-20)
T (20-35)
T(l-10)
T(50-100)
T(0-.15)
T(20-35)
Departing
Moored
Moored
Loading
Ballast
Loading
Loading
Ballast
Fueling
Unloading
2922/9453(Galveston, TX)
2943/9514(Galveston/Houston,TX)
3000/9359(Pt. Arthur/Beaumont,TX)
2943/9507(Houston/Baytown,TX)
2959/9357(Beaumont,TX)
2943/9501(Galveston,TX)
2950/9357(Pt. Arthur/Beauraont,TX)
3010/9315(Lake Charles,LA)
2922/9453(Galveston,TX)
3000/9405(Beaumont,TX)
1980:
34.0
3.6
5.1
32.3
6.8
10.2
Oth. Casualty T(.5-l)
Unknown T (20-35)
PE-Valve Op. T(10-20)
PE-Hose Cut T(35-50)
PE-Sounding T(10-20)
PE-Sounding T(10-20)
Load
Ballast
Loading
Unloading
Fueling
Fueling
2908/9513(Galveston,TX)
2856/9520(Galveston,TX)
2748/9727(Corpus Christi,TX)
2943/9507(Houston Channel,TX)
2944/9517(Houston Channel,TX)
2943/9507(Houston Channel,TX)
Source: U.S. Coast Guard PIRS computer data base, 1982.
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TABLE 21
AVERAGE SHIPMENT AND "LARGEST" SHIPMENT VOLUMES
FOR COMPANIES IMPORTING OIL INTO THE GULF OF MEXICO,
JAN-OCT 1982
Company Volume
(tons)
Number of
Shipments
Average
Shipment
(tons)
Largest
Shipment
(tons)
Amoco Oil Co. 9,339,292 176 53,065 129,311
Ashland Oil Co. 3,493,746 78 44,792 142,857
Atlantic Richfield Co. 2,389,338 49 58,966 107,000
Champlin Petroleum Co. 1,750,068 30 58,336 107,141
Charter Oil Co. 428,302 8 53,538 77,041
Chevron, USA 4,144,747 107 38,736 71,065
Cities Services Oil Co. 1,857,933 44 42,226 73,236
Clark Oil and Ref. Co. 2,612,480 51 51,225 85,101
Coastal Corp. 2,534,987 50 50,700 90,593
Conoco, Inc. 523,570 7 74,796 159,332
Coral Petroleum, Inc. 425,862 8 53,233 66,571
Continental Petroleum 336 2 168(*) 223 C
Crown Central Pet. Corp. 1,445,071 26 55,580 89,230
Delta Refining Co. 1,004,429 16 62,777 83,804
Exxon Corp. 4,699,632 132 35,603 79,580
GHR Energy Corp. 1,395,744 33 42,295 150,157
Gulf Oil Corp. 3,010,028 70 43,000 90,129
Gulf States Oil and Ref. 749,074 14 53,505 85,399
Horizon Petroleum Co. 438,108 6 73,018 71,558
Houston Oil and Ref. 216,028 4 54,007 64,719
Hunt Oil Co. 240,498 9 26,722 32,101
Intercoastal Petroleum 1,496 5 299(*) 275 C
International Processors 316,301 6 52,717 69,918
Kerr-McGee 1,633,843 29 56,339 84,331
Koch Industries, Inc. 140,717 3 46,906 57,213
LaGloria Oil and Gas 589,881 12 49,157 74,761
Marathon Oil Corp. 7,263,039 65 111,739 432,347
Mobil Oil Co. 3,369,083 42 30,216 280,432
Mobile Bay Ref. Co. 142,409 6 23,735 35 r639
Murphy Oil Corp. 729,879 12 60,823 80,218
(*) Companies which have probably had oil shipped aa part of another company's
shipment. These partial shipments will not be included in estimates of the
"low end" of Gulf of Mexico shipments.
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TABLE 21, Continued
Company Volume Number of Average Largest
(tons) Shipments Shipment
(tons)
Shipment
(tons)
Nat'l Coop. Refy. Assoc. 43,247 1 43,247 43,247
Phillips Petroleum Co. 1,605,222 37 43,384 55,434
Placid Ref. Co. 143,789 3 47,930 74,860
P&O Falco, Inc. 71,605 1 71,605 71,605
Sea Horse Marine, Inc. 12,679 75 169 (*) 986 (*)
Sentry Ref. 277,072 10 27,707 50,393
Shell Oil Co. 9,483,704 180 52,687 270,582
Sigmore Corp. 484,691 7 69,242 74,372
Std. Oil - Ohio 1,574,663 34 46,314 82,836
Sohio Supply Co. 1,334,089 30 44,470 83,552
Strategic Petroleum Res. 7,282,197 185 39,363 266,101
Sun Company, Inc. 207,956 4 51,989 72,657
Tenneco, Inc. 304,351 6 50,725 71,401
Texaco, Inc. 6,660,026 145 45,931 283,803
Texas City Ref. Inc. 2,972,783 44 67,563 89,916
Tosco Corp. 424,336 9 47,148 77,802
Total Petroleum, Inc. 399,979 6 66,663 85,062
Union Oil Co. - USA 1,077,659 16 67,354 200,016
Vulcan Asphalt and Ref. 107,320 4 26,830 28,408
Gulf of Mexico Total: 91,863,289 1,897 48,426
(*) Companies which have probably had oil shipped as part of another company's
shipment. These partial shipments will not be included in estimates of the
"low end" of Gulf of Mexico shipments.
Source: American Petroleum Institute, Imported Crude Oil and Petroleum
Products (Washington: API, 1982).
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TABLE 22
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANY AVERAGE OIL SHIPMENTS
AND COMPANY LARGEST SHIPMENTS
IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, JAN-OCT 1982
Range(thous-
and tons)
Averaqe Shipment Larqest Sinqle Shipment
Number of Comments Number of Comments
Companies Companies
below 20 3 3
20-30 4 1
30-40 3 2
40-50 13 Gulf of Mexico average 1
50-60 15 3
60-70 6 3
70-80 3 Conoco,Horizon,P&O Falco 12
80-90 1 Mobil 10
90-100 -- 2 Coastal,Gulf
100-110 — 2 Arco, Charaplin
110-120 1 Marathon
120-130 — 1 Amoco
130-140
140-150 — 1 Ashland
150-160 — 2 Conoco, GHR Energy
200-210 1 Union Oil
260-270 1 Strategic Pet. Res.
270-280 1 Shell
280-290 — 2 Mobil, Texaco
430-440 — 1 Marathon
Source: American Petroleum Institute, Imported Crude Oil and Petroleum
Products (Washington: API, 1982). For full details of companies, see Table
21, at page 243.
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known) . (3_)
It would be preferable for the occurrences
constituting the SPILLS(2) significant spill value to
range over the full breadth of company average shipment
volumes (i.e.- 35,000-75,000 tons). Because of the data
collection limitations noted in the Coast Guard PIRS
system, it is not fully clear whether the 9,999,999
gallon spills reflect lower range values (such as 35,000
tons) or higher range values (in excess of 35,000 tons).
Use of these four occurrences to constitute the variable
SPILLS(2), the annualized frequency for a significant
spill, generates a value of 4 occurrences/5 years, or 0.8.
A related question which arises is whether any
additional spill occurrences should be added to
SPILLS(2). These potential additions are spills which,
while not reaching the volume level to clearly constitute
the "significant" spill range, are occurrences which
could have resulted in significant volume spills. To
answer this question, the Gulf tanker spills for the
1976-1980 period are analyzed below.
The first division in the historical spill
occurrences of interest is the spill data element "vessel
operation". Examining Table 20, at page 241, the spills
for the 1976-1980 period have been separated into two
broad categories: Part A, which contains spills where
vessel operation is "vessel underway", "unknown
operation", or "no operation reported"? and Part B, which
contains spills where vessel operation is "all other
operations". The Part A category is primarily composed
of the operation "vessel underway". The Part B listing
for "all other operations" is composed primarily of
operations that are port loading/unloading, ballasting,
and fueling activities.
Of greatest interest in this division is the
discovery that no spills of greater than 163 tons are
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found in the "all other operations" category of spills.
In fact, 31 of the 36 spills in Part B are below 34 tons
(10,000 gallons) in volume.
In contrast, all four of the "significant" spills
identified, of 21,429 tons and three spills of +34,014
tons, are found in Part A, and all four of these spills
are vessel operation "vessel underway". Further, 13 of
the 17 spills in Part A are above 34 tons (10,000
gallons).
Conclusions that may be drawn from these findings
include:
- Vessel operations that are port oriented
activities, (particularly loading/unloading) are
likely to generate small rather than significant or
large spills; and
- The vessel operation that is clearly identifiable
with significant (and potentially catastrophic)
spills is operation "vessel underway".
Further consideration of tanker spills during this
period, and especially Part A vessel operation spills,
reveals information about the spill element "cause of
incident". Consider Parts A and B separated into "cause
of incident", in Table 23, at page 248. The cause that
is most closely associated with both number of
significant spills and also spill volume is "grounding".
It should also be noted that "grounding" only appears as
a cause in the Part A vessel operation category. Other
causes of large volume spills are "personnel error" and
"collisions".
Conversely, for Part B "other operations", the
overwhelming cause of incident is "personnel error",
accounting for 27 out of 36 "other operations" spills.
The final selection of a value for SPILLS (2) is
therefore uncertain depending upon the number of spills
which by "vessel operation" and "cause of incident" are
to be characterized as "potential" significant spills.
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TABLE 23
ANALYSIS OF GULF TANKER SPILLS, 1976-1980, BY CAUSE OF INCIDENT
(spills of 3.4 tons = 1,000 gallons and above)
Tanker Operation - "Underway", ''Unknown Operation1
or "No Operation Reported”
Cause of
Incident
Collision
Corrosion
Grounding
Personnel Error
Unknown
0-
17701
1
1
3
1,701-
3,'4crr"
Volume in Tons
3,401-
1770 0"7
17,007- 34,014+ Total
337014'
Cause of
Incident
Tanker Operation - "All Other Operations"
0-
T7701
Volume in Tons
1,701- 3,401- 17,007-
3,401" r7TTO7 34,014
34,014+ Total
Collision 3 3
Other Casualty 1 1
Personnel Error 27 27
Unknown 4 4
Weather/Seas 1 1
Source: U.S. Coast Guard PIRS computer data base, 1982. For full information
about spills represented in this Table, refer to Table 20, at page 241.
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For the Gulf during the 1976-1980 period, there are
several alternative values for SPILLS(2):
- 0.8 = 4 spills of +20,000 tons/5 years?
- 1.6 = 4 spills of +20,000 tons, plus 4 additional
smaller spills where operation="underway" , and
cause="grounding"/5 years?
- 2.0 = 4 spills of +20,000 tons, plus 6 additional
smaller spills where operation="underway", and
cause="grounding or collision''/^ years?
- 3.2 = 4 spills of +20,000 tons, plus 12 additional
smaller spills where operation=”underway", and
cause="grounding, collision, unknown, or personnel
error unknown"/5 years?
- Other values, which add to the 0.8 value a
fraction of the smaller, "potential" spill events
that have occurred (i.e.- while recognizing the need
to add "potential" spills, a recognition that not
every "potential" spill should be counted as a
"significant" spill) .
The approach of adding "potential" spills to a
frequency has been endorsed and used by the U.S. Coast
Guard in its 1979 report "Deployment Requirements for
U.S. Coast Guard Pollution Response Equipment", in which
the Coast Guard observed:
For the purpose of (Coast Guard) data gathering, an
historic massive spill is taken to be any harbor,
coastal or open sea incident in which over 3,000
tons of petroleum or its products was actually
spilled. This lower limit is set at only 3% of the
nominal for a massive spill (i.e. - estimating a
massive spill at 100,000 tons) so that a larger
number of incidents will be eligible for study. The
assumption is that many of these smaller incidents
had the potential for a much larger spill and hence
can contribute to our knowledge of possible future
massive spills of the 100,000 ton variety. (4_)
The 0.8 value, which makes use of only spills
actually within the range of company average shipments,
is a valid frequency, but may understate the real
frequency for significant volume spills. Selective
inclusion of other "potentially significant" spills in
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the 1.6 and 2.0 frequencies is an effort to acknowledge
that any or all of the smaller spills where the vessel
was "underway" and the cause was identified as
"grounding" or "collision" might have been significant
spills.
The value 3.2 continues this addition process for
"potentially significant" spills, but raises the
corollary question: does the frequency overstate the
occurrence of significant spills by inclusion of spills
that are not really "potentially significant" occurrences?
A value for SPILLS (2) that includes "potentially
significant" spills can only be fully reliable where all
information about these "potentially significant" events
is known. Was a major spill averted only because the
wind and water currents permitted efficient cleanup? Was
the spill never really likely to become a major event?
Did the spill take place fortuitously near lightering and
cleanup resources?
For the purpose of operationalizing the Chapter II
methodology, the frequency to be used for SPILLS (2)
should fall somewhere between 0.8 and 3.2, recognizing
the need to add "potential" spills from appropriate
causes. An intuitive review of causes of incidents
results in the conclusion that any collision or grounding
is a potentially serious event, and so it is appropriate
to include many of those groundings and collisions which
a vessel experiences while "underway" into SPILLS (2). If
the "potential" spills from groundings and collisions are
added to the four known spills in the "significant"
range, SPILLS (2) = 6 potential spills, plus 4 identified
"significant spills / 5 years = 2.0.
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Estimating SPILLS(1),
A Catastrophic Spill Frequency
SPILLS(1) , the frequency for a catastrophic spill
event, is linked to V(l) which has been hypothesized for
each company operating in the region to be the company's
largest single shipment volume. An important limitation
prevents arriving at a value for SPILLS(1) in the manner
applied for SPILLS(2). For the volumes associated with
catastrophic spills, there is no way through the PIRS
data base to determine how many, if any, of the spills
identified as +9,999,999 gallons were on the scale of
"catastrophic" occurrences.
The difficulty of generating a reliable SPILLS(1)
value exists even if one of these occurrences were to be
identified as a "catastrophic" volume spill. An
annualized frequency is composed of two parts: the
numerator of the fraction, which represents the number of
incidents during a time period; and the denominator,
which is the number of years in the time period. The
unresolved question for almost any effort to reach a
SPILL(l) value is whether the time period used is of
sufficient length. Note that this was not as serious a
problem in calculating SPILLS(2), because for
"significant" spills there were more than one occurrence
during a multi-year period. For SPILLS(1), on the other
hand, it is not clear whether the one major spill should
be viewed as 1 spill in 5 years; 1 spill in 6 years;
etc. The extreme infrequency of spills of "catastrophic"
volume undermines the reliability of a SPILLS(1)
estimate. This limitation has been recognized by the
OECD in its analyses of worldwide spill occurrences. (5^)
It is proposed that a value for SPILLS(1) might be
estimated based on the estimates for spills of
"significant" volume, SPILLS (2). The frequency of
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"significant" spills is likely to be more reliable than a
SPILLS(1) estimate, because of the higher level of
occurrence of "significant" events. Estimating the
fraction or percentage of significant spills that would
constitute the expected frequency of a "catastrophic"
spill would then permit a hypothetical value for
SPILLS(1) to be generated.
In an effort to relate the frequency of
"catastrophic" volume spill events to the frequency of
"significant" spill events (which occur far more often
than do "catastrophic" level events), a methodology
suggested for a different region is of some value. This
approach is the result of analyses conducted for the Gulf
of Alaska outer continental shelf area by consultants
with Booz, Allen and Hamilton, and Applied Management
Science. Among their assumptions, the authors grouped
tanker spills in the Gulf of Alaska caused by collision
and rammings and spills from other causes. The study
hypothesized:
When a ramming or collision does occur, about 10
percent of the accidents result in a major oil
spill. Ten percent of the rammings and collisions
leading to a major spill result in a total loss of
the vessel, and the entire contents are presumed
lost. For the remaining 90 percent of the
accidents, a spill is assumed to be 6/10 the
vessel's capacity. (6J
The approach to estimating spills from collisions and
rammings is therefore that out of 100 spills from these
causes, 9 are likely to be 66% cargo losses, and 1 is
likely to be a 100% loss. The assumptions in this study
have been cited with approval as part of a 1978 Exxon
Special Report. (7)
While it is not appropriate to apply this theory
directly to the Gulf of Mexico, some use can be made of
the concept of an assumption about the relationship
between the frequency of "significant" spills and the
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percentage of these spills as being "catastrophic" events
(in the study, a total cargo loss). The difficulty with
applying the theory directly to the Gulf of Mexico is
that the Gulf of Mexico, being a shallow water area, has
"groundings" as its principal cause of major spills. See
Table 23, at page 248. Thus, the Gulf of Alaska's major
spill causes are "rammings" and "collisions", while the
Gulf of Mexico is principally concerned with
"groundings", "collisions" and "personnel error".
It would seem to be a reasonable method for
estimating SPILLS(1) to assume that the frequency of
catastrophic spills is a small fraction of the frequency
of "significant" spills. In considering a value for this
"fraction", application of the Gulf of Alaska's 10% of
the number of spills which generate a 6/10 cargo loss is
used. For the Gulf of Mexico, SPILLS(2) is defined as
the frequency of a significant spill (i.e.- a spill which
is equivalent to a company's average shipment volume). A
"significant" spill may be analogized to the Gulf of
Alaska's definition of a serious spill (6/10 cargo
loss). Therefore, if SPILLS(2) is estimated as 1.6 (see
earlier discussion), use of the approach from the Gulf of
Alaska study, applying a slightly more conservative value
of 8%, yields an estimated SPILLS(l) frequency of 0.16
spills/year, or 1 catastrophic volume spill in 6-7 years.
The consideration in relating SPILLS(1) frequency to
SPILLS(2) frequency that must be evaluated carefully is
the percentage value used. As more information is
obtained about the Gulf, and as additional "significant"
and "catastrophic" spills are recorded and added to a
data base, a more precise empirical relationship between
the two frequencies will become available.
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Validating Gulf of Mexico Tanker Spill Data
In order to establish that the data dealing with
Gulf of Mexico tanker spills, assumptions made about
"potential spills" and causes, and the derived estimates
of spill frequencies SPILLS(1) and SPILLS (2) are fair
estimates, the results of other studies and information
sources will be briefly reviewed. This section is
divided into Gulf of Mexico validating data and worldwide
validating data.
Gulf of Mexico Validating Data
Other data which relate to the Gulf of Mexico and
oil spill risks are drawn from two sources:
- Data from the Coast Guard PIRS data base dealing
with unintentional barge oil spills in the Gulf of
Mexico? and
- Coast Guard hypothesized future spill frequencies
for key Gulf of Mexico ports, generated as part of
the Coast Guard Deployment Report.
Gulf of Mexico Barge Spills: Spills by barges have
been excluded from the discussion until this point in
order to focus on tanker spills and frequencies. There
are many differences between spills by tankers and
barges: tankers are self propelling and navigating,
while barges must be towed or pushed by tugs? tankers are
typically in the 50,000-100,000 DWT range, while barges
are most frequently 1,000-10,000 DWT? many large tankers
cannot enter Gulf shallow water ports, while most barges
can enter such ports? and many other operational
differences. (8J
There are, however, important parallels between
tanker and barge spill experiences which can be used to
support some of the assumptions made in reaching
estimates for tanker spill frequencies. The Gulf of
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Mexico barge spills for 1976-1980 are set forth in
Appendix K.
Of importance is the analogous relationship of vessel
operations and large spill occurrences, and also of
causes of spills. For barge operations, out of 38 spills
occurring during "other vessel operations" (particularly
port loading and unloading operations), only 2 spills are
within the 50-500 ton range. The remaining 36 spills are
of minor levels of damage, below 50 tons. See Appendix
K, Part 2.
In contrast, in the category of barge operations
"underway", "unknown operation" and "no operation
reported", there are 24 spills, in which 12 are above 500
tons, with 8 more in the 50-500 ton range. Thus, the
assumption that operations "underway", "unknown" and "no
operation reported" are the appropriate points of
attention for tankers is reinforced by the findings for
barge operations.
The second aspect of barge findings which confirms
assumptions made concerning tankers is in the area of
causes of incidents. See Table 24, at page 256, which
compares tanker and barge spills when grouped by cause of
incident. As in the case of tankers, barge spills
occurring while "underway", "unknown" or "no operation
reported" are overwhelmingly caused by either collisions
or groundings. Groundings constitute 14 spills and
collisions 10 spills out of the 30 spills in this
operation category.
In the "other operations" category, the overwhelming
single cause of barge spills is "personnel error", the
same finding as in the case of tanker "other operations"
spills.
A third point of interest is to examine barge spill
locations by ports and to compare these locations with
tanker spills. See Table 25, at page 257.
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TABLE 24
COMPARISON OF GULF TANKER AND BARGE SPILLS, 1976-1980,
BY CAUSE OF INCIDENT
(spills of 3.4 tons = 1,000 gallons and above)
Vessel Operation - "Underway,", "Unknown Operation,
or "No Operation Reported"
Cause of Tankers Barges
Incident Number Percent N umb e r Percent
Corrosion 1 5.9% —
Collision 2 11.8% 10 33.3%
Grounding 7 41.2% 14 46.7%
Personnel Error 2 11.8% 2 6.7%
Sinking -- — 1 3.3%
Unknown 5 29.4%2 10.0%
Total 17 100.0% 30 100.0%
Vessel Operation - "All Other Operations"
Cause of Tankers Barges
Incident Number Percent Number Percent
Collision 3 8.3% 4 10.5%
Cor rosion — -- 2 5.3%
Fire/Expl. -- -- 1 2.6%
Grounding — — 1 2.6%
Material Fault — -- 1 2.6%
Minor Damage — — 2 5.3%
Other Casualty 1 2.8% — —
Personnel Error 27 75.0% 25 65.8%
Unknown 4 11.1% 2 5.3%
Weather/Seas 1 2.8% — —
Total 36 100.0% 38 100.0%
Source: U.S. Coast Guard PIRS computer data base, 1982.
For full information about spills represented in this
Table, refer to Table 20, at page 241, for data on tanker
spills, and Appendix K for data on barge spills.
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TABLE 25
COMPARISON OF GULF TANKER AND BARGE SPILLS, 1976-1980,
BY LOCATION OF INCIDENT
(spills of 3.4 tons = 1,000 gallons and above)
Location of
Incident
Number of Number of
Tanker Spills Barge Spills
Beaumont/Pt. Arthur, TX 18 8
Corpus Christi, TX 7 14
Freeport, TX 1
Galveston/Houston, TX 18 31
Gramercy, LA 1
Gulfport, MS 1 3
Lafayette, LA 2
Lake Charles, LA 1 2
Mobile, AL 2
New Orleans, LA 1 4
Tampa Bay, FL 2 3
Source: U.S. Coast Guard PIRS computer data base, 1982.
For full information on tanker spills, see Table 20, at
page 241, and Appendix K for data on barge spills.
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As with tanker spills, Galveston, TX is identified as
the location with the greatest number of barge spills,
and Beaumont/Pt. Arthur and Corpus Christi follow.
The conclusion is that, while recognizing that
differences in tanker and barge operations and problems
do exist, that the proportions for vessel activities,
causes, and regional locations of both tanker and barge
spills are virtually identical.
Projected Spill Frequency for Key Gulf of Mexico
Ports: As part of its 1979 Deployment Report, the Coast
Guard projected expected spill frequencies for major
ports in the U.S., including the following Gulf of Mexico
port areas: Tampa, FL; Lake Pascagoula, MS? Baton Rouge,
LA; New Orleans, LA; Lake Charles, LA; Pt. Arthur, TX;
Texas City, TX; and Corpus Christi, TX. See Appendix L
for the component locations included in each port region,
and the projected spill frequency for each port.
These projections were based upon 1974-1977 spill
figures, including only spills larger than 50,000 gallons
(170 tons), and were adjusted to a hypothetical 1985
level. The resulting frequency for the Gulf of Mexico is
estimated at 8.043 spills of +170 tons per year.
The Coast Guard's projections are for all vessel
spill events over 170 tons, and so both tanker and barge
spills are included:
Year Tanker Spills Barge Spills Total
3
2
7
10
_7
29
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Total
2
0
4
3
2
11
1
2
3
7
_5
18
Note that the Gulf spills in this category have
increased from years 1976-1977 to years 1978-1980,
reaching approximately the Coast Guard projections of 8
spills of +170 tons per year. This increasing trend is
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also found in worldwide spills, with the OECD reporting
that the incidence of large spills (in the 10,000-25,000
ton range and above) sharply increased in the 1976-1979
period over the prior 1965-1975 period. (9J The
important conclusion, however, is that the relative order
of magnitude of spill frequency based on both the data
directly obtained in this dissertation and the data used
by the Coast Guard in its Deployment report are
comparable.
Worldwide Validating Data
Estimated Worldwide Spills/Barrels Transported: The
use of worldwide spill data is of limited use for direct
comparisons with smaller geographic regions, unless
number of spills can be related to some generally
applicable value. A study by Stewart performed for the
Department of Interior in 1976 generated a rate for
tanker spills divided by barrels of oil shipped of 3.87
spills of +1,000 barrels per 1 billion barrels
transported. (1_0) This ratio has been directly adopted
by the U.S. Geological Survey in its 1982 environmental
impact statement of oil spill risks for the Gulf of
Mexico Outer Continental Shelf area. (11)
Translating this ratio into tons of oil, an estimated
frequency of 3.87 tanker spills of +143 tons is
hypothesized for every 142,857,143 tons shipped.
The level of Gulf shipments for the most recent
recorded period, January-October, 1982, is 91,863,289
tons. Annualizing this yields 110,235,947 tons.
Applying the Stewart ratio results in a hypothesized 2.99
spills of 143+ tons.
Examining the reported tanker spills during
1976-1980, there were 12 tanker spills of 143+ tons. See
Table 20, at page 241. This annualizes to a rate of 2.4
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spills per year.
As with other validating data discussed, the purpose
of discussing the Stewart estimate is to show that the
actual findings for the Gulf during 1976-1980 are
basically in accord with other spill data in terms of
relative order of magnitude.
U.S. Coast Guard Analysis of Worldwide Tanker
Spills: As part of its study of location of pollution
prevention equipment in the United States, the Coast
Guard's 1979 study analyzed 68 worldwide tanker spills of
over 3,000 tons for cause of incident and relative water
location (i.e.- harbor, open ocean, etc.). The findings
of this analysis are found in Table 26, at page 261. Two
results are of interest:
First, the majority of spills occurred within 50
miles of the coast (62.9%). In the Gulf, virtually all
spills of this size during the 1976-1980 period occurred
within this same region. The relatively high percentage
of worldwide spills beyond 50 miles may not be
appropriate to compare against the Gulf of Mexico,
because the worldwide spills include open ocean locations
(such as the North Atlantic Sea) which, having far more
severe weather than the open Gulf of Mexico, can be
expected to produce more open ocean spills.
The second result is the distribution of causes of
incidents. For these worldwide figures, "grounding",
"structural failure" and "collision" account for 89.8% of
the spills studied. The "groundings" and "collisions"
are consistant with the Gulf tanker statistics for
1976-1980. The "structural failure" figures are quite
different, with the Gulf showing no major spills having
been assigned this cause. It is not clear why this
difference exists? however, one possibility may be the
existence of more stringent U.S. vessel standards for
vessel operations in U.S. waters, which has the effect
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TABLE 26
WORLDWIDE TANKER SPILLS, 1967-1978,
BY CAUSE OF INCIDENT AND WATER LOCATION
(68 spills analyzed, 3,000 tons or greater)
Cause of
Incident
Harbor
Interior
Harbor
Entrance
Coastal
Area
50+ NM
at Sea
Total
Breakdown 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5%
Collision 0.0% 1.5% 10.3% 0.0% 11.8%
Explosion 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 2.9%
F ire 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 1.5% 3.0%
Grounding(*) 2.9% 10.3% 27.9% 0.0% 41.1%
Ramming 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Struct. Failure(**)i 0.4% 0.4% 6.3% 29.8% 36.9%
Other 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 2.9%
Total 3.3% 13.6% 46.0% 37.1% 100.0%
(*) "Groundings" include both actual groundings and also strandings.
(**) "Structural Failures" include actual structural failures,
flooding, and sinking.
Source: A. O. Brien, et. al., Deployment Requirements for U.S. Coast
Guard Pollution Response Equipment, Vol. 1 (Washington: U.S.
Department of Transportation, 1979).
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of separating out substandard vessels (which may continue
to operate in other world waters).
Estimating Company Activity (ACTIVITY)
The variable ACTIVITY included in Chapter II reflects
the level of company participation in the total activity
of the designated geographic region. This level of
activity is of importance to a company planning its
exposure to oil spills, because a company with a high
share of the region's activity can expect overall to have
a higher exposure to the possibility of a spill event.
The ACTIVITY variable can be viewed from two
perspectives: a company's share of the number of vessel
shipments in the region; and/or a company's share of the
total oil cargo volume moved in the region. See Table
27, at page 263, which lists the Gulf of Mexico importing
companies and their share of both Gulf shipments and Gulf
volume shipped for January-October 1982.
Which proportion should be used to define ACTIVITY is
somewhat uncertain because the degree of exposure to a
spill event is based on both the number of shipments and
also the volume shipped. Each additional shipment is an
additional vessel movement which could result in a
spill. Similarly, the larger the volume of each
shipment, the greater a "catastrophic" spill event will
be for the company. Therefore, increasing the number of
vessel shipments or increasing the volume per shipment,
will each increase a company's "share" of the chance that
a major spill will be from that company's vessel. (12)
See the discussion following dealing with vessel size and
pollution-causing incidents.
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TABLE 27
LEVEL OF ACTIVITY OF COMPANIES
IMPORTING OIL INTO THE GULF OF MEXICO,
JAN-OCT 1982
Company Volume
(tons)
Amoco Oil Co.
Ashland Oil Co.
Atlantic Richfield Co.
Champlin Petroleum Co.
Charter Oil Co.
9,339,292
3,493,746
2,389,338
1,750,068
423,302
Chevron, USA
Cities Services Oil Co.
Clark Oil and Ref. Co.
Coastal Corp.
Conoco, Inc.
4,144,747
1,857,933
2,612,480
2,534,987
523,570
Coral Petroleum, Inc.
Continental Petroleum
Crown Central Pet. Corp.
Delta Refining Co.
Exxon Corp.
425,862
336
1,445,071
1,004,429
4,699,632
GHR Energy Corp.
Gulf Oil Corp.
Gulf States Oil and Ref.
Horizon Petroleum Co.
Houston Oil and Ref.
1,395,744
3,010,028
749,074
438,108
216,028
Hunt Oil Co.
Intercoastal Petroleum
International Processors
Kerr-McGee
Koch Industries, Inc.
240,498
1,496
316,301
1,633,843
140,717
LaGloria Oil and Gas
Marathon Oil Corp.
Mobil Oil Co.
Mobile Bay Ref. Co.
Murphy Oil Corp.
589,881
7,263,039
3,369,083
142,409
729,879
Percent Shipments Percent
of Total of Total
Volume Shipments
10.13 176 9.28
3.79 73 4.11
3.13 49 2.58
1.90 30 1.58
0.46 3 0.42
4.49 107 5.64
2.01 44 2.32
2,83 51 2.69
2.75 50 2.64
0.56 7 0.37
0.46 8 0.42
0.00 2 0.11
1.57 26 1.37
1.09 16 0.84
5.10 132 6.96
1.51 33 1.74
3.26 70 3.69
0.81 14 0.74
0.48 6 0.32
0.23 4 0.21
0.26 9 0.47
0.00 5 0.26
Q .34 6 0.32
1.77 29 1.53
0.15 3 0.16
0.64 12 0.63
7.87 65 3.43
3.61 42 2.21
0.15 6 0.32
0.79 12 0.63
TABLE 27, Continued
Company Volume
(tons)
Percent
of Total
Volume
Shipments Percent
of Total
Shipments
Nat'l Coop. Refy. Assoc. 43,247 0.05 1 0.05
Phillips Petroleum Co. 1,605,222 1.74 37 1.95
Placid Ref. Co. 143,789 0.16 3 0.16
P&O Falco, Inc. 71,605 0.08 1 0,05.
Sea Horse Marine, Inc. 12,679 0.01 75 3.95
Sentry Ref. 277,072 0.30 10 0.53
Shell Oil Co. 9,483,704 10.28 180 9.49
Sigmoor Corp. 484,691 0.53 7 0.37
Std. Oil - Ohio 1,574,663 1.71 34 1.79
Sohio Supply Co. 1,334,089 1.45 30 1.58
Strategic Petroleum Res. 7,282,197 7.89 185 9.75
Sun .Company, Inc. 207,956 0.23 4 0.21
Tenneco, Inc. 304,351 0.33 6 0.32
Texaco, Inc. 6,660,026 7.22 145 7.64
Texas City Ref. Inc. 2,972,783 3.22 44 2.32
Tosco Corp. 424,336 0.46 9 0.47
Total Petroleum, Inc. 399,979 0.43 6 0.32
Union Oil Co. - USA 1,077,659 1.17 16 0.84
Vulcan Asphalt and Ref. 107,320 0.12 4 0.21
Gulf of Mexico Total: 91,863,289 1,897
Source: American Petroleum Institute, Imported Crude Oil and Petroleum
Products (Washington: API, 1982).
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Estimating Values for FACTOR
The variable FACTOR is a collection of elements
which are within a company's decisionmaking control.
These elements have been identified by earlier research
efforts as increasing or decreasing the company's
likelihood of being involved in a spill event. FACTORS
is included in the Chapter II methodology to note that
there are such aggravating and mitigating elements which
a company can control through decisionmaking, but as
noted in Chapter II, this particular variable cannot
presently be operationalized. This limitation stems from
two sources: first, some of the elements in FACTOR are
at best hypothesized aggravating or mitigating variables,
where no hard data on performance based on the presence
or absence of the variable has yet been obtained. For
example, while a factor such as crew training is
postulated by the industry as being likely to enhance
crew performance and therefore lower the likelihood of an
accident, no certainty about the degree of improvement
exists. (13)
The second limitation in quantifying some FACTOR
variables is that elements have been identified as being
correlated with spill accidents, but the weight that
should be given to the element cannot presently be
determined. Using another example, differences in vessel
size, vessel flag, and vessel crew have been correlated
against vessel accidents, permitting assumptions about
preferable crew and vessel flag nationalities. However,
there is no real sense at the present of how
significantly these factors will bear on overall exposure
to a spill. Knowing that vessels registered under a
Greek flag experience higher rates and quantities of
spills per tonnage carried (1£) is insufficient to lead
to a statement that selection of a Greek vessel
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increases the likelihood of a spill by a stated
percentage.
This section will briefly discuss some of the
presently identified elements which may contribute to the
likelihood of a spill event. For the purposes of the
Chapter II model, FACTOR must at present not be included
in the equations, because of the danger of overstating or
understating the importance of these contributing
elements.
Tanker Size
The statistics for pollution-causing incidents
(worldwide) as a function of tanker size are set forth in
Table 28, at page 267. Of interest is that the highest
frequency of accidents per port call occurs in the
100,000-200,000 ton tanker category, with the 200,000 and
above category closely following.
If spills per ton delivered is examined, the reverse
situation holds, with the 6,0000-10,000 range having the
highest statistic and the 100,000-200,000 and 200,000+
categories being lowest.
These two sets of statistics generate an interesting
conclusion: the large range tankers experience the
greatest frequency of pollution causing incidents;
however, because each large vessel transports more oil
than does a small tanker, the incidence per ton delivered
is low for the heavy tankers.
As with other elements of FACTOR, it is not clear
what is actually represented by this distribution. The
conclusions of the joint Office of Ocean Resources
Coordination and Assessment and Engineering Computer
Optecnomics study is set forth below. The researchers in
this study were not in a position to establish the
tradeoffs between size of vessel, exposure, and benefit
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TABLE 28
WORLDWIDE TANKER POLLUTION CAUSING INCIDENTS, 1969-1978
BY TANKER SIZE (DEADWEIGHT TONS)
Tanker Size
(DWT)
Delivered
Casualties per
Port Call
(1/10,000)
Casualties per
Long Ton
(1/100,000,000)
6,000-19,000 5.8 LO•00
20,000-49,999 6.0 2.6
50,000-99,999 7.5 2.2
100,000-199,999 11.8 1.8
2 00,000 and over 10.5 0.7
Source: Norman Meade, et. al., "An Analysis of Tanker
Casualties for the Ten Year Period 1969-1978", presented
at the 1981 Oil Spill Conference, March 2-5, 1981,
Atlanta Georgia, Figure 6 and Figure 8.
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to the company:
As a hypothetical example, suppose that a shipper
has 80,000 tons of crude oil to be delivered, and
has the option of using a 20,000 DWT or an 80,000
DWT tanker to transport the cargo. The 20,000 DWT
tanker has a lower rate of accident and PCI's
(pollution causing incidents) per port call, but
would necessitate making four round trips to deliver
the entire amount. The 80,000 DWT tanker has a
higher rate of accidents and PCI's per port call,
but in making only one trip its total exposure to
risk is lower. For tankers greater than 80,000 DWT
such comparisons cannot be made. Many of the
tankers this size and larger utilize the offshore
deepwater terminals, thus reducing the risk
associated with the port call. A comparison of
rates of accidents per port call for smaller
carriers making conventional port calls versus a
Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) discharging or
loading at a deepwater terminal compares two tankers
with unequal exposures to risk. (15)
Flag of Registry
The study conducted by the Office of Ocean Resources
and Coordination and Assessment and Engineering Computer
Optechomics analyzed worldwide tanker casualties. The
ORCA study examined spills by flag of registry. The
study found that:
- Greek and Liberian tankers typically have the
poorest records;
- Panamanian, United States and United Kingdom
tankers have the second poorest record; and
- Japanese, French and Italian tankers have the best
record (±6_) .
An OECD study of oil spills during the period 1965
to 1979 also draws conclusions concerning principal world
tanker fleets. From this study rates for the eight
principal tanker fleets have been prepared in Table 29,
at page 269. From these rates a more refined set of
conclusions can be drawn:
TABLE 29
SPILL ACCIDENTS BY LEADING WORLD FLEETS,
1965-1979
Percentages of DWT Shipped, Accidents,
and Quantity Spilled Among Leading World Fleets
Maior Oil Fleets Percentage Percentage Percentage
by Country of DWT
Shipped
of
Accidents
of Quantitv
Spilled
France 7% 4% 2%
Greece 8% 17% 23%
Italy 4% 4% 2%
Japan 13% 7% 5%
Liberia 46% 35% 51%
Panama 4% 8% 6%
United Kingdom 13% 10% 7%
United States 6% 15% 4%
Number of Accidents and Quantity Spilled
per DWT Shipped
Major Oil Fleets Accidents Rank Quantity Rank
by Country per DWT
(thousands)
per DWT
(thousands)
France 0.60 7 3,593 8
Greece 3.83 1 38,056 1
Italy 1.55 3 7,822 5
Japan 0.59 8 5,434 7
Liberia 1.14 5 14,738 3
Panama 2.10 2 17,520 2
United Kingdom 1.03 6 7,090 6
United States 1.42 4 9,236 4
Source: Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development, Combatting Oil Spills: Some Economic
Aspects (Paris: OECD, 1982),
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Liberia experiences the greatest number of
accidents, and also the greatest quantity spilled.
However, Liberia carried 46% of the tonnage during this
time period, over three times the volume of the United
Kingdom and Japan. Thus, the number of accidents and
volume spilled do not alone suggest that Liberia is the
most hazardous flag of registry.
Extracting the relative rankings from Table 29:
Rank Accidents/DWT Quantity Spilled/DWT
Shipped Shipped
1 (worst)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 (best)
Greece
Panama
Italy
U.S.
Liberia
U.K.
France
Japan
Greece
Panama
Liberia
U.S.
Italy
U.K.
Japan
France
From the OECD data, the following further
conclusions emerge:
- Greece and Panama clearly emerge as flags with the
worst performance per DWT shipped both in terms of
number of accidents and also quantity spilled. It
can be seen that Greece is the country whose fleet
experiences the highest number of accidents per DWT
shipped and also experiences the largest volume
spilled per DWT shipped.
- Liberia, the United States and Italy are
identified as "average" flags. Liberia remains a
less desirable flag, although this is due to the
volume of oil spilled per DWT shipped rather than to
the number of accidents sustained per DWT. Italy,
although fairly undesirable in terms of number of
accidents per DWT, has not experienced a
particularly high quantity/DWT rate. The U.S.
appears to experience a substantial share of both
numbers and volume spilled.
- The most desirable flags are clearly seen to be
the U.K., Japan and France, occupying the 6-8
ranking for both accidents and volume per DWT.
An additional study of spills from 1964-1976
performed by the Tanker Advisory Center found similar
results. (3/7). This study also reached some important
conclusions on tankers and the relationship
between accidents and changes of ownerships:
- Tankers that change ownership several times have
poor casualty records;
- Serious casualties usually occur shortly after
tankers change owners;
- Significant differences exist in casualty rates by
owners; and
- The average tanker sustains a reported casualty
about once every four years; (18)
Even with the above conceptual understanding of flag
of registry performance, this knowledge cannot presently
be directly translated into a quantitative planning
tool. The conclusions from the ORCA-Engineering Computer
Opteconomics support this conclusion:
The analysis of tanker casualties by flag indicates
that a simple bivariate analysis may obscure
relationships that would be of interest to the policy
analyst. The analysis of flag showed that certain
vessels had better safety records than others. To
what extent this is attributable to the other
characteristics of that particular fleet (e.g.,
bigger vessels, voyages in safer waters, or newer
vessels with more modern equipment) cannot be
determined from a bivariate analysis. Likewise, the
fact that tankers of certain flags had relatively
poor records may be due as much to age, size, or
locale of use as it is to the nation itself. (19)
Crew Training
Crew training programs to train vessel crews in
accident prevention and spill handling techniques are
being offered by a number of organizations. Training in
the U.S. includes a program in petroleum tanker safety at
the Maine Maritime Academy; a program on oil spill
prevention and control offered by the National Spill
Control School, Corpus Christi, TX; a program on
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petroleum tankship operations offered by the World Trade
Institute in New York; and a course in oil and hazardous
material control at Texas A&M University. See Appendix M
for details about these programs.
This training is typically offered to the captain and
mates of a vessel, who in turn pass their knowledge along
to the crews. Length of programs vary, averaging five
days, and program costs per person can range from
$575-$l,000 and above. There are also programs offered
in Switzerland dealing with navigation of VLCC's (very
large crude carriers) and also programs in England and
Scotland.
The degree of benefit achieved from such training is,
however, uncertain. Representatives of training programs
have indicated that while some improvement is to be
expected, the level of improvement is unknown. (^0_) This
uncertainty is due to variations in crew background and
nationality, and is also due to the fact that even crew
training cannot avoid some types of accidents. In
addition, no formal studies have been performed of
trained versus untrained crews.
Ports and Vessel Approaches
For the Gulf of Mexico in the 1976-1980 period under
examination, it is clear that three ports and off-port
areas, Galveston, TX, Beaumont, TX, and Corpus Christi,
TX, experienced the greatest number of spills. See Table
25, at page 257.
The level of spill incidents in a port area is a
function of the overall level of activity in the port,
and also the level of tanker/oil activity in the same
port. However, from the individual company perspective,
use of a port such as Galveston or Beaumont/Pt. Arthur
rather than Corpus Christi or New Orleans places the
company's shipment in a higher risk environment. Of
course such knowledge may not be of use to a company
which has no choice but to use a particular port (due to
refinery or delivery constraints).
Conclusion
This Chapter has selected values and has made
estimates where required for the variables V(i),
SPILLS(i), ACTIVITY, and FACTOR. These values will be
applied in Chapter XII when the Chapter II methodology i
operationalized to the degree possible given the present
state of knowledge about oil spill events.
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CHAPTER X
GULF OF MEXICO CLEANUP CAPABILITY
Introduction
The company responsible for a spill is liable for
cleanup costs and specific damages associated with the
spill under the Clean Water Act. (1.) There may be other
additional cleanup responsibilities applicable at both
the state and federal level dependent upon the natural
and historic resources affected by a spill event. (2)
This assignment of liability for cleanup and damage costs
has added greatly to the cost consequences of a spill to
the company whose traditional costs were previously only
those associated with cargo loss, vessel loss or damage,
and crew injury. The high costs associated with cleanup
and damages have made it very important for the
organization to attempt to control these costs. As
damage costs can be reduced by reducing the spill itself,
the cleanup activity plays a very important part in
controlling costs.
Cleanup costs can be expected to be related to the
potential severity of damage costs: larger spills or
spills in sensitive areas will likely require greater
cleanup effort and therefore will generate greater costs.
(3_) This relationship is contained in equation 3 in
Chapter II at page 39.
All companies involved in the transportation of oil
invest some funds (Y) in preparation for future cleanup
actions (F(k) costs). Investment options range from use
of insurance to cover damage and cleanup costs? retaining
outside firms to handle all the phases of cleanup; or
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maintaining a total in-house capability for spill
cleanup. Because no single alternative is likely to
produce the most cost effective solution, company cleanup
strategies usually involve a combination of company
cleanup capacity, contractor support and insurance.
Company resources, liability limits, availability of
outside resources, risk averseness of management, public
opinion, and financial exposure (based on volume of oil
transported and rate of spill) are major factors that are
used to determine cleanup investment. Higher end
liability limits will require far more complex and costly
solutions to adequately protect the company.
Several distinct groups which possess cleanup
resources and capabilities can become involved in a
cleanup operation:
- Government, both federal and state;
- Contractors?
- Cooperatives;
- Private organizations; and
- The company itself.
Most companies rely upon some combination from among
these groups to supply their cleanup needs. (_4) The
company can choose the amount of involvement of
contractors, cooperatives, some private organizations
and, of course, itself. The company cannot, however,
directly control the degree of involvement and costs
incurred by government groups such as the U.S. Coast
Guard Gulf Strike Force or regional response team.
However, the need for these groups to become involved
(and therefore the degree of additional costs generated
by the groups) is likely to be related to how well the
company itself manages the cleanup operation. (_5)
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Roles of Cleanup Groups
Government
The Clean Water Act, through the National Contingency
Plan (NCP) , clearly defines the responsibilities of the
government at the federal and regional levels for spill
response. (_6) The function of coordinating the
government spill response is filled by the On-Scene
Coordinator (OSC) . (7.) The role of the OSC is to make
the spiller aware of its responsibilities under federal
acts and regulations, and to advise the spiller on the
proper cleanup countermeasures for the spill.
For most Gulf spill cases cleanup is undertaken by
the spiller, with the OSC acting only in an advisory
capacity. For those spills in which the OSC must take
direct action, commercial contractors are usually used by
the OSC to support the cleanup effort. If still greater
capability is required, the OSC may call upon the Gulf
Strike Force in Bay St. Louis, the Regional Response Team
(RRT) in New Orleans or Miami, or the National Response
Team (NRT) . (8_) See Figure 5, at page 279 , for a
description of the functions of these groups.
Regional Response Teams are usually only activated
for medium sized spills, those between 10,000 and 100,000
gallons. (9_) The National Response Team is generally
activated only in the case of a major spill of over
100,000 gallons, where the spill creates a major threat
to the public health or welfare, or where the spill
threatens a particularly sensitive area. (1JD) Therefore,
the Regional Response Team and the National Response Team
usually act in only an advisory capacity to the OSC, with
the OSC largely acting as a supervisor of the private
spiller's cleanup efforts.
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(**) - osc acts as an advisor as long as cleanup activities undertaken by
industry are deemed appropriate by the OSC. If the OSC does not find industry
actions appropriate, OSC then activates the Regional Response Plan as needed
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FIGURE 5
NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN STRUCTURE AND
ROLE OF INDUSTRY IN NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN
Sources: 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1510.31(c), Figure 1? and also discussion with
industry representatives.
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The Company
As a spiller, a company has first responsibility for
cleanup. See Figure 5, at page 279, for the role that
the spiller plays in the National Contingency Plan. A
company may clean up the spill independently, or may hire
other cleanup groups to take over the cleanup
operations. A company's needs as outlined through
contingency planning help determine the amount of dollars
to be allocated to Y for cleanup expenditures.
Development of a company cleanup plan is best approached
through defining the organization's goals in the
post-loss stage. The technical personnel, with expertise
in such areas as physical properties of oil, spill
tracking, equipment specifications and uses, and physical
properties of the ocean and coastal environment, are
responsible for the development of the operational side
of the cleanup plan within the guidelines set forth by
company management. (11)
Cooperatives
Available company resources also include cooperative
organizations to which a company may belong. Through a
sharing of resources, particularly sharing of equipment
requiring greater capital outlays than can be justified
at the single company level, the member companies can
obtain greater coverage for their cleanup investment than
if each company attempted to separately invest in all
equipment necessary to protect itself in case of a spill
event.
Many of the companies belonging to cooperatives use
the cooperative cleanup plan as the basis for their
individual company plan. As member companies supply
advisory personnel to the cooperatives, many
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opportunities exist for information exchange within the
industry, which is beneficial to all member companies.
Contractors
Contractors support companies and the government in
cleanup efforts through offering specialized cleanup
services. Contractors can supply experienced manpower,
specialized equipment and experience in spill
management. They reduce the overall personnel and
capital investment costs to the companies, because a
company only pays for the contractor's time when the
contractor is actually needed.
Contractors are either retained by companies to
respond to spills or are hired to clean up a specific
spill problem. Size and interest define the
specialization of contractors. Many choose to specialize
in only a particular phase of cleanup.
Private Organizations
Organizations such as the Sierra Club and the Audubon
Society can often provide trained volunteers for
specialized, labor intensive phases of cleanup, such as
wildlife rehabilitation. Obviously, when properly
trained and supervised the groups can provide an
invaluable service to supplement a company's limited
resources. Consultants from universities can also often
provide expertise beyond a company's staff and these
consultants can be used for independent verification of
actions taken and of spill effects if such support is
required in subsequent litigation.
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Gulf Cleanup Resources
Knowledge of the cleanup resources available in the
Gulf of Mexico can help a company decide where its
cleanup investment dollars will best be spent. See
Appendix N for- a list of available equipment in the
Gulf. At the federal level the U.S Coast Guard can
provide equipment, manpower and information on available
resources. The SKIM system, a Coast Guard data base of
available spill equipment, is used to obtain information
on resources. The RRT can also provide advice in a spill
situation.
State governments can often supply expertise on the
local environment through their wildlife agencies and the
state governments can also provide equipment and
manpower. While information and specially needed expert
advice is always available at the federal and state
level, the equipment and manpower resources are usually
made available only after all company, industry, and
private contractor resources are used or are determined
to be inappropriate.
Therefore the companies in the Gulf need to carefully
consider what resources, particularly equipment and
manpower, are available in the private sector.
Cooperatives and contractors are particularly useful for
the small company that cannot afford to purchase the
larger offshore equipment or for a company whose accident
rate is low enough that company ownership is not cost
effective. Use of these organizations expands available
equipment resources and manpower without a large
individual company expenditure.
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Contractor Resources
Few companies own equipment, reflecting the cost
effectiveness of the other alternatives. There are many
contractors located within the Gulf. Most specialize in
coastal cleanup with only a few having offshore
capability. Contractors tend not to get involved in
offshore equipment investments because the capital
investment required to achieve even a minimal response
capability is too costly for most private companies. The
number of offshore spills to which one contractor could
be expected to respond are too few for the contractor to
achieve a return on its investment comparable to the
return available from maintaining a coastal response
capability. (12_) Only a few of the major contractors
have offshore capabilities.
The major contractors within the Gulf are: Crowley
Environmental, Coastal Services, Oil Mop, Peterson
Maritime, J&L Industries, Western Environmental Services,
Marine Pollution Control, Clean Channel Industries and
Browning-Ferris Industries. There are many other
contractors supplying a variety of services and equipment
to the oil industry who can also be called upon during a
spill to provide pumps, workboats and food service. The
contractors are located along the Gulf coast near major
ports or near areas of oil and gas industry
concentration, and particularly along the Texas and
Louisiana coasts.
Spill Cooperatives
There are currently two spill cooperatives located in
the Gulf: Corpus Christi Area Oil Spill Control
Association and Clean Gulf Associates. The Corpus
Christi Association is a government-industry joint
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effort, while Clean Gulf is composed only of industry
members. Clean Gulf is a Gulfwide cooperative with 72
members, while the Christi Association is a local
cooperative of 47 members. See Appendix 0 for a list of
the members of each cooperative.
Corpus Christi Area Oil Spill Control Association:
This cooperative was formed by local government and
industry groups as a nonprofit cleanup cooperative in
1970. It provides cleanup in the tidal waters (including
bays, lagoons and estuaries) of Aransas, Nueces and San
Patricio counties, behind the Texas barrier islands.
There are currently 40 assessable industry members and 7
government members. (13)
An initial call is paid each year by the industry
members for the current year's projected operating
expenses, with any shortfall assessed among all members.
The local government's assessment is based on oil tax
revenue collected by each government. Currently 1/3 of
the assessment is paid by the local governments and 2/3
is paid by the industry members. See Table 30, at page
285, for the current assessment levels.
The cooperative has approximately $750,000 in
resources for dealing with spills, including both
offshore and onshore capability. Initial equipment
resources were purchased through grants: the state of
Texas gave a grant of $80,000 to purchase equipment and
the Environmental Protection Agency gave $49,000 for
skimmers. (_L4) Grants were also received from industry,
local governments and the Port of Corpus Christi.
Since 1971 the association has responded to 516
spills, with 98 of the spills occurring in 1978 alone.
(15) The costs of spill recovery in 1982 were $31,213
for members and $93,912 for nonmembers. (1_6) Most spills
are cleaned up by the association's trained personnel,
making for a rapid and coordinated spill response due to
285
TABLE 30
ASSESSMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
CORPUS CHRISTI AREA OIL SPILL CONTROL ASSOCIATION
(1983)
40 assessable members at $1,250 each $50,000
City of Aransas Pass .....250
City of Corpus Christi 9,150
Port of Corpus Christi Authority 9,150
City of Rockport 250
Aransas County 500
Nueces County 2,200
San Patricio County 1,000
TOTAL 72,500
Source: Corpus Christi Area Oil Spill Control
Association, Statement of Income and Expenses, Year
Ending December 31, 1982, (Corpus Christi, TX: CCAOSCA,
1983) .
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personnel familiarity with equipment and procedures.
This association is unusual in that it shares the
responsibility for spill cleanup between local government
and industry. Thus,- while the industry may be
responsible for a spill, the existence of this
association reflects the community's recognition that it
is dependent upon both tourism and also on oil revenues.
To enable both the oil industry and tourism (tourist
beaches, lodging, food and related services, and sport
fishing) to exist in the Corpus Christi area and provide
jobs and revenues to the area, the community has chosen
to absorb some of the risk of oil spills by financially
contributing to pre-spill cleanup through the association.
Clean Gulf Associates: Clean Gulf was formed
initially to meet the needs of the offshore drilling and
pipeline companies. (1_7) There has developed a Marine
Transportation division within Clean Gulf to address the
concerns of the tanker service divisions of member
companies. See Appendix P for the Clean Gulf membership
list. Clean Gulf provides greater coverage of the Gulf
than does the Corpus Christi Association due to its
different objectives.
Clean Gulf specializes in offshore cleanup and has
the largest private inventory of offshore equipment in
the Gulf. Clean Gulf has equipment based at several
locations throughout the Gulf: Rockport, Galveston,
Venice, Intercoastal City, Houma, Grand isle, and
Cameron. These locations primarily reflect the needs of
the offshore drilling and pipeline industry as opposed to
tanker service. Most locations are close enough to the
tanker risk areas, however, not to cause a major problem
in equipment logistics. Clean Gulf, while owning its own
equipment has contracted with Halliburton Services
Company to provide actual spill response and to maintain
the equipment. (18)
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Clean Gulf equipment is available to members as
needed. It is possible for non-members to use Clean
Gulf’s equipment in cases of emergency, provided the
equipment is not required by members, at a higher
non-member rate.
Individual Company Resources
The use of contractors and cooperatives is the most
cost-effective solution for maintaining adequate response
capability. The major drawback associated with the use
of outside rather than in-house resources is that under
some conditions, the company could be exposed and
therefore vulnerable. Exposure can occur within a shared
system when another member is using the resources. For
example, when a large spill occurs, a system may be
temporarily stripped of resources exposing the other
companies to a lower response capability. In fact, after
any spill occurrence where resources are used, there will
be a lag time during which equipment is temporarily
unavailable while it is repaired, receives maintenance or
is restocked. Such a situation rarely reaches such a
level that a company is seriously compromised, but even
small spills have the potential to escalate during
vulnerability periods. The larger companies operating in
the Gulf of Mexico, Shell, Mobile, Exxon, Conoco, etc.,
in anticipation of such periods have invested in the
nonreusable items that may not be easily restocked and in
containment devices which can slow down the effects by
delaying spreading of the spill. While not requiring
major capital outlays, they provide an added protection
against vulnerability points. There are at least nine
major companies as identified through the USCG's SKIM
System and Clean Gulf that stockpile pumps, small
skimmers, spraying equipment, boom, dispersants,and
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Sorbent boom on lightering vessels. These companies are
Chevron, Coastal States, Conoco, Exxon, Gulf, Marathon,
Mobile, Texaco, and Shell International Marine. Some of
these companies are involved in oil recovery equipment
design (such as Shell) or in the development of
dispersants (including Exxon, Chevron and Shell). (19)
Gulf Offshore Capability
In addition to these equipment and response resource
groups, a new group has appeared on the Gulf oil spill
resource scene - MIRG. In 1981, 11 oil companies
operating in the Gulf formed the Marine Industry Group to
enhance oil spill response capability. Those companies
involved are Amoco Marine Transportation, Arco Marine,
Conoco, Coscol Marine, Exxon Shipping, Gulf Refining and
Marketing, Marathon Marine, Mobil Oil, Philips Petroleum,
Shell, and SOHIO. (2_0) In particular, MIRG is
developing: a listing of resources and logistics for
resource movement to the spill? an environmental element
to identify sensitive areas and countermeasures? rules
and regulations synopsis affecting spill response? and a
capability analysis to study available resources and
projected needs. (2_1) The environmental element (3
volumes) and resource-logistic elements (4 volumes) are
complete at this time. These resources are available to
members and membership is open to petroleum companies or
those with related activities. (22)
The yet to be completed capability study by MIRG
raises an important question: are the Gulf resources
capable of handling a major spill response? This is a
question that is being asked not only in the Gulf, but
worldwide as damage claims for spills increase.
In the Gulf there are 141 establishments with at
least some cleanup equipment on hand. (,2_3) Of these
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facilities, only 16 have offshore capability. Those
facilities are located as follows:
- Corpus Christi - 2 facilities;
- Galveston - 3 facilities;
- Port Arthur - 1 facility;
- New Orleans - 2 facilities;
- Mobile - 4 facilities; and
- Tampa - 4 facilities. (24)
In examining the question of capability this section
will focus on three types of equipment: offshore
skimmers, offshore boom and dispersants. Many other
types of equipment are needed for an effective response,
such as manpower, vessels, storage systems, airplanes,
and other equipment, but if there is not enough equipment
available at the basic level of booms, skimmers and
dispersants, the availability of support resources is
moot. Equipment availability as estimated for the Gulf
in 1979 is shown in Table 31, at page 290.
Evaluating Cleanup Capability
The available cleanup equipment located within the
Gulf region must be translated into cleanup capability in
terms of oil removed or the amount of oil by which a
spill is reduced. Reviewing equation 3 from Chapter II:
EXPOSURE = D (i) x IMPACT x (V(i)
(for V(i) ^ CLEAN: CLEAN))
- (for V(i) < CLEAN: V(i) )) + IND + F(k) + (O(i) x V(i))
CLEAN is the maximum capability in the Gulf for both
public/industry resources and private company dedicated
resources. CLEAN is expressed in units of oil capable of
being cleaned up. CLEAN also contains an effectiveness
component, as seen in Equation 4 from Chapter II:
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TABLE 31
GULF OF MEXICO OFFSHORE SPILL EQUIPMENT, 1979
Source: Offshore Off shore
Boom (f t.) Skimmers
Disper sant
(gal. )
U.S. Coast Guard 3,600
Industry 7,500
Clean Gulf Assoc. 7,000
Contractors —
7
12
16,450
1,210
11,000
TOTAL: 18 ,100 19 28,660
Note: U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard can provide 35
additional skimmers and 30,700 feet of boom from other
non-Gulf areas if needed and if available.
Sources: Arco Marine, American Petroleum Institute,
Clean Gulf Associates, U.S. Coast Guard.
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CLEAN = (CAP (public/industry) x EFF) +
(CAP(private company) x EFF)
EFF is the effectiveness measure of offshore cleanup
capability based on historical performance of cleanup
efforts in the region. Without an effectiveness measure,
the calculations for CLEAN can be overly optimistic and
may cause a company to underestimate its potential costs.
For the purposes of evaluating cleanup capability a
set of assumptions and conversion factors will be used,
based on assumptions that are used by the industry. See
Appendix Q.
Skimming Capability
Large skimmers can recover 500 bbl./hour under
optimistic conditions. During the IXTOC I well blowout
in the Gulf of Mexico and the Amoco Cadiz spill in
France, cleanup efforts experienced relatively low rates
of recovery. In the IXTOC I spill the industry used the
best collecting equipment available with very limited
success. None of the equipment used was able to pick up
more than 14% of the oil trapped, with total collection
of the spilled oil being less than 5%. (_2_5) The U.S.
Coast Guard, Shell and Oil Mop all participated in the
cleanup effort with the state of the art equipment. Poor
performance was considered to be partially caused by
Pemex's management, "but almost all private contractors
and government officials agree that, given similar
weather conditions, they would have had difficulty doing
much better." (26)
Real world conditions such as wave height, bad
weather, pumping capability limits from skimmer to barge
storage, personnel inexperience, and many other factors,
prevent equipment from being operated at peak
capability. This limitation is reflected in the Chapter
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II methodology by assigning EFF a value which represents
a company's evaluation of the above real world factors,
and its evaluation of equipment manufacturers' reports
and historical equipment performance.
For the purpose of operationalizing the Chapter II
methodology, EFF is assigned the value of 50%. This is
actually an optimistic rate when compared to the IXTOC I
cleanup performance. {21) A 50% EFF level means that one
skimmer will be expected to have a 500 x (.5) = 250
bbl./hour cleanup capability.
Skimmer use is also limited by the amount of boom
available. Boom is used to surround and trap the oil,
concentrating the oil for skimmer pickup. The amount of
boom available in the Gulf is 18,000 feet. At 3,000 feet
per skimmer only six skimmers could operate at one time.
Based on a more optimistic assumption that each
skimmer will require 2,000 feet, the available boom will
allow nine skimmers to operate simultaneously. There are
19 skimmers in the Gulf available for use. See Table 31,
at page 290. However, given the boom limitation, only 9
skimmers could be used at one time.
A third assumption made in evaluating skimmer
capability is that a skimmer operable for 12 hours each
day. The 12 hour assumption reflects the real world
condition that on clear and good weather days and if
adequate lighting can be arranged at night, more than 12
operating hours may be available; but that on poor
visibility and bad weather days and most nights skimming
cannot be performed.
Because most Gulf major spills have occurred near
ports or heavily trafficked port approaches (see Table
20, at page 241, for tanker spill locations, and Appendix
K for barge spill locations) it is likely that oil not
skimmed will reach shore. This likelihood requires
another assumption about the amount of time which will be
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available for offshore cleanup operations before oil
reaches shore. A seven day assumption is made, which is
an optimistic estimate, particular where a spill occurs
within 50 miles of shore.
A corollary assumption to the seven day oil movement
discussed above is an assumption about how many cleanup
days will occur. Six days out of the seven will be
assumed for actual cleanup activities, allowing one day
lost for transit of equipment and manpower to the spill
scene. Arco Marine has estimated that it takes from
16-44 hours from the time of spill occurrence to the time
of equipment deployment at the scene. (28)
The amount of oil that Gulf skimmers can be expected
to recover in six days of operation, given the
assumptions concerning level of effectiveness, boom
limitations, and daily hours of operation, is:
250 bbl./hr./skimmer x 9 skimmers = 2,250 bbl./hr.
2,250 bbl./hr. x 12 hr./day x 6 days = 162,000 bbl.
= 23,142 tons.
If only skimmers are used in cleanup in the Gulf, CLEAN
will be assigned a value of 23,142 tons.
If instead of optimistic assumptions the less
favorable assumptions for Gulf cleanup are used (i.e.,
3,000 feet of boom required per skimmer), CLEAN for
skimmers in the Gulf would be:
250 bbl./hr./skimmer x 6 skimmers = 1,500 bbl./hr.
1,500 bbl./hr. x 12 hr./day x 6 days = 108,100 bbl. =
= 15,444 tons.
Whether one considers the present Gulf cleanup
capability adequate depends upon how a company views
future possible spills in light of the historical Gulf
spill occurrences. The Arco Marine study discussed above
elected to use a spill volume of 3% of gross deadweight
294
tonnage in its definition of "large but not unexpected
spill size", for the purpose of sizing and selecting oil
spill countermeasures. (29^) This volume is clearly far
below either "catastrophic" or "significant" spill events
defined in Chapter IX. For example, a vessel of 40,000
DWT which spills 66% of its cargo produces a spill of
26,666 tons, which represents the very upper limit of the
optimistic Gulf cleanup capability assumptions. Use of a
3% of deadweight tonnage estimate would cause the company
to plan for spills of only 1,200 tons. In contrast, many
companies operating in the Gulf face "significant" spills
of 40,000-70,000 tons, and face potential "catastrophic"
spills of +70,000 tons. See Chapter IX, and Table 22, at
page 245.
Gulf cleanup capability can be expected to deal with
substantial parts of spills that have occurred in the
Gulf to date. See Table 20, at page 241, and Appendix K,
for the range of spill occurrences by volume. The
significant spill range in the Gulf during 1976-1980
ranged from 3.4 tons to above 34,014 tons.
However, if the Gulf spill experience is examined
further, it can be seen that during 1976-1980 there were
3 spills in excess of 34,014 tons and one spill at the
21,000+ level. Therefore, even without the Gulf having
experienced a "catastrophic" spill event on the order of
Amoco Cadiz (a V(l) volume spill), there have been 4
spills in the "significant" range which either exceeded
or were just at the maximum Gulf cleanup capability.
Dispersants
Dispersants will be briefly discussed from the
perspective of adequacy of supply. In the Gulf there are
28,660 gallons of dispersant available. At an
application rate of 1 part dispersant to 20 parts oil,
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approximately 13,647 tons (573,200 gallons) of oil can be
dispersed. Reviewing the Gulf spill experience from
1976-1980, there were 6 tanker spills which exceeded this
level.
The limitation on the use of dispersants is
regulatory. Dispersant use for a spill on the scale of a
"significant" spill in Gulf waters has not to date been
approved by the Environmental Protection Agency, nor is
such approval forseeable in the near future. (30)
Dispersants, therefore, cannot at the present time be
viewed as a viable cleanup resource in the Gulf for a
large spill, and will therefore not be included in CLEAN.
Costs of Cleanup - Current Capability
The Gulf capability determined above allows nine
skimmers to operate. The representative skimmer used in
estimating costs is the High Volume Open Sea Skimmer
("HOSS"), a type of skimmer owned by Clean Gulf. The
HOSS is an integrated system containing boom, skimmer and
barge. The additional equipment required for operation
are 3 tugs/skimmer unit for positioning the skimmer unit
and for dragging the boom.
The personnel required to operate the HOSS system
include 14 persons (8 workmen, 6 operators) for launching
and retrieving activities; 9 persons (5 workmen, 4
operators) for cleanup operations; 1 forman; 1 mechanic;
and 1 electrician. (3_1) The operating costs for nine
skimmers of HOSS size (representing the maximum cleanup
capability at present in the Gulf) set forth in Table 32,
at page 296.
The approximate cleanup cost is represented in the
Chapter II methodology by variable F(k). For 9 skimmers
in operation for the periods estimated, this cost is
averaged between the low and high estimates at $730,000.
296
TABLE 3 2
ESTIMATED COSTS OF CLEANUP OPERATIONS IN GULF OF MEXICO,
ASSUMING 9 SKIMMERS OPERATIONAL
Item Number Total Number $ Rate per Total Costs
Needed Per Needed for 6 Days
Skimmer 9 Skimmers
Workmen(*) 5-8 45-72 $ 1,600 $ 72,000-$151,000
Operators(*) 4-6 36-54 $ 1,900 $ 68,000-$103,000
Foremen(*) 1 9 $ 2,200 $ 20,000
Sr. Mechanics(*} 1 9 $ 2,400 $ 22,000
Sr. Electricians(*) 1 9 $ 2,400 $ 22,000
Tugboats(**) 3 27 $12,000 $324,000
HOSS Skimmers(**) 1 9 $16,200 $146,000
Total Costs: $674,000-788,000
(*)Note: Workmen = $18/hr. straight time; $28/hr. overtime;
Operators =* $23/hr. straight time ; $32/hr. overtime;
Foremen = $25/hr. straight time; $37/hr. overtime;
Mechanic = $28/hr. straight time 7 $40/hr. overtime;
Electrician = $28/hr. straight time; $40/hr. overtime;
Time adjusted from 1979 figures to end of 1982 at 41% overall inflation rate.
(**)Note: Tugs - Estimate from Industry of $2,000/day/tug;
HOSS - Clean Gulf Associates - adjust from 1978 price to
1982 level at 49% inflation rate.
Sources:
Jon Byroade, Ann Twedell, Peter LeBuff, U.S. Environmental Protection
Aqencv/ Handbook for Oil Spill Protection Cleanup Priorities (Cincinnati:
EPA, 198rn
Clean Gulf Associates.
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This cost will permit offshore removal of an estimated
CLEAN = 23,142 tons of oil.
Because the maximum offshore cleanup capability
cannot remove more than 23,142 tons of oil in the
available time frame, a spill in excess of 23,142 tons
can be expected to generate onshore cleanup costs. (32)
In Equation 3 from Chapter II (see page 39) the
variable D(i) damage costs includes the cost of onshore
cleanup, variable ONSHORE(i). These costs are included
in the variable for damages because the level of onshore
cleanup is dependent upon how much oil actually reaches
shore (i.e.- is not removed at sea, evaporated or
dispersed). The cost of onshore cleanup varies greatly,
being estimated by one company to cost between $5,000 -
$21,000 per ton. (3_3) Hypothesizing a "significant"
spill of 30,000 tons, 6,858 tons of oil would remain for
onshore cleanup. These cleanup costs could range from
$34,290,000 (using the low $5,000/ton estimate) up to
$144,018,000 (using the higher $21,000/ton estimate).
Onshore cleanup will be discussed at greater length
in Chapter XI. It is clear from even the above example,
however, that offshore cleanup costs per ton are far
below onshore cleanup costs, offshore cleanup costs
averaging $32/ton ($733,000 cost divided by a 23,142 ton
cleanup capability). Further, oil cleaned up promptly
offshore is not likely to produce damage claims from
third parties for injuries to tourism, fishery resources,
and property damage.
Reducing Exposure Costs by Increasing
Cleanup Capability (CLEAN)
Because the cost exposure from onshore cleanup
operations is clearly very high, increasing offshore
cleanup capability is one alternative available to reduce
the cleanup cost of a spill event. Additional skimmers
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already exist in the Gulf, limited in use primarily by
the absence of sufficient boom. The acquisition of more
boom would therefore allow these skimmers to become
operational without the necessity of a company also
having to purchase new skimmer systems. Each additional
skimmer brought on line would provide an improved cleanup
capability of 2,571 tons (250 bbl./hr./skimmer x 12
hours/day x 6 days).
The cost of acquiring boom for each skimmer would
be: 2,000 ft. boom x cost/linear ft. Offshore boom
costs are approximately $130-$150/linear foot. (34)
Using the lower $130/ft., boom would cost
$260,000/skimmer. When purchased through cooperative
arrangements where costs are spread over 40 members or
more the costs to an individual company would be
significantly reduced (if divided equally among 40
members, an individual company cost could be as low as
$6,500) .
For each additional skimmer system brought on line,
the operating costs during cleanup F(k) would be
$81,000/skimmer. See Table 32, at page 296. If a spill
is of a volume where 2,571 or more tons will still remain
after 23,142 tons is cleaned up with presently existing
Gulf capabilities, the addition of additional skimmer
systems could result in an onshore cleanup savings of
$12,855,000 - $53,991,000 for each skimmer added.
Reducing Exposure Costs by Increasing
Effectiveness (EFF) of Cleanup Operations
The effectiveness of a cleanup operation is greatly
affected by a company's awareness before a spill event of
possible weaknesses and inefficiencies in its cleanup
program. A review by a company of the adequacy of its
operational and managerial cleanup plans in a pre-spill
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environment can often highlight these problems and permit
adjustments to be made.
Factors Contributing to Inefficiencies in Cleanup
Operations; There are a number of human interaction
problems associated with oil spill cleanup. These stem
from the spill event bringing together individuals
representing various institutions who are strangers to
one another; to bringing on-scene individuals without
experience in cleanup activities; to performance
inefficiencies due to lack of equipment and resources.
On-scene spill cleanup disputes among response team
members, the response team and the company, or between
government agencies and a company, can seriously disrupt
the decisionmaking process and also interrupt effective
cleanup operations. These disputes frequently concern
such issues as who is in charge, determination of when
cleanup has been completed, and decisions concerning the
method of cleanup to be employed. "Effective
decisionmaking is the key to managing a successful spill
response effort" (35) , and situations which impair
effective decisionmaking are likely to reduce the
efficiency and overall effectiveness of the cleanup
effort.
The real effect of conflict from the perspective of
the company, whether the company remains in charge of the
cleanup effort or whether the OSC intervenes, is higher
costs associated with cleanup and with damages. Most
companies involved in a spill cleanup have indicated that
inter-group conflict has not been an unusual situation.
(36)
Conflict also leads to underutilization of available
resources, through non-action or misguided action by
groups left without direction or guidance. Lack of
direction or proper monitoring can inadvertantly increase
damage from a spill through delay, improper cleanup
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techniques, or improper equipment use. These damages
have tended to affect the environment, private property,
living resources, and equipment. Well established chains
of command and proper supervision are needed,
particularly for those who are not cleanup professionals
such as construction workers or public employees used for
beach and marsh cleanup, or volunteers working with
wildlife rehabilitation. (37)
Organization and planning have generally been
identified as the weakest link in the company cleanup
effort. Cleanup techniques and tools are more advanced
than the management of spills. This difference in
development is due in part to the differing nature of
engineering and management. Technical advances can be
accomplished outside of the spill setting by the
assignment of qualified mechanical engineers or chemical
engineers to develop cleanup techniques or tools.
Managerial success, on the other hand, depends upon
the people who happen to become involved in cleanup and
the success of the group interactions which take place.
Low frequencies of spills, combined with short memories
and new managerial players, compound this problem. A
further complication is that many managerial decisions
made during a particular spill cannot be generalized as
an overall management strategy, because many decisions
are site and spill specific. These strategies may also
not be fully reflective of "optimal" management
decisionmaking because of constraints during the spill,
such as a time factor or limited resources.
The immediate need for tools and equipment dictated
that many engineers became involved in cleanup problems.
This led to an emphasis on the technology/operations side
rather than the managerial/organization side of the
cleanup process. (3_8) While managerial skills can be
developed, the technical experts are not necessarily
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oriented toward acquiring and maintaining such skills.
Therefore increased emphasis on manager training is
needed.
Companies have also found that lack of training for
cleanup personnel has been a serious handicap at many
spill sites, resulting in wasted manpower and inefficient
cleanup activities. (3J9) Both the upper/middle
management levels responsible for supervising the plan,
and also the operational, cleanup task oriented level,
have suffered from lack of training.
Company Efforts to Identify Potential
Inefficiencies: Many of the weaknesses in training and
preparation discussed above can be identified by
companies prior to the occurrence of a spill through the
mechanism of testing plans, simulation of spills in a
workshop environment or development of an "artificial
disaster" scenario.
To address the problem of inadequacies in management
training for spill cleanup control, Esso Resources
Canada, Ltd., has devised a computer simulation for
training company on-scene commanders to "make rapid
decisions on the proper allocation of manpower and
resources to optimize the spill cleanup and minimize
environmental damage." (4_0) The simulation consists of a
48 hour scenario that can be completed in four hours of
real time. Decisionmaking is measured both by the time
delay before a decision is made and also by the outcome
of the decision. Evaluation of the training scenario is
based on "percentage of oil recovered, percentage of
shoreline oiled and cost of cleanup". (4_1) Many other
groups are also specifically addressing managerial
skills. In the Gulf, the Texas A&M Oil Spill Control
Course (Galveston, Tx.) and the National Spill Control
School (Corpus Christi, Tx.) have workshop courses for
spill response which focus on supervisory and managerial
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problems of spills as well as "hands-on" training.
Another approach used by companies to evaluate
response capabilities is a "surprise test" of the spill
response system in the form of a simulated disaster
scenario. Sun Oil has conducted two such tests, in 1979
and 1981. Problems that became apparent during the Sun
tests were:
- Confusion over alerting messages and confusion upon
arrival on site;
- Inadequacies in planning for transportation to the
spill site;
- Leadership roles en route and on-scene needed to be
clearly defined;
- Lack of a home office coordinator and staff;
- Inadequate on-scene communication equipment;
- Need for security identification for on-scene
personnel;
- Need for early availability of spill documentation
equipment (including spill overflight); and
- Pre-spill core crew medical screening (for serious
medical problems which preclude a high stress
situations) (42)
All of these problems can cause delays and increased
costs in cleanup operations.
Costs of Identifying Inefficiencies: The costs of
computer simulations, surprise tests and training courses
represent Y investments to achieve some enhancement in
cleanup efficiency (enhanced EFF) and ultimately reduced
NET EXP.
Training courses at spill control schools average
between $500-600 per person for a one week course. See
Appendix M. The cost to a company is both the cost of
the course plus the employee's salary during the training
period. For an employee in the $52,000 annual salary
range, this cost would be $600 + $1,000 (one week's
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salary) = $1,600.
A surprise test includes the actual test period (ex:
1 day) , the cost of pre-test planning, and the cost of
post-test evaluation. Surprise test costs vary with the
degree of elaborateness attempted in the test. One set
of assumptions produces an estimate of between
$60,000-100,000. See Appendix R.
The cost of developing a computer simulation depends
on the degree of complexity of the simulation, making an
estimate of costs difficult. If company can draw upon
its own in-house resources for development of such a
simulation, the cost of preparation can be better
controlled and reduced. A very rough estimate based on
programmer coding and testing costs is in the
$60,000-100,000 range. Another factor affecting this
cost is the extent to which a company has already
developed computer programs, such as spill modeling
programs, which could be incorporated into a cleanup
simulation scenario.
The level of increased effectiveness (EFF) achieved
from these measures has not at this time been measured in
any useable form. Industry spokesmen, however, all feel
that some increased effectiveness in cleanup operations
is achieved by taking such identification and training
measures. (43)
Conclusion
In this Chapter the various levels of capability in
the Gulf, represented by "CLEAN", the costs of cleanup
operations "F(k)H, and alternatives available to a
company to improve its cleanup capacity and cleanup
effectiveness ("EFF"), have been presented. These
elements will be reviewed in Chapter XII as part of
operationalizing the Chapter II methodology.
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NOTES
1. Clean Water Act, 91 Stat. 1566-1611, Sec. 311.
2. See discussion of Federal and State liability laws
in Chapters V, VI, VIII.
3. See discussion of Federal and State liability laws
in Chapters V, VI, VIII.
4. Interviews with company representatives and API.
5. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan, Federal Register 40(28) (February 10,
1975) : 6282-6302, Sec. 1510. Hereafter referred to as
"National Contingency Plan".
6. Clean Water Act, Sec. 311, and National
Contingency Plan, Sec. 1510. Government involvement at
the federal level is mandated through legislation such as
the Clean Water Act, the Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act, and the Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Management Act.
The focus of the regulations is to plan an integrated
system for "efficient, coordinated, and effective action
to minimize damage from oil and hazardous substance
discharges, including containment, dispersal and removal
of oil and hazardous substances."
7. In the case of spills occurring in the coastal
areas of the U.S., thus encompassing most Gulf spills,
the OSC is a U.S.Coast Guard officer.
8. Assistance is also available through state and
local governments, universities, and special agency
groups such as NOAA's Scientific Support Coordinators.
These groups can provide additional equipment, personnel
and scientific exepertise.
9. National Contingency Plan, Sec. 1510.5(r) (l)-(3) .
10. Ibid.
11. Leon Kazmierczak, "Major Spill Response Planning
for Tanker Operations", Proceedings, American Petroleum
Institute Oil Spill Conference, 1979 (Washington, D.C.:
API, 1979), 125. A response plan should include the
following elements:
- An activating or alerting mechanism to notify the
company response team and the U.S. Coast Guard;
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- Organization of the chain of command;
- Task identification including: supervision,
biological, chemical and physical analysis, and
personnel and resource needs, legal/cost
documentation and public relations;
- Task assignment, usually on an "on call" basis;
- Advisory and equipment resource identification;
- Detailed instruction to all personnel on what the
plan is, how it works, what responsibilities apply to
each individual, and how equipment is used; and
- Personnel training and plan updating.
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CHAPTER XI
DAMAGE COSTS
Introduction
Potential damage costs related to oil spills
occurring near coastlines are directly related to the
effectiveness of offshore cleanup efforts. Any oil not
recovered offshore, or that is not evaporated, dispersed
or carried out to sea by winds and currents, has the
potential of causing damage onshore or to the near-shore
environment. This Chapter examines the costs asociated
with the oil that remains after an offshore cleanup is
terminated.
A methodology is suggested for estimating the value
of coastal resources for the Gulf of Mexico region,
focusing on those resources that have traditionally been
awarded compensation for damages incurred. While this
approach is applied to the Gulf in this Chapter, the same
approach can be used to evaluate other regions of
interest to a company. The main purpose of a damage
calculation is to give a company operating in the region
an estimate of the scale of possible damages that might
be incurred should a large spill with major coastal
contamination take place.
The potential costs associated with oil not cleaned
up offshore or dispersed are represented in equation 4 in
Chapter II, at page 40:
D (i) = ONSHORE(i) + DAMAGES(i) + LIT(i) + CONTRACTS(i)
ONSHORE(i) represents the costs per ton of cleaning
up the oil that has reached shore. These costs are
likely to be substantially higher than offshore cleanup
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costs per ton, due to the highly labor intensive nature
of onshore cleanup. The variable DAMAGES(i) is the
estimate of the cost per ton of potential third party
damages for economic injury, loss of income, damage to
physical property and damage to natural resources. While
it is difficult to measure the actual tonnage causing
third party damages, these damage costs generally far
exceed total cleanup costs because of the inclusion in
DAMAGES (i) of factors for economic injury and loss of
income.
LIT(i) and CONTRACTS(i) represent the legal expenses
associated with spill damage suits and losses due to
breach of contracts associated with nondelivery of oil.
These variables are difficult to estimate in general
terms, because each individual company has its own
individualized range of alternatives for dealing with
such costs (in-house counsel versus independent outside
counsel? mitigation of damages clauses in delivery
contracts, and other ways to control these costs). The
costs associated with LIT(i) and CONTRACTS(i) are
generally not as substantial as the costs for ONSHORE(i)
or DAMAGES ( i) .
Finally, this Chapter frequently refers to the 1978
Amoco Cadiz tanker spill off the coast of France as a
historical spill reference point when discussing
damages. The Amoco Cadiz is the best documented
catastrophic spill to date, and also represents a spill
that generated a significant amount of onshore cleanup
costs and high damage claims. Therefore, comparisons
between estimates generated for D(i) variables for the
Gulf of Mexico and costs associated with Amoco Cadiz will
often be used as a validation tool.
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Estimating ONSHORE(i)
Estimates of the cost of onshore cleanup vary
widely. Historically, costs have ranged from $5,000 -
$30,000 per ton. (3.) This cost variation is due to both
the amount of oil impacting a cost and also to the
sensitivity of the area to oil. Usually the highest
onshore cleanup costs are the result of a relatively
small spill of heavy oil impacting a highly sensitive
area. The costs of the careful, labor intensive methods
used to clean a sensitive area, when spread over the
relatively small amount of oil spilled, can generate a
high cleanup cost/tonnage spilled ratio. Since the
spills to be examined in this discussion are relatively
large, the onshore cleanup variable ONSHORE(i) will be
chosen from the lower end of the scale at $5,000 per ton.
By way of comparison, after the 1978 Amoco Cadiz
spill 25,000 tons were cleaned onshore at a cost of $100
million, or $4,000 per ton. (2) When this figure is
adjusted to 1983 dollars the cost would be $5,652 per
ton. (3_) Therefore, use of $5,000 per ton to estimate
onshore cleanup costs is well within the range of
historical spill cleanup costs.
Estimating DAMAGES(i): Methodology
Geographic Divisions: For the purpose of estimating
DAMAGES (i) , the Gulf has been divided into sub-areas.
Because it is unlikely that any spill could damage the
entire Gulf coast, divisions based on some reasonable
parameters are needed to permit a reasonable assessment
of damage exposure.
The divisions chosen for the Gulf are Summary
Synoptic Meteorological Observation (SSMO) areas, as
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delineated by the U.S. Naval Weather Service Command.
(4^) These areas divide the Gulf coastline into seven
areas, each approximately three degrees in width. See
Figure 6, at page 313.
The primary reason for selecting SSMO divisions is
that data exist on an area by area basis of weather
conditions and ocean currents, which are factors that
greatly affect spill movement of oil toward or away from
shore. Spill trajectory models are used for predicting
spill movement, and make use of weather and current data
to predict time and location of landfall. (_5) Selection
of the SSMO divisions permits trajectory and other models
to make use of existing additional information at a
lesser cost for data collection. Having area divisions
with existing necessary data also allows a company
evaluation process to be more quickly brought to the
implementation stage.
The Gulf area could, of course, be divided into
smaller arbitrary units such as counties, known economic
areas or port areas. There are, however, problems with
using these types of divisions. For example, much of the
cost data is not available on a county by county basis,
and what data are available are not collected within
every Gulf state. (6_) This makes accurate comparisons of
area by area data difficult at that level. The same
difficulty holds true for known economic areas; the data
needed for comparison are either not collected or are not
in a form that permits data comparisons. {!_) Use of port
area divisions tends to discount all other areas. This
approach also fails to account for spill effects that can
extend beyond port areas or to account for those spills
that do in fact occur outside of a port area designation.
As individual companies define particular areas of
interest beased on their own exposure, these larger areas
can be divided and more precise data can be collected.
SUMMARYSYNOPTICMETEOROLOGI AL OBSERVATIONDIVISIONSFORTHE GULFOFMEXICO
SOURCE:.NAVALWEATHERSERVICECOMMAND.SU RYFYNOPTICMETEO OLOGICALOBS RVATIONS(S’S'M'O'I,NORTHAMERICANCOAST LRINEA E SV.ATLA TICNDGU FCO STS:VOL.4(ASH VILLE,:NATIONALCLIMATICCE ER,1975).
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Until specific interests can be defined, it is not cost
effective for individual companies to undertake such a
specific evaluation for the entire Gulf.
Affected Resources: The cost consequences to a
company whose vessel or cargo is involved in a spill will
relate directly to which factors may be claimed in
lawsuits as appropriate sources of reimbursement. Thus,
particular attention was paid to those factors
specifically included in spill liability legislation. (j8)
Factors were also chosen to be as inclusive as possible
within the current data limitations, of which the primary
limitation is an inability to quantify damages for many
resources. Given these limitations, the choice was made
to determine the dominant factors that generate the
greatest vulnerability in terms of costs to the spiller
company, and to use only these factors for the area
comparisons. This allows a more pragmatic assessment to
be made of the potential damages to third parties that
could occur in each area.
In taking the above approach, it should be
remembered that an inability to quantify damages does not
mean that damages cannot occur to a resource.
Additionally, it is possible that damage to a presently
unquantifiable resource may also have an indirect effect
on quantifiable resources. One example is damage to
seagrasses and marine productivity areas, which in turn
may impact fisheries and other commercially harvested
resources. (9^)
For each SSMO area concentrations of the following
six factors were estimated:
- Acreage of high marine productivity?
- Acreage of high density shellfish?
- Acreage of high finfish abundance?
- Miles of major shorefront recreational beaches?
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- Acreage of coastal wetlands; and
- Number of charterboats and headboats. (10)
Of these factors, two have no current dollar values
attached: coastal wetlands and high marine
productivity. These factors are included because they
are important nursery areaa for most fisheries, and if
either of these two factors are damaged it is possible
for damage to result to fisheries at a later stage.
A review of claims for damages from spills reveals
that the traditional recovery awards have been granted
for damages to fishermen, the tourist industry and the
recreation industry based upon these groups' use of
coastal and nearshore marine resources. (11.) These
recoveries usually so dominate damage compensation that
they all but eclipse the other factors.
Four factors are used as proxies to estimate the
importance of commercial fishing for shellfish and
finfish (high density shellfish and high finfish
abundance), recreational fishing (charterboat/headboat
fleets) and coastal tourism (major shorefront
recreational beaches) for each area.
Estimating Resource Values in SSMO Areas: Because
the dollar values of commercial fishing, recreational
fishing and coastal tourism are only available on a
statewide basis, it is necessary to determine each SSMO's
percentage share of statewide values for these
resources. The location of these factors in the Gulf
were further defined from existing data on economic and
ecological factors collected by the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, NOAA, and the Minerals Management
Bureau. (12)
The concentrations for the factors by SSMO area were
obtained from county data and from Outer Continental
Shelf leasing areas contained within each area. (13) See
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Appendix S for data elements, and Appendix T for leasing
area divisions. By comparing counties in each state and
SSMO areas, it was possible to determine the percentage
of each state's factors that were contained in each SSMO
area. These percentages were determined for each factor
in every SSMO area. See Table 33, at page 317.
Where data unavailability prevented a more refined
breakdown of data, several assumptions were made about
the relationship between the dollar value of the
resources and the level of the resource in a given area:
In the case of recreational fishing as compared to
other tourism expenditures only Texas made a dollar
estimate separating these two elements. For Texas, 19%
of tourism dollars were attributable to recreational
fishing. (14) Lacking other evidence, the assumption was
made that for the other Gulf states a similar
relationship exists between recreational fishing and
other tourism expenditures. Therefore, 19% of tourism
dollars were attributed to recreational fishing (using
charterboat/headboat fleet as a proxy for the level of
recreational fishing) and 81% were attributed to coastal
tourism (using miles of major shorefront recreational
beaches as a proxy for the level of coastal tourism).
Commercial fisheries values are reported in terms of
total catch value. To separate shellfish from finfish it
was assumed that past figures on apportionment of catch
were equivalent to current apportionment of catch. For
Texas in 1978, 98% of the catch value was reported as
shellfish, with finfish then representing 2% of the
catch. (1_5) Louisiana and Mississippi in 1976 reported
shellfish catch equivalent to 92% and 63% respectively.
(16) Alabama and Florida in 1977 reported shellfish
catch at 91% and 75% respectively. (17) Since no later
estimates are available, catch was divided proportionally
between shellfish and finfish for each state based on the
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TABLE 33
CONCENTRATIONS FOR SELECTED COASTAL RESOURCES
IN THE GULF OF MEXICO
(SSMO Areas as a Percentage of State Concentrations)
S tate./
SSMO
Area
High
Marine
Productiv-
itv(Acres)
High
Density
Offshore
Shellfish
(Acres)
Finfish
High
Abundance
(Acres)
Major
Shorefront
Recreation
Beaches
(miles)
Coastal
Wetlands,
forested/
unforested
(Acres)
Charterboat/
Headboat
F leer
(No. boats)
TEXAS 1,628,711 9,927,577 14,820,069 140.2 948,663 13 0
Area
Area
29
28
79%
21%
71%
29%
64%
36%
62%
38%
55%
45%
79%
21%
LOUISIANA 10,740,332 9,675,425 16,656,554 22.9 3,687,395 46
Area
Area
28
27
35%
65%
57%
43%
52%
48%
15%
85%
31%
69%
22%
78%
MISSISSIPPI 2,071,807 305,461 2,679,745 83 132,543 37
Area
Area
27
26
64%
36%
33%
67%
52%
48%
51%
49%
29%
71%
16%
34%
ALABAMA 516,032 -- 872,224 19.2 194,630 37
Area 26 100% — 100% 100% 100% 100%
FLORIDA 9,779,507 14,191,247 33,967m211 591.1 3,513,989 415
Area
Area
Area
Area
26
25
24
23
12%
43%
43%
2%
6%
32%
62%
9%
45%
45%
1%
11%
22%
59%
8%
6%
41%
32%
22%
15%
20%
30%
35%
Sources:
u.s. DePcirtment of Interior, Minerals Management Service, Draft Regional
Environmental Impact statement,
W • iService, 1982)"Measurement Tables of Environmental Resources , Visual No.
14;and "Fisheries Resources and Recreation", Visual No. 4 (chart on back o
Vi3E?1B: Liebow, K. S. Butler, and T. a. Plaut, «t. al.» Te3cf»Region Ecological Characterization: A Socioeconomic Study, Vol. Ij Synthesi
Papers, uisY Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of Biological Studies,
FWS/OBS-80/19 (1980).
. _ . . -
D. K. Larson, et. al. , Mississippi Deltaic Plain Region Ecological
.
Characterization: A Socioeconomic study, Vol/l: /ffifljOP? *and WiTcIlife"Service, Office of Biological Studies, fwb/OBS-79/05 (1980).
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above percentages. See Table 34, at page 319.
The percentages in each SSMO area for each factor
were then used in combination with state dollar values
for the factors to arrive at dollar estimate for each
factor in each SSMO area. See Table 35, at page 320, for
the dollar value for each factor by SSMO area.
Finally, because the dollar values for the affected
resources were based on 1979 and 1980 dollar values, it
was necessary to adjust these values to present 1983
dollar levels. See Table 36, at page 321, adjusting
Table 35 values to present dollars.
Validation of Potential Damage Levels in SSMO
Areas: The total potential damage costs for each SSMO
area range from almost $6 billion (Area 24) to $1.5
billion (Area 23). The average potential damages for the
SSMO Areas is $2.5-3 billion.
The scale of potential damages estimated is not
excessive when compared to other historical spills. The
Amoco Cadiz litigation has pending lawsuits totalling $2
billion for damages caused in 1978. (1^) If adjusted to
present dollars the damages claimed would be valued at
$2.8 billion, which is within the range of the average
potential damages for Gulf SSMO areas.
DAMAGES(i): Estimating
Potential Resource Damage
Estimating Oil Movement: During the Amoco Cadiz
spill, of the 230,000 tons spilled, 70,000-80,000 tons
impacted 250 miles of beach, (lj)) Oil from the Torrey
Canyon spill travelled over 225 miles impacting 242 miles
of shoreline in France and Britain. (2_0) In the Gulf of
Mexico oil from the IXTOC I spill in the Bay of Campeche
travelled over 600 miles northward to impact beaches in
Texas. It is estimated that 4,000-11,000 tons either
impacted beaches or were offshore in the form of tar
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TABLE 34
DOLLAR VALUE OF SELECTED COASTAL RESOURCES IN
THE GULF OF MEXICO, BY STATE
State/SSMO Area Catch Value Catch Value Tourism Recreational
Shellfish Finfish (Coastal)
(1979) (1979) (I960)
Fishing
TTMT
($ million) ($ million) (Smillion) ($ million)
TEXAS 156.8 3.2 2,991.0 709.0
Area 29 111.3 2.0 1,854.4 560.1
Area 28 45.5 1.2 1,136.6 148.9
LOUISIANA 183.7 116.0 1,701.0 399.0
Area 28 104.7 8.2 25 5.2 87.8
Area 27 78.0 7.7 1,445.9 311.2
MISSISSIPPI 20.2 11.8 648.0 152.0
Area 27 6.7 6.2 330.5 24.3
Area 26 13.5 5.7 317.5 127.7
ALABAMA 44.6 4.4 178.2 41.8
Area 26 44.6 4.4 17 8.2 41.8
FLORIDA 68.3 22.3 6,885.0 1,615.0
Area 26 4.1 2.0 757.4 242.3
Area 25 21.0 10.3 1,514.7 323.0
Area 24 42.3 10.3 4,062.2 484.5
Area 23 — 0.2 550.8 565.3
Sources:
Table 33, at page 317.
U.S. Department of Interior, Minerals Management Service, Draft Regional
Environmental Impact Statement, 1982 (Washington: Minerals Management
Service, 1982) , "Measurement Tables of Environmental Resources”, Visual No.
14jand "Fisheries Resources and Recreation", Visual No. 4 (chart on back of
visual).
E. B. Liebow, K. S. Butler, and T. R. Plaut, et. al., Texas Barrier Islands
Region Ecological Characterization: A Socioeconomic Study, Vol. is Synthesis
Papers, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of Biological Studies,
FWS/OBS-80/19 (1980).
D. K. Larson, et. al. , Mississippi Deltaic Plain Region Ecological
Characterization: A Socioeconomic Study, Vol. I: Synthesis Papers, U.S. Fish
ana wildlife Service, Office of Biological Studies, FWS/OBS-79/05 Tl980) .
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TABLE 35
VALUES FOR SELECTED COASTAL RESOURCES IN
THE GULF OF MEXICO, BY SSMO AREA
SSMO Area Catch Value Catch Value Tourism Recreational
Shellfish
(1979)
($ million)
Finfish (Coastal)
(1979) (1980)
($ million) (Smillion)
Fishinq
'(TSffOT^
($ million)
Area 29 111.3 2.0 1,854.4 560.1
Area 28 150.2 9.5 1,391.7 236.7
Area 27 85.6 13.3 1,776.3 355.5
Area 26 58.1 10.0 1,253.1 411.7
Area 25 21.9 10.3 1,514.7 323.0
Area 24 42.3 10.3 4,062.2 484.5
Area 23 0.2 550.8- 565.3
Sources s
Tables 33 and 34, at pages 317 and 319.
U.S. Department of Interior, Minerals Management Service, Draft Regional
Environmental Impact Statement, 1982 (Washington: Minerals Management
Service, 1982), "Measurement Tables of Environmental Resources", Visual No.
14;and "Fisheries Resources and Recreation", Visual No. 4 (chart on-back of
visual).
E. B. Liebow, K. S. Butler, and T. R. Plaut, et. al., Texas Barrier Islands
Region Ecological Characterization: A Socioeconomic Study, Vol. I: Synthesis
Papers~T U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of Biological Studies,
EWS/OBS-80/19 (1980).
D. K. Larson, et. al., Mississippi Deltaic Plain Region Ecological
Characterization: A Socioeconomic Study, Vol. I: Synthesis Papers, U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, Office of Biological Studies, FWS/OBS-79/05 (1980).
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TABLE 36
TIME ADJUSTED (TO 1983) VALUES FOR SELECTED COASTAL RESOURCES IN
THE GULF OF MEXICO, BY SSMO AREA
SSMO Area Catch Value Catch Value Tour ism Recreational Total Value,
Shellfish Finfish
(1983*) (1983*)
($ million) ($ million)
(Coastal)
(IWFT—
(Smillion)
Fishing
($ million)
All Resources
7TF3T*1
($ million)
Area 29 157.3 2.8 2,410.7 728.1 3,298.9
Area 28 212.2 13.4 1,809.2 307.7 2,342.5
Area 27 121.0 19.5 2,309.2 462.2 2,911.9
Area 26 82.1 14.1 1,629.0 535.2 2,260.4
Area 25 30.9 14.6 1,969.1 419.9 2,434.5
Area 24 59.8 14.6 5,280.9 629.9 5,982.2
Area 23 — 0.3 716.0 734.9 1,451.2
(*) 1979 values for shellfish and finfish adjusted by factor of 41.3% CPI;
1980 values for tourism and recreational fishing adjusted by factor
of 30% CPI.
Sources:
Tables 33, 34 and 35, at pages 317, 319 and 320.
U.S. Department of Interior, Minerals Management Service, Draft Regional
Environmental Impact Statement, 1982 (Washington: Minerals Management
Service, 1982), "Measurement Tables of Environmental Resources", Visual No.
14;and "Fisheries Resources and Recreation”, Visual No. 4 (chart on back of
visual).
E. B. Liebow, K. S. Butler, and T. R. Plaut, et. al., Texas Barrier Islands
Region Ecological Characterization: A Socioeconomic Study, Vol. I: Synthesis
Papers" U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of Biological Studies,
FWS/OBS—80/19 (1980).
D. K. Larson, et. al. , Mississippi Deltaic Plain Region Ecological
Characterization: A Socioeconomic Study, Vol. I: Synthesis Papers, U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, Office of Biological Studies, FWS/OBS-79/05 0-980) .
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mats. It was further estimated that 50,000-100,000 tons
passed offshore in the Texas OCS region in the form of
emulsified oil. (.21) An offshore current shift prevented
this oil from coming ashore.
In another Gulf incident, the Burmah Agate in 1979
collided with the freighter Mimosa five miles off
Galveston. The oil from the Burmah Agate travelled
approximately 170 miles from the spill site, to the south
Texas coast. Of the oil released 150-200 tons impacted
just south of Galveston, 70 tons at San Jose Island and 1
ton at the northern end of Brazos Island. (22)
For other historical spills and their level of
coastal impact, see Table 37, at page 323.
The distance that oil travels and the amount of
coastline impacted is largely a function of spill
location in relation to distance from shore, and the
ocean currents active at the time. Spill trajectory is
measured by vector analysis using water current speed,
3.5% of wind speed, and the coriolis deflection. (23)
From this it can be seen that currents play a larger role
than wind in determining oil movement direction. As can
be seen from current charts of the Gulf much of the year
the nearshore currents could cause the oil from a coastal
spill to impact large stretches of coast, particularly in
Texas. See Appendix H.
The approximate length of coastline in each SSMO
area is: Area 29 - 300 miles; Area 28 - 200 miles; Area
27 - 300 miles; Area 26 - 200 miles; Area 25 - 400 miles;
Area 24 - 180 miles; and Area 23 - 100 miles. (24) Since
historical worldwide and Gulf of Mexico major oil spills
have impacted on the order of 200+ miles of coastline and
have travelled hundreds of miles at sea (even after
offshore cleanup efforts)., it will be estimated that a
catastrophic Gulf spill will impact the coastline of one
entire SSMO area.
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TABLE 3 7
LENGTH OF COASTLINE IMPACTED BY SELECTED HISTORIC SPILLS
Date Soill Source Quantity
(ton s)
121,0003/18/67 Torrey Canyon
12/28/69 Santa Barbara 4,714
offshore platform
2/4/70 Steam Tanker 16,000
Ar row
4/15/74 Imperial Sarnia 500
12/18/74 Mizushima 38,500
Refinery
3/17/78 Amoco Cadiz 230,000
12/9/78 Peck Ship (barge) 1,57'
12/31/78 Andros Patricia 46,028
11/1/79 Burmah Agate/
Mimosa
2,857
Location
Scilly Islands,
English Channel
Santa Barbara
Channel , 5.5
miles from shore
Chedabucto Bay,
Nova Scotia
Whale Bank Shoal,
Canada, less than
1 mile from shore
Inland Sea, Japan
Portsall rocks of:
Coast of France,
less than 1 mile
from shore
Off Puerto Rico
near Cape San Juan,
P . R.
Cause
Ran
aground
Well
blowout
Struck
a rock
Grounded
Coastline
Contamination
242 miles
40 miles
190 miles
65 miles
Occurred 291 miles
on land,
emptied into
sea
Ran
ag round
Rupture
250 miles
(130 miles
on Brittany
coast)
16.2 miles
23.6 miles west of Hull
Cape Villano,
Spa i n
5 miles off
Galveston Bay
5,114 tons
fract., hit 62.1
explos- miles (24.9
ion, fire miles heavily
impacted Cape
Burlla to Foz)
TX
Tanker/
freighter
collision
(**)
(**) Oil from Burmah Agate travelled 170 miles down the Texas Coast impacting
the shoreline from south of Galveston to Brazos Island in south Texas.
Source: Exxon Corporation, Oil Spill Cleanup Manual, Vol. Ill: Reliance
on Chemical Dispersants for an Oil Spill Response (Exxon Corp., April, 1980),
p. A-4 to A-10.
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Estimating Damages and Onshore Cleanup: The length
of time for an onshore cleanup effort for a major spill
has varied considerably, depending upon the sensitivity
of the area impacted and the degree of cleanup desired.
Onshore cleanup time for some of the better documented
spills is shown below:
Spill Amount Peak Manpower Number of Months
Amoco Cadiz
(tons)
230,000
1,134Nepco 140
Santa Barbara 5,225
Mizushima 42,800
6,000
700
1,000
230,000(total)
7
3.5
4
6 (25)
Based on these and other large spills, onshore
cleanup for a catastrophic spill will be assumed to take
six months.
The other important duration question which must be
estimated is: what is the length of time that a
catastrophic spill can be expected to impact area
resources? A six month period will also be estimated for
this value, because in the case of certain affected
resources such as coastal tourism, the time that the
spill has not been substantially cleaned up onshore is a
good estimate of the length of time that a region will
experience a dropoff in tourism. This duration value is
in reality a highly volatile one: negative publicity can
cause a longer term impact even after cleanup is
performed; a highly sensitive area may be decimated for a
more prolonged period.
It is also important to note that if a spill occurs
during a critical season for resource use (for example,
the high tourist season, or the period of prime
harvesting of shellfish), the true impact on the region
may be for most of the year's expected revenues from such
resources. The use of a six month estimate should
therefore offset the potential overestimation of impacted
areas with the potential underestimation of damage
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duration.
In order to determine a value of damages per ton, it
is necessary to make an estimation of the amount of oil
that might go ashore during a catastrophic spill. For
this estimation, the Amoco Cadiz spill will again be used
as a proxy. During the Amoco Cadiz spill approximately
35% of the oil not cleaned up by offshore cleanup
operations went ashore and impacted the coast and
environment. (26) Assuming a 200,000 ton catastrophic
spill in the Gulf coastal area, approximately 23,150 tons
represents the maximum Gulf cleanup capability. See
Chapter X. Of the remaining 176,850 tons not cleaned up,
use of a 33-35% IMPACT value (see Equation 3, Chapter II,
at page 39) produces an expected volume of oil impacting
the area of between 58,360-61,898 tons. Taking the
midrange for these values produces 60,000 tons of oil
that are expected to impact the area from a 200,000 ton
spill. The damages per ton expected for each area using
this estimated level of oil is shown in Table 38, at page
326 .
Referring again to the Amoco Cadiz, the claimed
damages from the spill are approximately $2 billion. See
Appendix U. The claimed damages per ton for Amoco Cadiz
are therefore $28,600/ton in 1978 dollars. If these
damage claims are adjusted to 1982 dollars (based on the
CPI) , the claims would rise to $2.8 billion, or
$40,000/ton. Thus, the Gulf SSMO estimated damage
figures, ranging from $12,500/ton (Area 23) to
$50,000/ton (Area 24) fall within the range that includes
the Amoco Cadiz event.
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TABLE 38
GULF CATASTROPHIC SPILL ESTIMATED
POTENTIAL DAMAGES PER TON (*)
(by SSMO Area)
SSMO Total Value Value Dollars per Ton (*)
Area per Year 1/2 Year Assuming 1/2 Value
($) ($) Damage Level ($)
29 $3.30 bi11ion $1.65 bi11ion $27,500
28 $2.30 billion $1.15 billion $19,200
27 $2.90 billion $1.45 bi11ion $24,000
26 $2.30 billion $1.15 billion $19,200
25 $2.40 bi11ion $1.20 billion $20,000
24 $6.00 billion $3.00 billion $50,000
23 $1.50 billion $0.75 bi11ion $12,500
(*) Based on a 200,000 ton spill, with 60,000 tons of oil
reaching shore.
Source:
For total dollar values for each SSMO area, see
Tables 33, 34, 35 and 36, at pages 317, 319, 320 and 321,
and see also Appendix S.
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Estimating LIT(i) and CONTRACTS(i)
The cost to a company of entering litigation after a
large spill can be quite high due to the number of years
that court cases may slowly progress. It has been
estimated that the litigation costs after the Santa
Barbara spill were at least $5 million. (2_7) The costs
for the Amoco Cadiz litigation will be much higher
because after four years of litigation there has not yet
even been a decision as to which jurisdiction (the U.S.
or France) will hear the case. A trial is unlikely for
another three to five years.
Considering the magnitude of the data gathering,
fact analyzing, witness contacts, and pleadings in a case
the scope of Amoco Cadiz, it is not unreasonable to
anticipate litigation costs on the order of $10-15
million. These costs will vary based on the company's
degree of using outside counsel versus in-house
attorneys; the number of expert witnesses used; and
whether or not a settlement can be reached before trial.
The cost of broken contracts due to non-delivery of
cargo is likewise difficult to estimate. A company may
have insurance to cover non-delivery, contracts may
provide for exemptions in cases of force majeure
conditions (such as acts of God), or a specified
liquidated damage level may be provided in contracts to
limit maximum exposure. Additionally, it is possible
that at a particular time, other shipments of oil may be
substituted to meet refinery operation needs, eliminating
damage to the refinery. It is unlikely in any event that
the cost of broken contracts will exceed the cargo value
lost.
328
Refining the Valuation of Costs
As current studies of the economic and ecological
factors along the coast continue over time, valuation of
resources and quantification of damages will become more
feasible. Those factors that were previously
unquantifiable and therefore rarely subject to damage
compensation will assume larger and larger proportions in
damage recoveries. Company awareness of any trends that
could cause a status change in the valuation of factors
can be attained through continued observance and periodic
reassessment of affected resources in a region.
Particular areas that the company may choose to observe
for such trends are: current resource studies? damage
recovery awards? and legislative changes regarding damage
compensation, parties which may seek recovery, and
damages for which recovery may be sought. See Table 39,
at page 329, historical damage awards. Note, for
example, the award in the Zoe Colocotrania spill, in
which compensation was awarded for damage to mangroves,
one of the first decisions awarding compensation for
coastal wetlands damage.
While it is important for the industry to obtain the
most recent data available, the actual collection of
primary data may be costly to engage in and proprietary
in nature. For example, the federal or state governments
have multiple uses for data collected on economic or
ecologic factors within a region while for industry such
data would have only limited uses. Also, if data were
collected at a government level with special attention to
compatibility of form and reliability of data there would
be increased data coherence between regions and therefore
of more value for cross comparison of factor and areas.
Data collection for the company is a two edged sword: as
more is known greater accuracy can be achieved through
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TABLE 39
OIL SPILL DAMAGE AWARDS FOR RESOURCES
Place of Size of Loss
Date Ship Name Incident (Tons) Damages Paid
1962 Eagle Courrier Japan 400 Fishing Industry:
$500,000
(Claimed $1 million)
1969 Darhachi
Toyo Maru
Japan 500 Fishing Industry:
$160,000
(Claimed $800,000)
1971 Juliana Niigata (Japan) 7,000 (Proposed
Y 204 million to
fishery association
1 million to fish
dealers)
1973 Zoe Colocotrania Puerto Rico 5,500 $5.5 Million for
mollusks and
$0.6 million for
mangroves
1974 Universe Leader Bantry Bay
(Ireland)
2,000 Fishermen:
£ 300,000
1976 STC-101 Chesapeake Bay 1,000 Damage to birds
$115,000
1976 Urquiola Cornua (Spain) 101,000 Oysters and mussel
fishery claim
Ptas. 35.5 million
1977 Adrian Maersk Hong Kong 1,000 To Seafarmers
HK 5 million
1978 Amoco Cadiz Brittany 230,000 Provisional Comp:
Fishermen: Frs.
23-45 million
Oystermen:
Fr. 22 million
1978 Ryu-yo-Maru Japan 105 Fishery Association:
Y 1,031 million
Source; Orqanization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Combatting
Oil Spills: Some Economic Aspects (Paris: OECD, 1982), 127-137.
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models, allowing better planning; while at the same time
more factors will be quantitatively defined such that
greater damage claims become possible. Therefore primary
data collection from a cost stand point may not be
desirable for the company to pursue but analysis of
primary data is of great interest. As the known
information cannot be canceled, the best course is to use
the information as it becomes available to refine current
assessments.
Individual companies can also consider refining the
evaluation of damages on the basis of their particular
area of interest. Most companies use relatively few
ports of entry for the majority of their shipments. (28)
This can be seen by examining those companies that
imported oil into the Gulf in the first ten months of
1982 and their major ports of entry. See Tables 40, at
page 331. These companies could concentrate only on the
areas where their major ports are located: Champlin,
using Corpus Christi, should concentrate on SSMO Area 29;
Exxon, using Houston and Baton Rouge, on Areas 28 and 27;
Chevron, using Pascagoula, on Area 26; Phillips
Petroleum, using Freeport, on Area 29; and GHR Energy,
using New Orleans, on Area 27. See Table 41, at page
333. Additionally, all companies should consider any
other areas they cross during shipping, such as Area 23
if their routing is through the Straits of Florida, as
potentially important areas of impact.
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Importing
Company
Amoco
Ashland
Arco
Champlin
Charter
Chevron
Cities Service
Clark Oil
Coastal Corp.
Conoco
Coral Pet.
Continental
Crown Central
Delta Ref.
Exxon
GHR Energy
Gulf Oil
Gulf States
Horizon
Houston Oil
Hunt
Intercoastal
Inti. Pet.
Kerr-McGee
Koch Ind.
La Gloria
Marathon
Mobil
Mobile Bay
Murphy
National Coop.
Phillips Pet.
Placid Ref.
Sea Horse
Sentry
TABLE 40
GULF OF MEXICO PORTS USED BY OIL IMPORTERS,
JANUARY-OCTOBER, 1982
Major Ports Used SSMQ
(no. of shipments) Areas
Galveston (143), Gramercy (21) 28,27
New Orleans (69), Gramercy 27
Houston (28), Texas City (6) 29
Corpus Christi (30) 29
Houston (5) , Garyville (3) 2l?,27
Pascagoula (103) 26
Lake Charles (26), Houston (xO), Mobile (8) 27,28,26
St. James (40) 27
Corpus Christi (49) 29
Lake Charles (5) 28
St. James (3), Gramercy (3) 27
New Orleans (2) 27
Houston (13) , Texas City (6)
New Orleans (14) 27
Baton Rouge (66) , Houston (54), New Orleans (7) 2~T, 28,27
New Orleans (33) 27
New Orleans (34), Port Arthur (21), Beaumont(14) 27,28,28
Corpus Christi (14) 29
Nederland (4) 23
Freeport (3l 29
Mobile (9) 26
New Orleans (3) 27
New Orleans (6) 27
Corpus Christi (27) 29
Corpus Christi (3) 29
Beaumont (6) , New Orleans (4) 28,27
New Orleans (39), Gramercy (19) Galveston (5) 27,27,28
Beaumont (39) U[
Mobile (6) 26
New Orleans (9), Meraux (3) 27
Freport (1) .29
Freeport (36) .29
New Orleans (2) 2_7
New Orleans (63) 27.
Bayport (3), Mobile (3) 28,26
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TABLE 40, Continued
Iraportinq Major Ports Used SSMO
Company (no. of shipments) Areas
Shell Oil New Orleans (78) , Houston (68) , Gramercy (29) 27,28, 27
Sigmor Corpus Christi (7) 29
Std Oil-Ohio New Orleans (18), Beaumont (15) 77,28
Sohio Supply Beaumont (15), New Orleans (14) 28,27
Str. Pet. Res. Freeport (123), Beaumont (32), Gramercy (27) 29,28,27
Sun Company Beaumont £2) 28
Tenneco NewOrleans (6) 27
Texaco Port Arthur (59), LOOP (47), Baton Rouge (34) 28,27,27
Texas City Galveston (43) 28
Tosco Corp. Nederland (5), Beaumont (4) 28
Total Pet. Beaumont (5) 28
Union Oil-Cal. Gramercy (13) 27
Vulcan Mobile (4) 2lT
Source: American Petroleum Institute, Imported Crude Oil and Petroleum
Products (Washington: API, 1982).
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TABLE 41
PORTS USED FOR OIL TRANSPORTS - 1982,
BY SSMO AREA
S.S.M.O. Ports
Area
Area 29: Corpus Christi
Freeport
Area 28 Galveston
Texas City
Baytown
Baypor t
Houston
Port Arthur
Beaumont
Nederland
Lake Charles
Area 27 St. James
Capline
Garyvilie
Baton Rouge
Port Allen
Gramercy
New Orleans
LOOP
Mer aux
Norco
Convent
Area 26 Pascagoula
Mobile
Area 25 n/a for 1982
Area 24 n/a for 1982
Area 23 n/a for 1982
Source: American Petroleum Institute, Imported Crude Oil
and Petroleum Products (Washington: API, 1982).
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CHAPTER XII
OPERATIONALIZING AN OIL SPILL STRATEGY METHODOLOGY
Introduction
In the preceding Chapters, the variables contained in
the Chapter II methodology for evaluating spill
consequences have been discussed, focusing upon the Gulf
of Mexico area as a test region for U.S. companies
importing oil into Gulf ports. The present Chapter
brings these variables together and evaluates
alternatives of a company through the Chapter II
approach. When evaluating company alternatives, the
following questions are considered:
- Is the proposed alternative to reduce consequences
sufficiently cost-effective to the company?
- How certain or speculative is the proposed
alternative?
- What is likely to be the public perception of each
alternative? Will this perception be likely to
affect the company's willingness to undertake the
strategy?
- Is there any difference between small and large
companies in the cost-effectiveness of the
alternative?
- Where there are limits in operationalizing the
methodology due to information gaps, can the
methodology be used for the alternative purpose of
helping a company identify the type of information
it requires in order to be willing to undertake the
investment?
Examination of a particular oil company in the Gulf
of Mexico is difficult, because many important pieces of
information concerning company activities and policies
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cannot be obtained. For a company undertaking its own
appraisal of spill consequences, variables ACTIVITY, D(i)
for the localized port area in which the company
operates, and V(l) and V(2), will be the company's own
level of activity, potential damage for the port area of
operation, and the volumes represented by the company's
largest shipment into the region and its average shipment
into the region.
For the purpose of illustrating how a company could
utilize the Chapter II methodology in planning a strategy
for dealing with oil spill consequences, two company
scenarios will be employed. One scenario is reflective
of a small company operating in the Gulf, while the
second is a representation of a large company operation.
The Small Company scenario includes the following
information:
- Small Company makes 25 oil cargo trips into the
Gulf annually, with total tonnage shipped equalling
1,375,000 tons;
- Average shipment volume for Small Company is 55,000
tons (i.e.- V(2) = 55,000 tons);
- The largest single shipment of Small Company is
200,000 tons (i.e.- V(l) = 200,000 tons); and
Small Company utilizes the port of Corpus Christi
exclusively for its shipments;
The Large Company scenario includes the following
information:
- Large Company makes 150 oil cargo trips into the
Gulf annually, with total tonnage shipped equalling
8,250,000 tons;
- Average shipment volume for Large Company is 55,000
tons (i.e.- V(2) = 55,000 tons);
- The largest single shipment of Large Company is
200,000 tons (i.e.- V(l) = 200,000 tons); and
Large Company utilizes the port of Corpus Christi
exclusively for its shipments;
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The two scenarios contain essentially common elements
in order to more easily compare and contrast differences
in small and large organization decisionmaking. The key
difference between Small Company and Large Company is the
level of activity in the Gulf, with Large Company
operating at six times the level of Small Company.
The Small Company example of 25 trips is
representative of many smaller Gulf companies. See Table
21, at page 243. The average shipment tonnage of 55,000
is midway in the range of 40,000-70,000 tons, which
includes 34 of the 49 Gulf companies operating during
1982. See Tables 21 and 22, at pages 243 and 245. The
use of Corpus Christi as a port of preference permits the
selection of a port which experiences heavy vessel
activity, and which is also one of the three ports with
the greatest spill exposure for tankers and barges. See
Table 25, at page 257.
The Large Company example draws upon companies at the
level of Mobil, Marathon, Chevron, Exxon, and others in
the Gulf. The 150 trips is representative of any of the
six companies in the 100-180 trips/year range. (See
Tables 21 and 22, at pages 243 and 245. The selection of
200,000 tons for largest single shipment is actually a
low assumption in light of six companies in the Gulf with
200,000 and above single shipment tonnage: Marathon
(432,000); Texaco (283,000); Mobil (280,000); Shell
(270,000); Strategic Petroleum Reserve (266,000); and
Union Oil (200,000). Selection of Corpus Christi permits
direct comparisons of damage potential with Small Company.
The approach taken in this Chapter is to illustrate
both the cost-effective aspect of the Chapter II
methodology, as seen in Equations 1-7, and also the more
evaluative, qualititative aspect of the methodology, as
generally described in Equation 8. The analysis in this
Chapter will consider the following situations:
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Basic Case - No Y Investments:
- Example 1. Corpus Christi area spill? no insurance?
existing Gulf cleanup resources. This is the "base
case" example, which suggests the greatest NET EXP
for Small Company and Large Company if no Y
investments are undertaken.
- Example 2. South Florida spill, illustrating the
different consequences that result from changing the
location of a spill site.
- Example 3. Applying the
company that utilizes two
operation.
Insurance Alternatives:
- Example 4. Y investment
- Example 5. Y investment
CRISTAL.
Chapter II methodology to a
or more different ports of
in TOVALOP and CRISTAL only,
in P&I club, TOVALOP and
- Example 6. Y investment in third party individual
company policy, TOVALOP and CRISTAL.
Cleanup Alternatives:
- Example 7. Y investment made by one company of
increasing existing Gulf cleanup resources by adding
new capability.
- Example 8. Y investment made by multiple companies
in a cooperative arrangementt of increasing existing
Gulf cleanup resources by adding new capability.
- Example 9. Y investment by company to improve the
efficiency of Gulf cleanup efforts.
- Example 9A. A variation on the Chapter II
methodology to be used where a company wishes to
determine a threshold level of improvement from a Y
investment necessary before the company will proceed
with the investment.
Reduced Spill Probability Alternatives:
- Example 10. Y investment by company to reduce the
probability of a spill event through crew training.
- Example 11. Y investment to reduce the probability
of a spill event through vessel equipment
improvements and modifications.
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Legislative Changes:
- Example 12. Y investment by company to reduce
overall consequences by seeking legislative changes
setting a limit on (a) liabilities for damages? and
(b) liabilities for cleanup costs incurred by third
parties.
Combining Alternatives:
- Example 13. In this example, planning for a spill
in the Corpus Christi area is performed by combining
a number of alternative Y investments. This example
considers the example of a company using:
- P&I insurance, TOVALOP and CRISTAL;
- Acquisition of additional cleanup resources?
- Crew training to reduce probability of a spill
event.
Computations for all examples in this Chapter are found
in Appendix V. The results of the examples are
summarized at the conclusion of this Chapter.
Example 1:
Basic Example, No Y Investment
This example postulates the consequences of oil
spills having effects in the SSMO Area 29. This area
contains the port of Corpus Christi, which has a high
incidence of significant volume spills. This example
illustrates the NET EXP of Small Company and Large
Company, assuming no Y investments, and only the existing
Gulf cleanup resources available.
Initializing Variables
SPILLS (i) : SPILLS(i) has been estimated for the Gulf
in Chapter IX. SPILLS(1) equals 0.16 "catastrophic"
spills per year? and SPILLS(2) equals 2.0 "significant"
spills per year. These frequencies are applied for both
Small Company and Large Company calculations, because
SPILLS (i) represents a Gulfwide frequency. The variable
ACTIVITY will be used to apportion to each company its
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share of SPILLS(i).
ACTIVITY: To determine ACTIVITY, both the number of
shipments for each company, and the region's total
shipments, must be obtained. For the Gulf region annual
activity, an estimated 2,000 shipments will be used.
This level is consistent with the ten month Gulf data for
1982. See Table 21, at page 243.
Small Company's ACTIVITY equals 25 trips/2,000 trips
Gulfwide = 0.0125. Large Company's ACTIVITY equals 150
trips/2,000 trips Gulfwide = 0.075.
FACTOR: This variable, which represents reductions
in spill frequency for a company resulting from Y
investments in alternatives such as crew training, vessel
safety equipment and other investments, is set in Example
1 at 1.0. This suggests that Small Company and Large
Company have not undertaken any Y investments which
reduce their frequency of spill occurrence.
V (i) : The spill volumes V(l) and V(2) have been
discussed in the assumptions about Small Company and
Large Company. V(l) equals 200,000 tons and V(2) equals
55,000 tons, for both Small Company and Large Company.
CLEAN and F(k): The Gulf cleanup capability has been
evaluated in Chapter X at 23,142 tons. This represents 9
skimmers capable of simultaneous operation, working for 6
days, 12 hours a day. The effectiveness of the offshore
cleanup effort, EFF, has been estimated at 0.5 in Chapter
X.
Variable F(k) represents the cost to the company of
an offshore cleanup operation. To cleanup at the maximum
Gulf capability, F(k) = $730,000. See Chapter X.
D(i); D(i) represents the costs incurred as a direct
result of that part of the spill which has not been
cleaned up at sea and which reaches shore or affects
other economic resources. D(i) is composed of four
elements, DAMAGES(i), ONSHORE(i), LIT(i) and CONTRACTS(i).
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DAMAGES(i) is the measure of damages to the affected
region's coastal tourism, commercial fishing, and other
economic and natural resources. The table depicting
DAMAGES (i) for each SSMO area in the Gulf is Table 38, at
page 326. For a spill affecting Area 29, DAMAGES (i) =
$27,500/ton.
LIT(i), the cost of litigating claims for damages, is
estimated at $250/ton. See Chapter XI. ONSHORE(i), the
cost of onshore cleanup of oil reaching the coast, has
been estimated in Chapter X at $5,000/ton. Finally,
CONTRACTS (i) is not assigned a value in these examples,
because the company may be in a position to minimize its
actual costs for nondelivery of oil to refineries. See
Chapter XI.
D(i) for a spill in the Corpus Christi area therefore
equals: $27,500 + $250 + $5,000 = $32,750.
IMPACT: Variable IMPACT, representing the estimated
fraction of oil not cleaned up by offshore cleanup
operations which is expected to affect the coastline and
natural resources in the spill area. IMPACT, as
discussed in Chapter XI, is estimated at 0.35.
IMP and Q(i): Variable IND represents the indirect
costs to a company from diversion of management and other
resources to follow up after a spill event. IND is
estimated at $250,000, reflecting one year of time for
one upper manager, one scientific person, one legal
counsel, one public relations/government relations
person, and other personnel. See Chapter XI.
Variable O(i), the value per ton of the lost oil, is
estimated at $35/bbl., or $245/ton.
Determining EXPOSURE(i): For both Small Company and
Large Company in this example, EXPOSURE(i) will be the
same value. The setting of V(l) and V(2) at the same
values for Small and Large Companies results in both
companies facing the same EXPOSURE for "catastrophic" and
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"significant" spills. In addition, neither company is
undertaking Y investments, and so the difference in NET
EXP will be based on the company's different levels of
activity in the area. Values for EXPOSURE(i) are set
forth below:
EXPOSURE(1) = $2,077,214,825.
EXPOSURE(2) = $ 379,627,325.
The importance of EXPOSURE(i) is that this variable
reflects the cost which a company may face if a spill of
volume V(i) occurs which affects the selected geographic
region. For a catastrophic spill impacting the lower
Texas coast, the potential cost exposure of the company
is in excess of $2 billion. Note that this figure is
well within the estimates of costs from the Amoco Cadiz
spill off the coast of France. See Chapter XI, and
Appendix U. If the company experiences a significant
spill event, the range of costs is at the level of the
hundreds of millions of dollars, with EXPOSURE(2)
equalling $379.6 million.
A company cannot simply plan its strategy around this
EXPOSURE(i) variable, because the frequency of a spill
occurring in the region (SPILLS(i)) and the likelihood of
a company experiencing the event (ACTIVITY) must also be
considered. However, even where a company discounts the
EXPOSURE(i) value by SPILLS(i) and ACTIVITY, the company
must remain aware that if a spill should occur to that
company, the cost potential is reflected by EXPOSURE(i).
Small Company NET EXP
To calculate Small Company's NET EXP in Example 1,
the company's P(i) must be determined: For Small Company:
P(l) = 0.002.
P(2) = 0.025.
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P(l) is far lower in value than P(2), because the
expected frequency of a "catastrophic" spill has been
estimated as being only 8% of the frequency of a
"significant" spill. See Chapter IX. Note that P(i) for
Small Company results in a substantially discounted value
for Small Company's share of spill events, due to Small
Company's low ACTIVITY variable.
NET EXP(Small) = $13,645,118.
The value of $13.6 million represents the potential
cost consequences from spills of 200,000 and 55,000 tons
that impact the lower Texas area, discounted by the
annual frequencies of these spills, discounted further by
Small Company's share of shipment activity in the Gulf.
Large Company NET EXP
Large Company's NET EXP is calculated in the same
fashion as Small Company, except that different P(i)
values are used to reflect Large Company's higher level
of activity:
P(l) = 0.012.
P(2) = 0.150.
Large Company's NET EXP for example 1 is now
determined:
NET EXP(Large) = $81,870,703.
The value of $81.9 million represents the potential
cost consequences from spills of 200,000 and 55,000 tons
that impact the lower Texas area, discounted by the
annual frequencies of these spills, discounted further by
Large Company's share of shipment activity in the Gulf.
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Example 2:
South Florida Coast Spill, No Y Investment
This example illustrates the manner in which a
company can adjust its evaluation of NET EXP consequences
based on a change in the location that is impacted by a
spill. In example 2, the consequences from a spill that
impacts the lower Florida coast is examined. The lower
Florida coast, Area 24, is the SSMO area with the highest
potential damage consequences in the Gulf. See Chapter
XI, and particularly Table 38, at page 326. Where the
Corpus Christi Area 28 is approximately the mean value of
damages among the SSMO areas, Area 24 is almost twice the
level of Area 29. As in example 1, this example
illustrates the NET EXP of Small Company and Large
Company, assuming no Y investments, with only the
existing Gulf cleanup resources available.
Initializing Variables
The only variable from the example 1 discussion which
will require adjustment is DAMAGES(i), the measure of
damages to third party economic and environmental
resources that are associated with a spill impacting SSMO
Area 24. For a spill affecting Area 24, DAMAGES (i) =
$50,000/ton. See Table 38, at page 326.
Having adjusted DAMAGES(i) for an Area 24 spill,
variable D(i) is also adjusted to reflect the higher
DAMAGES (i) value: $50,000 + $250 + $5,000 = $55,250/ton.
The values used to determine EXPOSURE(i) are the same
as those used in example 1, with the exception of the
adjusted D(i):
EXPOSURE(1) = $3,469,971,575.
EXPOSURE(2) = $ 630,509,075.
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Small Company NET EXP
Small Company's NET EXP in this example is performed
in the same fashion as in example 1. The P(i) values for
Small Company are unchanged, because P(i) reflects a
Gulfwide spill frequency as affected by Small Company's
level of activity in the Gulf. The only change from
example 1 is that the EXPOSURE(i) variable now reflects a
spill impacting the South Florida coast.
NET EXP(Small) = $22,702,670.
Large Company NET EXP
Large Company's NET EXP in example 2 is calculated in
the same fashion as Small Company. The example 2
calculation of NET EXP uses the same P(i) determined for
Large Company in example, because this is a Gulfwide
value, as affected by Large Company's level of Gulfwide
operations. The EXPOSURE(i) variable is the calculation
for a spill impacting the Southern Florida coast.
NET EXP(Large) = $136,216,020.
It can be seen that the potential consequences of a
spill which impacts Area 24 are far greater than spills
which impact Area 29 (example 1) . The lower Florida
coast damage from a catastrophic spill may reach $3.4
billion, in contrast to the lower Texas coast estimate of
$2.0 billion. A significant spill affecting the lower
Florida coast may produce $630 million in costs, while
the estimate for a lower Texas spill is $379 million.
In a similar fashion, the NET EXP values for both
Small Company and Large Company have shifted upward,
because a larger EXPOSURE(i) value is being adjusted for
the company level of Gulf activity.
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Example 3:
Multiple Ports of Operation
This example briefly describes the way in which the
Chapter II methodology can be modified to reflect company
activities in which more than one port of operations is
used. From an examination of Table 40, at page 331,
there are a number of Gulf companies which use two or
more ports regularly. For example, Shell Oil uses the
ports of New Orleans, Houston and Gramercy, making 78,
68, and 29 shipments respectively.
The adjustment in the Chapter II methodology is to
treat the company's operations in each port as though
each was the activity of a separate company? and then
these two values are added together. Thus, adjusting the
Chapter II equations:
c 2
NET EXP = ( 2 2 P(i) x (EXPOSURE (b, i) - INSURANCE))
b=l i=l
+ Y.
Where:
(b=l...c) is each port of operation used by a company
during the year.
D(b,i) = Damages associated with port "b";
ACTIVITY(b) = level of activity at each port "b"; and
EXPOSURE(b,i) =
Exposure to costs from spills of volume "i", in port
"b" .
By way of illustration, if new Small* Company has 25
shipments, of which 10 are into Corpus Christi and 15
into southern Florida/Tampa Bay (Area 24 potential
impact):
NET EXP(Small*) = "Corpus Christi NET EXP" +
"S. Florida NET EXP" = $19,079,649.
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A company will use for its D(b,i) value the per ton
value determined for the SSMO area in which the company's
principal port of operation is located. See Tables 38
and 41, at pages 326 and 333.
Considerations in Making Y Investments
The "base case" example 1, and the companion example
2, have been presented in some detail because the
examples that follow will be contrasted against this "no
alternatives selected" scenario. The value of the NET
EXP determination for a company is that this result may
be used for the purpose of comparing alternatives for
cost-effectiveness. In making this cost-effectiveness
analysis, a company will not only ask whether there is
any improvement (reduction) of NET EXP from selection of
an alternative, but will also ask whether the improvement
is sufficient to warrant the company expenditure on Y.
This question of magnitude of improvement in NET EXP
has two components. First, a company will wish to know
the ratio of (change in NET EXP):(level of Y
investment) . A company may view Y expenditures from the
perspective that the reduction in NET EXP must equal some
multiple of the associated Y investment. Thus, a company
may decide that it will undertake a $250,000 investment
in cleanup equipment, provided there is a reduction in
NET EXP of $1,250,000, five times the size of the Y
investment.
The second factor which a company will consider is
the size of the Y investment itself. It must be
remembered that the calculation of NET EXP does not
represent an actual "out of pocket" expense by a
company. Rather, NET EXP is a value which is the
potential cost to the company j-f_ spills of V(i) occur,
discounted by the share of the spill frequencies in the
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area that the company should bear, based on its activity
in the region. In contrast, Y represents an actual
expenditure of company resources, which will reduce the
estimate of NET EXP.
Thus, a company has two competing financial
considerations: on the one hand, any expenditure in Y
investments is money not available for other production
or shareholder uses? but on the other hand, the potential
financial outlay represented by EXPOSURE(i), and
discounted for the purpose of planning by NET EXP,
reflects potential outlays which are sufficiently large
to require some preventative and mitigative planning.
The third factor in a company's consideration of a Y
expenditure is the degree of "certainty" associated with
the expenditure. How certain can the company be that an
outlay of Y dollars will definitely result in the
anticipated reduction in NET EXP? The Y investment can
be "speculative" for a number of reasons, including:
- If the Y investment is made, can the company be
certain that the associated strategy will actually be
implemented? Example: Dollars expended on lobbying
for legislative and regulatory changes? a company
cannot be certain that the expenditure will result in
a successful change in the law.
- Is the degree of effectiveness of the Y investment
known? Example: While investments in crew or
management training in spill prevention and cleanup
are viewed as beneficial, it is not known how much
improvement, if any, is associated with the training.
The final consideration of a company in undertaking a
strategy is the public perception of the company's course
of action.
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Example 4:
TOVALQP and CRISTAL Coverage
Example 4 uses the Corpus Christi area, and considers
a company's only Y investment to be insurance through
TOVALOP and CRISTAL, obtaining up to $36 million in
coverage. Some of the smaller companies operating in the
Gulf use only TOVALOP and CRISTAL coverage for protection
from the consequences of oil spills. (1_) Examples 4, 5
(P&I coverage) and 6 (third party individual company
insurance policy) will be examined and subsequently
discussed.
Initializing Variables
The only variables from the example 1 discussion
which will require adjustment are INSURANCE, the level of
coverage from insurance alternatives selected by a
company, and Y, the annual cost of obtaining the
insurance protection. In example 4, INSURANCE is the
coverage available under TOVALOP and CRISTAL, and Y is
the estimated cost to a company of these programs:
INSURANCE = $36,000,000 in coverage;
Y = $70,000/tanker of average 55,000 tonnage. (2)
The values used to determine EXPOSURE(i) are the same
as those used in example 1. INSURANCE and Y do not
change EXPOSURE(i), but only affect the Equation 1
determination of NET EXP. Therefore:
EXPOSURE(1) = $2,077,214,825.
EXPOSURE(2) = $ 379,627,325.
Small Company NET EXP
Small Company's NET EXP in this example is performed
in the same fashion as in example 1. The P(i) values for
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Small Company are unchanged, because P(i) reflects a
Gulfwide spill frequency as affected by Small Company's
level of activity in the Gulf. The changes from example
1 are that INSURANCE now has a value of $36,000,000
rather than $0, and Y has a value of $70,000 per vessel
of 55,000 tons.
To determine the value of Small Company's total Y
investment in this example, it is necessary to translate
Small Company's 25 shipments into an estimated number of
vessels. This is necessary because insurance
alternatives are linked to vessels, not voyages. For the
purposes of estimating number of vessels, an estimated 10
voyages/vessel/year will be used. (3^)
Y(Small) = $175,000.
The determination of NET EXP is now made.
NET EXP(Small) = $12,848,113.
Large Company NET EXP
Large Company's NET EXP in example 4 is calculated in
the same fashion as Small Company. The example 4
calculation of NET EXP uses the same P(i) determined for
Large Company in example 1, because this is a Gulfwide
value, as affected by Large Company's level of Gulfwide
operations. In example 4, INSURANCE has a value of
$36,000,000, and Y has a value of $70,000 per vessel of
55,000 tons.
As with Small Company, Large Company's total Y
investment in this example requires that the 150
shipments of Large Company be translated in to a number
of vessels.
Y(Large) = $1,050,000.
The determination of NET EXP is now made.
NET EXP(Large) = $77,088,677.
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Example 5:
P&I Insurance Coverage
Example 5 uses the Corpus Christi area, and considers
a company's only Y investment to be insurance through P&I
club insurance, and also through TOVALOP and CRISTAL.
Both P&I insurance and the TOVALOP-CRISTAL coverage are
considered in this example, because P&I club insurance
typically requires that the insured also furnish TOVALOP
coverage. Therefore, the alternative of P&I insurance
necessarily includes the TOVALOP-CRISTAL alternative.
The level of protection under P&I insurance plus
TOVALOP-CRISTAL is $319.2 million: P&I coverage of $300
million, plus $19.2 million from TOVALOP and CRISTAL when
these resources are used in the context of P&I club
insurance. (4J
Initializing Variables
As in example 4, only variables INSURANCE and Y are
adjusted from the "base case" example 1. In the present
example 5, INSURANCE is the combined protection afforded
by P&I insurance, TOVALOP and CRISTAL, and Y is the
combined cost of obtaining coverage under these
programs. The cost of P&I insurance and the cost of
TOVALOP-CRISTAL have been estimated in Chapter IV as
being approximately equal. Therefore:
INSURANCE = $319,200,000 in coverage;
Y = $70,000/vess.(P&I) +
$70,000/vess.(TOVALOP-CRISTAL) = $140,000/vessel.
The values used to determine EXPOSURE(i) are the
as those used in example 1:
EXPOSURE(1) = $2,077,214,825.
EXPOSURE(2) = $ 379,627,325.
same
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Small Company NET EXP
Small Company's NET EXP in this example is performed
in the same fashion as in example 1, with P(i) values for
Small Company unchanged. In example 5, INSURANCE has a
value of $319,200,000, and Y has a value of $140,000 per
vessel of 55,000 tons. The determination of estimated
number of vessels is made for Small Company in the same
fashion as in example 4 (i.e., 15 shipments/10 shipments
per year per vessel).
Y(Small) = $350,000.
The determination of NET EXP is now made:
NET EXP(Small) = $5,376,713.
Large Company NET EXP
Large Company's NET EXP in example 5 is calculated in
the same fashion as Small Company:
Y(Large) = $2,100,000.
The determination of NET EXP is now made:
NET EXP(Large) = $32,260,277.
Example 6:
Company Purchase of Individual Third Party Insurance
Example 6 uses the Corpus Christi area, and considers
a company's only Y investment to be insurance purchased
by the individual company through third party carriers,
and also purchase of TOVALOP and CRISTAL protection.
This situation occurs where a company is precluded from
membership in a P&I club but still desires a level of
insurance coverage beyond the $36 million afforded by
TOVALOP and CRISTAL. Exclusion from P&I clubs can occur
for a variety of reasons, including smallness of the
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company seeking membership; the poor safety record of the
company; and other reasons. (5J
Individual company purchase of third party insurance
carries two limitations: first, the level of coverage
available under an individual company policy is
significantly lower than P&I maximum coverage, typically
limited to $100 million. A second drawback is that
individual company insurance is more expensive than P&I
group leveraged coverage. (6J
The level of protection under third party insurance
plus TOVALOP-CRISTAL is $119.2 million: third party
insurance coverage of $100 million, plus $19.2 million
from TOVALOP and CRISTAL when these resources are used in
the context of third party insurance.
Initializing Variables
As in example 4, only variables INSURANCE and Y are
adjusted from the "base case" example 1. In the present
example 6, INSURANCE is the combined protection afforded
by third party insurance, TOVALOP and CRISTAL, and Y is
the combined cost of obtaining coverage under these
programs. The cost of third party insurance, at the
lesser $100 million level, is estimated to be equivalent
to double the cost of P&I insurance (at the higher
coverage level of $300 million). See Chapter IV.
INSURANCE = $119,200,000 in coverage;
Y = $140,000/vess.(third party insurance) +
$70,000/vess.(TOVALOP-CRISTAL) = $210,000/vessel.
The values used to determine EXPOSURE(i) are the same
as those used in example 1.
EXPOSURE(1) = $2,077,214,825.
EXPOSURE(2) =$ 379,627,325.
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Small Company NET EXP
Small Company's NET EXP in this example is performed
in the same fashion as in example 1, with P(i) values for
Small Company unchanged. In example 6, INSURANCE has a
value of $119,200,000, and Y has a value of $210,000 per
vessel of 55,000 tons. The determination of estimated
number of vessels is made for Small Company in the same
fashion as in example 4.
Y(Small) = $525,000.
The determination of NET EXP is now made:
NET EXP(Small) = $10,951,713.
Large Company NET EXP
Large Company's NET EXP in example 6 is calculated in
the same fashion as Small Company:
Y(Large) = $3,150,000.
The determination of NET EXP is now made:
NET EXP(Large) = $65,710,277.
Evaluating Insurance Oriented Alternatives
Cost Effectiveness of
Insurance Alternatives
Reviewing Examples 4, 5 and 6, it is clear that from
a cost-effectiveness viewpoint, use of P&I club insurance
plus TOVALOP and CRISTAL provide the greatest reduction
in NET EXP for both Small Company and Large Company. The
P&I alternative reduces Small Company's NET EXP by $7.8
million, and Small Company's return on its Y investment
is 23.1 (i.e., $23.1 improvement for each $1 expended on
the P&I alternative). Similarly, Large Company
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experiences a $49.6 million reduction in its NET EXP,
with a return on Y investment of 23.6.
The P&I insurance alternative is far superior to
either TOVALOP-CRISTAL only, or third party insurance
which the company must purchase individually.
TOVALOP-CRISTAL, example 4, produces only a $.8 million
improvement for Small Company, and $4.8 million
improvement for Large Company, both producing a return on
Y investment of only 4.6. The third party insurance
option is superior to TOVALOP-CRISTAL despite its higher
per/vessel cost, but still falls far short of the degree
of reduction in NET EXP produced by P&I insurance.
One point which can be observed from examples 4-6 is
that Small Company's and Large Company's level of
investment in Y, and the reduction in NET EXP, are
proportional to one another. This is due to the fact
that insurance oriented alternatives are linked to the
company's level of activity (i.e.- tonnage transported or
vessels operated).
While P&I insurance may be optimal for both Small and
Large Companies, the alternative may not be equally
available. As noted earlier, many small companies cannot
gain access into P&I clubs, due to size, poor
performance, or other factors. Thus, in the real world,
Large Company can be expected to have the opportunity to
make use of the P&I insurance alternative, while Small
Company may be forced to fall back on either third party
insurance or the bare minimum of TOVALOP and CRISTAL.
Degree of Certainty of
Insurance Alternatives
Of all the alternatives to be discussed in this
Chapter, the insurance alternatives have the greatest
certainty of providing the protection which has been
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purchased by a company's Y investment. Provided the
spill event does not fall into one of the exculpatory
clauses of the insurance program (ex., acts of God, war,
intentional spills), a company can be certain that the
policy will pay out for appropriate damages. This
certainty, coupled with the extremely large reduction in
NET EXP available from P&I insurance in particular, makes
insurance alternatives very strong candidates from a
cost-effectiveness perspective.
Public Perception of
Insurance Alternatives
The public can be expected to regard insurance
alternatives in a favorable light.
For those individuals who might be injured by the
effects of a spill, the strongest preference is likely to
be alternatives which reduce the actual risk of spills or
which will ensure that a spill, if it occurs, will be
minimized and controlled. These alternatives are linked
to company alternatives that affect variables FACTOR and
CLEAN.
The public, however, may also accept an insurance
alternative in lieu of actions to minimize spills. While
the risk of the spill and its consequences has not been
affected by an insurance decision, the potential victim
of a spill event can be assured that there is a pool of
money available from which he or she can expect fairly
rapid reimbursement.
This perspective of the public can be seen in the
legislative context by the shift occurring in the
previous and present Congress toward establishment of a
public compensation fund. Such a fund, which will be
explored more fully in Chapter XIII, basically operates
as a publicly-controlled insurance program, reimbursing
victims of spills under specified conditions. (7^) That
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such legislation appears to be acceptable suggests that
the representatives of the public recognize that
elimination of the risk of spills is presently
impossible; yet also recognize the need to protect
members of the public from bearing the risk of damage
without the protection of compensation.
Example 7;
Additional Cleanup Capability - Single Company Purchase
Example 7 uses the Corpus Christi area, and considers
a company's only Y investment to be acquisition of
cleanup equipment to enhance offshore cleanup
capability. As discussed in Chapter X, in the Gulf of
Mexico the lack of boom necessary to support skimmers
would cause 9 skimmers to remain idle if a major cleanup
operation was required. Therefore, enhancement of
cleanup capability can be achieved by acquisition of
additional boom (rather than necessitating purchase of an
additional skimmer and boom).
Example 7 represents a single company undertaking the
purchase of boom. Example 8 reflects the same boom
acquisition, but performed through a cleanup cooperative
in which costs can be shared among members.
Initializing Variables
The principal variables from the example 1 discussion
which will require adjustment are CAP, the optimistic
cleanup capability (both private and public) for offshore
cleanup in the Gulf; and CLEAN, the variable representing
the effective cleanup capability in in the Gulf. An
increase in CAP will act to increase CLEAN; because more
oil can be removed offshore, the EXPOSURE(i) equation
will also be modified, to reflect the lower overall
exposure in the Gulf due to enhanced cleanup capability.
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Finally, Y will reflect the additional cost of acquiring
boom, and F(k), the cost of the Gulf offshore cleanup
operation, will also be increased to include the
operating cost of a tenth skimmer.
CLEAN = 25,715 tons of oil removed;
F(k) = $811,000 for offshore operations;
Y = $260,000 for 2,000 ft. boom.
The determination of EXPOSURE(i) now includes the
enhanced CLEAN and the higher cost of F(k) :
EXPOSURE(1) = $2,047,802,813.
EXPOSURE(2) = $ 350,215,313.
Small Company NET EXP
Small Company's NET EXP in this example is performed
in the same fashion as in example 1. The P(i) values for
Small Company are unchanged, because P(i) reflects a
Gulfwide spill frequency as affected by Small Company's
level of activity in the Gulf. The change from example 1
are that EXPOSURE (i) has been recalculated, and the value
of Y is $260,000.
NET EXP(Small) = $13,110,989.
Large Company NET EXP
Large Company's NET EXP in this example is calculated
in the same fashion as Small Company. The P(i) values
for Small Company are unchanged, because P(i) reflects a
Gulfwide spill frequency as affected by Small Company's
level of activity in the Gulf.
NET EXP(Large) = $77,365,931.
361
Example 8:
Additional Cleanup Capability - Cooperative Purchase
Example 8 uses the Corpus Christi area, and considers
a company's only Y investment to be acquisition of
additional boom equipment (the same addition to cleanup
capability as described in example 8). Example 8 differs
from example 7 in that the present example reflects
acquisition of the same cleanup capability by a
cooperative cleanup entity to which the company belongs.
Initializing Variables
Variables CAP, CLEAN, EXPOSURE(l), EXP0SURE(2), and
F(k) are all set in this example as in example 7.
CLEAN = 25,715 tons of oil removed;
F(k) = $811,000 for offshore operations;
EXPOSURE(1) = $2,047,802,813.
EXPOSURE(2) = $ 350,215,313.
Small Company NET EXP
The main difference between example 7 and example 8
is in variable Y. While a company experiencing a spill
will shoulder the burden of cleanup operations itself
(i.e., variable F(k)), the cost of acquiring additional
equipment in example 8 is shared among members of a
cooperative group.
For the purposes of illustration, Small Company and
Large Company belong to a cooperative in which Small
Company represents 5% of the tonnage shipped among the
cooperative members, and Large Company represents 30% of
the tonnage shipped by the members. The members of the
cooperative are assumed to apportion costs of
expenditures on the basis of tonnage shipped, a common
practice of a variety of private industry groups. (18)
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Small Company's Y expenditures are therefore 5% of
the $260,000 cost of additional boom:
Y(Small) = $13,000.
Small Company's NET EXP in this example is performed
in the same fashion as in example 7. The P(i) values for
Small Company are unchanged, because P(i) reflects a
Gulfwide spill frequency as affected by Small Company's
level of activity in the Gulf. The change from example 7
is that Y is now $13,000 rather than $260,000.:
NET EXP(Small) = $12,863,989.
Large Company NET EXP
In this cooperative purchase example, Large Company,
representing 30% of tonnage among cooperative members,
bears 30% of the cost of additional boom.
Y(Large) = $78,000.
Large Company's NET EXP in this example is performed
in the same fashion as in example 7. The P(i) values for
Large Company are unchanged, because P(i) reflects a
Gulfwide spill frequency as affected by Small Company's
level of activity in the Gulf. The change from example 7
is that Y is now $78,000 rather than $260,000.:
NET EXP(Large) = $77,183,931.
Evaluating Cleanup Capability Alernatives
Cost Effectiveness of
Cleanup Capability Alternatives
The example of an individual company purchasing
additional cleanup capability (example 7) again raises
differences between small and large company
considerations. Note that Small Company derives only
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$.5 million in reduced NET EXP from the acquisition of
boom, generating a return on Small Company's Y investment
of 2.1. In contrast, for Large Company the saving in NET
EXP produced is $4.5 million, which represents a return
on Large Company's Y investment of 17.3.
This difference in cost-effectiveness for the two
companies is explained by the fact that acquisition of
additional cleanup resource is the same absolute cost for
each company? however, because Small Company's NET EXP
for a spill event is so much smaller than Large Company's
due to Small Company's low level of activity in the Gulf,
the level of benefit felt by Small Company is minor.
This difference may be compared against the insurance
alternatives discussed earlier. As noted in the
evaluation discussion, the level of insurance Y
expenditures are proportional to the level of activity of
the company in the region. In contrast, the acquisition
of a piece of cleanup equipment by one company causes
Small Company to bear a large Y cost relative to its
benefit received.
In example 8, however, the proportionality of Y
outlay to level of benefit derived is restored. Through
the cooperative mechanism, the cost of additional
equipment is shared, typically in proportion to the
company's share of activity among the cooperative
members. In example 8, Small Company's relatively small
contribution causes the cost effectiveness of its Y
investment to sharply increase. Large Company's return
on its Y investment also increases to approximately the
same level of return, 60.1.
This analysis suggests that small and large companies
can be expected to pursue different strategies if the
alternative under consideration is cleanup equipment.
Despite the cost of purchasing equipment itself, a large
company will derive a sufficiently large benefit in
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reduction of NET EXP (approximately 17.3) to justify the
large company undertaking such a purchase even in the
absence of a cooperative sharing arrangement. In
contrast, a small company, because it derives a smaller
NET EXP benefit, will be expected not to make an
individual purchase of equipment, and will instead be
more likely to purchase equipment only through a
cooperative group.
Degree of Certainty of
Cleanup Capability Alternatives
As noted in Chapter X, many assumptions were required
to generate the CAP values for use in the Chapter II
methodology. Variable conditions such as weather,
visibility, winds, crew experience, proximity of
equipment, all make a precise estimation of the benefit
of an additional piece of equipment somewhat uncertain.
However, among the various alternatives available to
a company, the improvement in cleanup capability ranks
second only to insurance in terms of certainty. While an
insurance program assures that funds will be generated,
the precise cleanup capability of a region must be
estimated. This estimate, however, is still far more
certain than the alternatives to be discussed shortly
such as crew training, management training in spill
cleanup operations, and vessel improvements, which are
alternatives for which not even a sense of utility
presently exists.
Public Perception of
Cleanup Capability Alternatives
The public can be expected to be very favorably
disposed to enhancements of regional cleanup capability.
Cleanup capability means that damage may be averted by
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successful cleanup operations, therefore avoiding any
question of disruption of individual lives and
businesses. The acquisition of cleanup equipment must
therefore be weighed by a company: on the one hand, the
value of additional equipment is less certain than the
acquisition of insurance; but on the other hand, the
public will be likely to view cleanup acquisitions more
positively than insurance, therefore making some
acquisition of cleanup equipment a wise election in terms
of company relations with the public at large.
Example 9:
Improving Cleanup Effectiveness of Company
Example 9 uses the Corpus Christi area, and considers
a company's only Y investment to be company training,
testing, simulations, and other actions to improve the
company's effectiveness in cleanup operations. Such
activities include "surprise tests" as conducted by Sun
Oil, computer simulations as developed by Exxon,
management training programs, and purchase of strategic
equipment (such as on-site communications gear) to
enhance the ability of personnel to interact efficiently.
(9_) . See Chapter X.
What makes this alternative somewhat different from
prior alternatives considered is that improvements in EFF
are not presently quantifiable in terms of magnitude of
effect. Therefore, a company undertaking any of these
example 9 alternatives cannot know what the level of
improvement in EFF, and therefore of NET EXP, will be.
Example 9 will therefore consist of two parts:
Alternative A, which hypothesizes a 10% improvement in
EFF? and Alternative B, which hypothesizes a 5%
improvement in EFF.
Example 9 reflects a cleanup effectiveness strategy
that includes three elements: conducting a "surprise
test"; use of management training; and purchase of
on-site communications equipment. The estimated Y cost
for these three actions is $210,000.
Initializing Variables
The principal variables from the example 1 discussion
which will require adjustment are EFF, the variable
representing the effectiveness of cleanup activities in
the Gulf; and CLEAN, the variable representing the
cleanup capability in the Gulf as adjusted by EFF. An
increase in EFF will act to increase CLEAN; because more
oil can be removed offshore through enhanced
effectiveness and efficiency, the EXPOSURE(i) equation
will also be modified, to reflect the lower overall
exposure in the Gulf due to enhanced cleanup capability.
Y will reflect the additional cost of the effectiveness
improvement undertaken.
Because the level of improvement from effectiveness
training and testing cannot be quantified, two
hypothetical values of improvement in EFF will be
examined: Alternative A: 10% level of improvement in
EFF; and Alternative B: 5% level of improvement in EFF.
Alternative A: 10% improvement in EFF:
- EFF(10%) = 0.55.
- CLEAN(10%) = 25,458 tons.
- EXPOSURE(1) = $2,050,677,675.
- EXPOSURE(2) = $ 353,080,175.
Alternative B: 5% improvement in EFF:
- EFF (5%) = 0.525.
- CLEAN(5%) = 24,300 tons.
- EXPOSURE(1) = $2,063,941,250.
- EXPOSURE(2) = $ 366,353,750.
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Small Company NET EXP
Small Company's NET EXP in this example is performed
in the same fashion as in example 1. The P(i) values for
Small Company are unchanged, because P(i) reflects a
Gulfwide spill frequency as affected by Small Company's
level of activity in the Gulf. The changes from example
1 are that EXPOSURE(i) has been for Alt. A and Alt. B,
and that Y is $210,000.
Alternative A (10% improvement in EFF)
NET EXP(Small) = $13,138,359.
Alternative B (5% improvement in EFF)
NET EXP(Small) = $13,496,727.
Large Company NET EXP
Large Company's NET EXP in this example is calculated
in the same fashion as Small Company. The P(i) values
for Small Company are unchanged, because P(i) reflects a
Gulfwide spill frequency as affected by Small Company's
level of activity in the Gulf.
Alternative A (10% improvement in EFF)
NET EXP(Large) = $77,780,158.
Alternative B (5% improvement in EFF)
NET EXP(Large) = $79,930,358.
Example 9A
Changing the Application of Chapter II Methodology
To Evaluate Company Alternatives
Example 9A continues the example of a company
alternative to enhance cleanup effectiveness, using the
Corpus Christi area and a company Y investment of company
surprise test, management training, and purchase of
on-site communications equipment.
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As noted in example 9, certain alternatives presently
cannot be quantified by a company for the purpose of
evaluation. Example 9A explores a different use of the
Chapter II methodology which represents a more realistic
and useful planning device for company alternatives which
resist firm quantification. In example 9A, rather than
the company hypothesizing a level of improvement, the
Chapter II methodology will be applied from "back to
front", with the company undertaking the following steps:
- Identify the Y cost of the alternative?
- Make a company decision about the ratio of Y cost
to level of reduction in NET EXP the company will
require before being willing to undertake the
investment;
- Algebraically determine the new NET EXP which would
be required, and solve the NET EXP equation for the
new value of CLEAN which would be required to produce
the new NET EXP?
- Algebraically determine the new EFF that would be
required to produce the new CLEAN value determined?
and
- Algebraica
in EFF requi
percentage i
vendor of th
etc.) will h
undertaking
improvement
company can
standpoint,
lly determine the percentage improvement
red to reach the new EFF value. This
improvement is now the value which a
e alternative (training, simulations,
ave to demonstrate can be achieved by
the alternative. If this level of
cannot be warranted or assured, the
decide that from a cost-effectiveness
the investment should not be made.
In this example 9A, only the Small Company scenario
will be used to illustrate how this variation of the
Chapter II methodology can be applied.
Initializing Variables
Reflecting the different approach of example 9A, a
company first identifies its Y investment, and than
a determination of the reduction in NET EXP desired:
makes
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- Y = $210,000.
- Ratio of (reduction in NET EXP):(Y investment)
desired by Small Company: 5:1.
- Amount of reduction in NET EXP(Small) required:
$1,050,000.
- New NET EXP(Small) must therefore be: $12,595,118.
Determining Improvement in EFF Necessary for
Company to Undertake Investment
Having determined that new NET EXP(Small) must be no
greater than $12,595,118 for Small Company to undertake
the investment in Y, solving for CLEAN by use of the NET
EXP and EXPOSURE(i) equations produces:
New CLEAN(Small) = 26,534.5 tons.
The new cleanup capability of the Gulf must be 26,535
tons to produce the new NET EXP. Solving for EFF using
the CLEAN equation produces:
New EFF(Small) = 0.588.
The new effectiveness level which would be necessary
to generate a CLEAN of 26,535 tons is 0.588. Therefore,
the degree of improvement in cleanup effectiveness
required to move from a 0.50 EFF level to a 0.588 EFF
level is:
Degree of improvement required in EFF = 17.62%
Thus, the degree of improvement which must be
demonstrated by a vendor of cleanup oriented training to
induce a company to undertake a Y investment of $210,000
where the company seeks a 5:1 return in reduced NET EXP
is 17.62%. That is, the training must be demonstrated to
produce a 17.62% improvement in cleanup efficiency and
effectiveness.
The approach of example 9A to strategic alternatives
that are difficult to quantify has a number of benefits
to a company. First, the company is making its key
planning assumption based on information within the
knowledge of the company: the management assumption in
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example 9A is the return on Y investment desired by the
company. Note that in contrast, the key assumption of
example 9 is a guess as to the level of effectiveness of
the Y investment.
A second and related benefit is that the company has
under an example 9A approach, a standard against which it
can evaluate vendor offers of training programs,
simulations, and other "cleanup effectiveness" programs.
The company now knows the level of performance
improvement it desires, and can explicitly discuss with a
vendor whether such an anticipated improvement can even
be anticipated.
Example 10:
Crew Training to Reduce the Probability of a Spill
Example 10 moves to a company alternative seeking to
reduce a company's likelihood of experiencing a spill
event. The exposure of a company to a spill is
represented by P(i), which consists of the Gulf or
regional spill frequency (SPILLS(i)), the level of
activity of a company as a fraction of the region's
activity (ACTIVITY), and the variable FACTOR. FACTOR is
an unquantified value reflecting that some company
decisions will increase the company's weighted likelihood
of experiencing a spill, while other decisions can act to
reduce this expectation.
Example 10 examines the Corpus Christi area, and
considers a company's only Y investment to be training of
vessel crews in safety and oil spill prevention and
cleanup activities. This type of training has been
discussed in Chapter IX.
Crew training, like examples 9 and 9A dealing with
improvements in cleanup effectiveness, is presently not
capable of precise quantification. Therefore, in
examining the crew training alternative, the variation in
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Chapter II methodology described in example 9A will be
used. Therefore, the question to be answered concerning
crew training is: given the investment Y required, then
if management wants a level of reduction in NET EXP, what
improvement must a crew training program be able to
demonstrate in order for a company to undertake the
investment? As with example 9A, only the Small Company
scenario will be examined:
Initializing Variables
Reflecting the example 9A approach, a company first
identifies its Y investment, and than makes a
determination of the reduction in NET EXP desired:
- Y = ($750/person/course) x (2 crews/vessel) x (5
members from each crew attending) x (2.5 vessels
operated by Small Company) x (2 courses taken per
year) = $37,500.
- Ratio of (reduction in NET EXP):(Y investment)
desired by Small Company: 5:1.
- Amount of reduction in NET EXP(Small) required:
$187,000.
- New NET EXP(Small) must therefore be: $13,458,118.
Determining Improvement in EFF Necessary for
Company to Undertake Investment
Having determined that new NET EXP(Small) must be no
greater than $13,458,118 for Small Company to undertake
the investment in Y, solving for FACTOR by use of the NET
EXP and EXPOSURE(i) equations produces:
New FACTOR(Small) = 0.984.
The level of improvement in FACTOR generated by improved
crew performance required to move from a 1.00 FACTOR
level to a 0.984 FACTOR level is: 1.60%
Therefore, the degree of improvement which must be
demonstrated by a vendor of crew training to induce a
company to undertake a Y investment of $37,500 where the
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company seeks a 5:1 return in reduced NET EXP is 1.60%.
That is, the training must be demonstrated to produce a
1.60% improvement in the company's share of exposure to a
Gulf spill event.
Example 11:
Vessel Improvements to Reduce the Probability of a Spill
Example 11 continues the examination of alternatives
seeking to reduce a company's likelihood of experiencing
a spill event through reduction of FACTOR. Example 11
examines the Corpus Christi area, and considers a
company's only Y investment to be making vessel
improvements which are expected to reduce the likelihood
of the vessel suffering a collision or grounding, or
which will reduce the likelihood of a spill even if a
grounding or collision occurs.
Vessel improvements can occur at two different levels
of complexity and cost. On a smaller scale, improvements
may consist of installation of navigational and safety
aids which increase vessel safety. Such aids include
radar, LORAN systems, collision avoidance systems,
shallow water speed indicators, and other equipment.
(10) On a larger scale, a vessel may undergo extensive
retrofitting, which focuses on structural changes to a
vessel. Such changes include double hulling a vessel for
added safety.
Vessel improvements, like examples 9, 9A, and 10, are
not presently capable of precise quantification.
Therefore, in examining vessel improvement alternatives,
the variation in Chapter II methodology described in
example 9A will be used. The question to be answered
concerning vessel improvements is: given the investment
Y required, then if management wants a particular
reduction in NET EXP, what improvement must a vessel
provide in order for a company to undertake the
investment? As with example 9A, only the Small Company
scenario will be examined.
Initializing Variables
Reflecting the example 9A approach, a company first
identifies its Y investment, and than makes a
determination of the reduction in NET EXP desired.
Alternative A will examine the smaller scale improvement
of installing vessel navigational aid equipment (such as
collision avoidance) on each vessel. Alternative B will
consider the larger scale improvement of a partial vessel
retrofit, with an estimated cost per vessel of $1.5
million. (11)
Alternative A: Navigational Aid Installation:
- Y = ($150,000/vessel) x (2.5 vessels operated
by Small Company) = $375,000.
- Ratio of (reduction in NET EXP):(Y investment)
desired by Small Company: 5:1.
- Degree of reduction in NET EXP(Small) required
$1,875,000.
- New NET EXP(Small) must therefore be:
$11,770,118.
Alternative B: Vessel Partial Retrofit:
- Y = ($1,500,000/vessel) x (2.5 vessels
operated by Small Company) = $3,750,000.
- Ratio of (reduction in NET EXP):(Y investment)
desired by Small Company: 5:1.
- Degree of reduction in NET EXP(Small) required
$13,645,118. (*)
- New NET EXP(Small) must therefore be: $0.(*)
(*) Note:
still not
Company's
Even if NET EXP is reduced to $0, it is
possible to produce a 5:1 return on Small
Y investment.
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Determining Improvement in FACTOR Necessary for
Company to Undertake Investment
The new value for FACTOR, and the degree of
improvement required in order for a company to be willing
to make the Y investment, are solved in the same fashion
as example 10. The results for each alternative in this
example are set forth below:
Alternative A: Installation of Navigational Aid:
- New FACTOR must be: 0.835.
- The improvement in FACTOR which will be
required before a company will undertake the
navigational aid improvement is: 16.5%
improvement.
Alternative B: Vessel Partial Retrofit:
- New FACTOR must be: 1.0. (*)
- The improvement in FACTOR which will be
required before a company will undertake the
vessel improvement is: 100% (*)
(*) Note: Even if NET EXP is reduced to $0, it is
still not possible to produce a 5:1 return on Small
Company's Y investment.
In the example above, Alternative B cannot produce a
5:1 return on Y invested in extensive vessel
modifications. The cost of the vessel retrofit is so
great when compared to the NET EXP of Small Company that
no amount of reduction of NET EXP can reach a 5:1 ratio.
Evaluating Alternatives For Which
Benefit is Uncertain
Cost Effectiveness and
Degree of Certainty of Alternatives
Examples 9 and 9A (improving cleanup effectiveness,
variable EFF) , example 10 (reducing spill event
probability through crew training, variable FACTOR), and
example 11 (reducing spill probability through vessel
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improvements, variable FACTOR), share a common
characteristic: in none of these alternatives is the
degree of improvement in NET EXP known with any degree of
certainty. For example, estimates for crew training vary
from as high as 5-10%, to low estimates of 0% improvement.
At the present time the level of improvement cannot
be predicted for any of these alternatives. Further, as
discussed in Chapter IX, the problem is compounded
because the many factors that contribute to the
likelihood of spill occurrence (FACTOR) or that
contribute to the efficiency of a cleanup operation (EFF)
are not presently capable of being weighted with any real
accuracy. (12)
As suggested in examples 9A, 10 and 11, a company
considering this type of alternative will serve its
cost-effectiveness interests best by using the Chapter II
methodology to produce a threshold level of improvement
in FACTOR or EFF that will be necessary before the
company will undertake the investment. If a company is
satisfied by the assurances of vendors that this
threshold will be met, then the Y investment should be
made.
A company considering alternatives which reduce
probable spill occurrence (FACTOR) or which enhance
cleanup efficiency (EFF) will arrive at different
decisions depending upon whether the problem is examined
from a cost-effectiveness or public relations
perspective. As noted above, the lack of assurance of
the value associated with these alternatives will
probably result in a cost-effective determination not to
make the Y investment. Few if any vendors of training
programs and vessel equipment will guarantee that their
services and products will reduce NET EFF by a specified
factor. The company will therefore not have had its
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threshold level of performance improvement met,
suggesting a "no Y investment" decision.
Public Perception of Alternatives
As noted in the evaluation of alternatives associated
with cleanup equipment acquisitions, the public at large
can be expected to be very favorably disposed toward
company investments in measures that are directed to
minimizing spill occurrence and minimizing damage. A
company therefore faces the offsetting considerations
that the public will respond positively to the act of
investing in alternatives that will lower FACTOR or
increase EFF, but the company also must consider that the
true improvement in terms of reduced NET EXP is an open
issue.
Strategy for Alternatives
Where Benefit is Uncertain
Since a company cannot expect a particular level of
improvement in its NET EXP, the only benefit associated
with the investments affecting FACTOR or EFF is the
positive public perception of such alternatives. Faced
with the contradictory considerations of cost and public
response, a company may elect the strategy of undertaking
the FACTOR or EFF oriented alternatives that represent
the least costly measures from among this type of
investment.
Referring again to examples 9A, 10 and 11, a company
can be expected to be least willing to undertake vessel
retrofit measures, this alternative being the most
expensive measure of the group. A company will be less
opposed to purchasing vessel equipment because the per
vessel cost is much lower.
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The alternatives which a company will probably accept
most readily are management, staff or crew training
programs, or the acquisition of simulation and other
training devices. For Small Company, training programs,
simulations, and surprise tests of cleanup response
systems have been estimated in Chapter X to be in the
$70,000 range each (See also examples 9 and 9A, in which
all three measures were combined); and the training of
crews is estimated at $37,500. In contrast, vessel
equipment expenditures for collision avoidance systems
may be $100,000-200,000 per vessel, while vessel
retrofitting may be any level, running in excess of $1-2
million per vessel.
The clearest solution is for a company to express its
willingness to pursue alternatives that lower FACTOR or
increase EFF, but for the company to stress the training
oriented alternatives and to reject pressure to undertake
larger Y investments.
Example 12:
Legislative Reductions in Cost Consequences
Example 12 describes two types of possible
legislative developments which would, if implemented,
affect a company's NET EXP:
- Damage liability limits? and
- Cleanup liability limits.
These two types of legislative changes have been
considered both nationally and internationally. In the
international environment, damage liability limits are
reflected in the Civil Liability Convention (see Chapters
V and VI). In U.S. domestic law, there exist cleanup
liability limits for federal government cleanup efforts,
but unlimited liability for costs incurred by states and
private parties. There has also been extensive debate in
Congress from 1976 through the present to establish
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damage liability limits for spill events. (13)
This example again considers a spill event in the
Corpus Christi area. Example 12 approaches the question
of company strategies to support lobbying for legislative
changes using a second variant of the Chapter II
methodology. Examples 9A, 10 and 11 asked the question:
given a Y level expenditure, what level of improvement
must be realized?. The approach to damage ceilings asks:
Given a stated objective (i.e.- a desired liability
ceiling) , what expenditure will the company be
willing to make in support of industry lobbying for
this ceiling level?
variant of theThis
following
- The
- The
steps:
obj ective
degree of
Chapter II methodology applies the
is identified (the desired ceiling);
improvement in NET EXP is calculated;
- The management decision is made of the required
degree of return on the company's Y investment; and
- The size of the Y expenditure that meets this
management objective is determined.
Initializing Variables
Although damage limits and cleanup limits can
theoretically be set at any level, there are clea
for ceilings which have gained support as being r
objectives. Therefore, Alternative A considers a
liability limit of $200 million, a level which is
presently in force in legislation dealing with
Trans-Alaska Pipeline activities. (_14) . Alternat
evaluates a cleanup liability ceiling of $30 mill
which has been suggested as one possible ceiling
Alternative A - Limit on Liability for Damage
r ranges
ealistic
damage
ive 3
ion,
level.
s: A
$200 million liability limit has the effect of modifying
the portion of the EXPOSURE(i) equation consisting of:
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DAMAGES(i) x IMPACT x (V(i)-CLEAN)
If the value for this part of the EXPOSURE(i)
equation is greater than $200 million, then a liability
ceiling will cause the value of $200 million to be
substituted in place of the DAMAGES(i)... part of the
equation. This has the effect of reducing both
EXPOSURE(1) and EXPOSURE(2) substantially:
EXPOSURE(1) = $574,956,575.
EXPOSURE(2) = $272,994,075.
For a small company, the effect on NET EXP and the Y
investment decision is as follows:
- Reduction in NET EXP(Small) from existence of a
$200 million liability limit: $5,670,353.
- If Small Company seeks a 5:1 return on its Y
investment, Small Company will be willing to invest:
Y(Small) = $1,134,071 in support of such legislation.
For a large company, the effect on NET EXP and the Y
investment decision is as follows:
- Reduction in NET EXP(Large) from existence of a
$200 million liability limit: $34,022,113.
- If Large Company seeks a 5:1 return on its Y
investment, Large Company will be willing to invest:
Y(Large) = $6,804,423 in support of such legislation.
Alternative B - Limit on Cleanup Liabilities: A $30
million cleanup liability limit has the effect of
modifying the portion of the EXPOSURE(i) equation
consisting of:
ONSHORE(i) x IMPACT x (V(i)-CLEAN) + F(k)
If the value for this part of the EXPOSURE(i) equation is
greater than $30 million, then a cleanup liability
ceiling will cause the value of $30 million to be
substituted in place of the (ONSHORE(i)...) part of the
equation. This has the effect of reducing both
EXPOSURE(1) and EXPOSURE(2):
EXPOSURE(1) = $1,796,983,000.
EXPOSURE(2) = $ 353,145,820.
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For a small company, the effect on NET EXP and the Y
investment decision is as follows:
- Reduction in NET EXP(Small) from existence of a $30
million cleanup liability limit: $1,222,507.
- If Small Company seeks a 5:1 return on its Y
investment, Small Company will be willing to invest:
Y(Small) = $244,501 in support of such legislation.
For a large company, the effect on NET EXP and the Y
investment decision is as follows:
- Reduction in NET EXP(Large) from existence of a $30
million cleanup liability limit: $7,335,034.
- If Large Company seeks a 5:1 return on its Y
investment, Large Company will be willing to invest:
Y(Large) = $1,467,007 in support of such legislation.
Evaluating Legislative Alternatives
Cost Effectiveness of Legislative Alternatives
Examples 11 and 12 reflect the two principal areas
where legislative rulemaking changes have been sought by
the oil industry: damages to third parties, and
reimbursement for cleanup expenditures of third parties.
From a purely cost-effective perspective, the benefit
obtained by contributing to efforts to generate
legislative liability ceilings is very high. Large
Company in example 12, Alternative A would realize a
reduction in its NET EXP of $34 million if a $200 million
liability limit were passed into law. Small Company
would experience a similar proportional improvement.
Note, however, that even a $200 million ceiling is
neither as cost effective in terms of return on Y
investment, nor as absolutely effective in reducing NET
EXP, as an investment in P&I insurance. The reason for
this is that while the present legislative regime imposes
unlimited liability, there are realistic upper limits on
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the value of resources in a region that suffers a spill
event- Thus, while the law speaks in terms of "no
limit", areas in the Gulf region do in fact have upper
limits for resource and commercial damage. See Chapter
XI .
A corollary conclusion which can also be drawn is
that a company will see a legislative alternative as
being more favorable than the P&I insurance option where
the liability ceiling is lowered to some value below $200
million. As will be discussed in Chapter XIII, the oil
industry is actively pursuing legislative solutions with
liability limits far lower than $200 million (15),
suggesting that at some level the value of a liability
ceiling is sufficiently great to cause additional
Y(interest group lobbying) investments.
Degree of Certainty of Insurance Alternatives
Alternatives focusing on legislative change are
highly uncertain. Efforts to achieve liability ceilings
have been in process from as early as 1976, and are still
unresolved issues today. The legislative change route is
a slow process, and because much of the process consists
of public congressional hearings, the oil industry has
the added uncertainty of having to publicly state its
desire for a limit on its own liability. A further
uncertainty is that the industry's ability to persuade a
Congress may change drastically with new elections or
with the death of a key congressional chairman. For
example, see the discussion in Chapter III concerning
changes in Senate and House committees in 1965.
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Public Perception of
Legislative Alternatives
s Chapter,
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iability.
of the
s a correct
den then
ceiling
reluctance
es in
(16) This
reluctance has also recently been seen in another
context, where Congress flatly rejected liability
ceilings for compensation to victims of air disasters.
(17)
Strategy for Legislative Alternatives
Once companies individually and through the industry,
collectively, have determined legislative changes dealing
with spill liability that are sufficiently valuable to
pursue, the essential strategy is that of tradeoff and
compromise. Knowing that the public may view efforts to
limit liability with hostility, companies in the industry
should consider other, offsetting changes in their own
handling of spills which the public will view favorably.
As discussed, the public views measures to reduce spill
occurrence and severity most favorably, and is also
favorably disposed toward insurance oriented solutions.
Therefore, companies seeking change should modify their
legislative efforts away from seeking the sole benefit of
liability limits, and should move toward a broader set of
solutions that include components favorable to the public.
Of all the alternatives discussed in thi
the public has historically shown the greate
and suspicion toward legislative limits on 1
The reason is apparent: the representatives
public cannot be sure that the ceiling set i
and fair ceiling? and once in place, the bur
falls on the public to attempt to change the
upwards. The Congress has demonstrated this
in statements made to industry representativ
legislative hearings on oil spill liability.
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The beginning of such a shift in American Petroleum
Institute and large company member testimony can be seen
in the most recent Congressional hearings on oil
pollution liability. See Chapter XIII.
Example 13;
Combining Alternatives
The many alternatives examined in this Chapter can be
used in combination by a company seeking a strategy to
deal with the consequences of an oil spill. It is also
possible for a company to approach its strategy using the
Chapter II methodology and one or more variations of the
methodology (ex, example 9A, example 12). Example 13
briefly indicates how a company strategy using three
different alternatives together can be analyzed. The
example focuses on the Corpus Christi area, and is a
strategy approach for Large Company.
Large Company elects the following three alternatives:
- PStl Coverage (plus TOVALOP-CRISTAL) ;
- Large Company purchase of 2,000 ft. boom;
- Large Company then wishes to know what level of
improvement in vessel safety would be required to
justify spending $225,000 on crew training, where
Large Company wishes a 5:1 reduction of NET EXP for
its Y(crew training) investment.
Analysis
For the insurance alternative and the cleanup
alternative, the process for determining the effect on
NET EXP follows example 5 for P&I insurance, and example
7 for improvement of cleanup capability. The following
variables are affected:
- INSURANCE = $319,200,000.
- CLEAN = 25,715 tons.
- Y(insurance) = $140,000 x 15 vessels = $2,100,000.
- Y(cleanup) = $260,000 for boom.
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The effect of the insurance and cleanup capability
alternatives on EXPOSURE(i):
- EXPOSURE(1) = $2,047,802,813.
- EXPOSURE(2) = $ 350,215,313.
The effect on Large Company's NET EXP is set forth below:
NET EXP(Large Company) = $27,755,529.
Large Company now wishes to evaluate a further
expenditure of Y on crew training. The approach is
analogous to example 10:
Y(crew training) = $225,000.
Management decision: 5:1 ratio of reduction in NET
EXP):(Y).
The new value for variable FACTOR required to
generate this level of improvement is 0.951. The degree
of improvement required from old FACTOR to new FACTOR =
4.9% Therefore, the company, having undertaken
Y(insurance) and Y(cleanup capability) expenditures, will
require that a further Y expenditure on crew training
will require a reduction in company exposure to spill
events of 4.9%.
Conclusion
To permit direct comparison of the cost-effectiveness
of the various examples presented in this Chapter, see
Table 42, at page 385. A summary table, Table 43, at
page 387, has also been presented which qualitatively
compares the key considerations facing a company in
making its overall assessment of whether a strategy is
acceptable:
- What is the magnitude of the improvement in NET EXP?
- What is the size of the Y outlay required?
- Is the investment certain to produce the hoped for
improvement in NET EXP?
- What is the public perception of the strategy?
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TABLE 4 2
SYNOPSIS OF EXAMPLES OF PLANNING ALTERNATIVES
Example Small Company Large Company
(1)
Y
(000's)
(2)
NET EXP
usinq Y
(3)
Improve-
ment from
(4)
Ratio
(3)/
(1)
Y
(000's)
(2)
NET EXP
usinq Y
(3)
Improve-
ment in
(4)
Ratio
(3)/
(000•s) NET EXP
TrraTTsr
NET EXP
TUdG's)
111
1. no Y 0 13,645 n/a n/a 0 81,871 n/a n/a
(2 and 3
omitted)
4. TOVALOP
/CRISTAL 175 12,848 797 4.5 1,050 77,089 4,782 4.6
5. P&I 350 5,377 8,268 23.6 2,100 32,260 49,611 23.6
6. Third
Party Ins. 525 10,952 2,693 5.1 3,150 65,710 16,161 5.1
7. Cleanup
equip., indivi¬
dual company 260 13,111 534 2.1 260 77,366 4,505 17.3
8. Cleanup
equip.,
cooperative 13 12,864 781 60.1 78 77,184 4,687 60.1
9. Alt. A-
EFF program,
10% effect 210 13,138 507 2.4 210 77,780 4,091 19.5
9. Alt. B-
EFF program,
5% effect 210 13,497 148 0.7 210 79,930 1,941 9.2
9A. EFF
program, if
17.6% effect 210 12,595 1,050 5.0 (not calculated)
10. Crew
training, if
1.6% effect 37.5 13,458 187 5.0 (not calculated)
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TABLE 42, Continued
Example Small Company Large Company
(1)
Y
(000* s)
(2)
NET EXP
usinq Y
(0001s)
(3) (4) (1) (2)
Improve- Ratio Y NET EXP
raent from (3) / (0001s) usinq Y
NET EXP
(000•s)
liL
(3)
Improve¬
ment in
NET EXP
(000 's)11.Alt A-
Nav. aids, if
16.5% effect 375 11,770 1,875 5.0 (not calculated)
11. Alt B-
Vessel retro¬
fit, if 100%
effect Cannot achieve 5:1 ratio of
(reduction in NET EXP):
(Y investment) (not calculated)12.Alt. A-
Damages ceiling
of $200M 1,134 7,975 5,690 5.0 6,804 47,849 34,022
12. Alt. B-
Cleanup ceiling
of $30 M 245 12,423 1,223 5.0 1,467 74,536 7,335
13. Combining
Alternatives (if
crew training has
4.9% effect) (not calculated) 2,585 26,631 55,240
(4)
Ratio
5.0
5.0
21.4
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TABLE 43
QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF COMPANY ALTERNATIVES
Alternative Magnitude of Level of How Certain What is the
Improvement Y Outlay is the Public
in NET EXP Improvement Perception
Insurance
Alternatives HIGHEST MODERATE CERTAIN FAVORABLE
Legislative
Changes (Liab¬
ility Ceilings)
HIGH(*) MODERATE/
HIGH
UNCERTAIN UNFAVORABLE
Cleanup
Equip. MODERATE/
LOW
LOW(* *) FAIRLY
CERTAIN
HIGHLY FAVORABLE
Reducing
Spill Freq.
and Severity
- Training UNKNOWN LOW UNCERTAIN HIGHLY FAVORABLE
~ Nav. Aids UNKNOWN MODERATE UNCERTAIN HIGHLY FAVORABLE
- Retrofit UNKNOWN VERY HIGH UNCERTAIN HIGHLY FAVORABLE
(*) Legislative changes may be "HIGHEST" magnitude of benefit if limit sought
is sufficiently low (i.e.- below $200 million).
(**) The "LOW" Y outlay designation includes a small company election to
purchase equipment only through a cooperative arrangement.
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From both Tables 42 and 43, it is clear that an
insurance oriented alternative (either alone or in
conjunction with other alternatives) is by far the
alternative of first importance to a company. The
magnitude of improvement in NET EXP is high (and
extremely high in the case of P&I insurance); the Y
outlay is moderate; but justifying the Y investment is
the fact that the alternative is certain to produce the
desired benefit if a spill occurs; and finally, the
public looks favorably on the alternative.
After insurance, the desirability of alternatives is
unclear, because a cost-effectiveness perspective will
conflict with a public-oriented perspective in terms of
which alternatives to pursue. From a cost-effective
viewpoint, pursuit of a legislative solution is the next
best alternative to insurance, because despite the high
level of uncertainty, the potential benefit to NET EXP is
very high. Improving cleanup resources is also a strong
consideration, because although the magnitude of
improvement is only moderate, the Y investment
(particularly if a cooperative is used) is low, and the
alternative is fairly certain to produce its intended
result. A distant last are the alternatives to improve
FACTOR and EFF, because of the lack of knowledge about
the level of benefit, and the high Y costs associated
with these solutions (particularly for vessel retrofits).
From a publicly oriented perspective, a reversal in
alternative preference results. Acquisition of cleanup
equipment is the second choice after insurance, because
of the strongly positive public reaction and also because
of the high certainty of a reduction in NET EXP. The
third level of selection is to undertake the lowest Y
cost FACTOR or EFF oriented alternatives available (such
as training programs), because the Y investment serves a
positive public image value and may have some beneficial
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effect on NET EXP. The two alternatives of legislative
changes and high-cost FACTOR and EFF measures are least
desirable: the legislative changes, because of public
hostility toward the industry and member companies; and
the high-cost FACTOR and EFF solutions, because of the
large Y outlay required.
Chapter XIII, concluding this work, briefly explores
trends of the industry in seeking to plan for the
consequences of oil spill events, and suggests that the
industry perspective may be starting to reflect certain
of the strategy considerations presented in this Chapter.
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NOTES
1. Inverview with Robert Hooker, Manager, Marine
Transportation, Champlin Oil Company.
2. Oil Companies International Marine Forum and Oil
Companies Institute for Marine Pollution Compensation,
Ltd. , Oil Spill Pollution Liability and Compensation: A
Position Statement Concerning Revisions to the Civil
Liabilities Convention, 1969, and the Fund Convention,
1976 (OCIMF, 1982). TOVALOP, CRISTAL, P&I insurance, and
third party insurance all operate on a sliding scale of
premiums based on tonnage of tankers and tonnage
shipped. To facilitate presentation of this example, the
use of 70,000 per tanker of average 55,000 tons permits a
basic averaging of the lower per ton premiums of large
tankers and the higher per ton premiums of smaller
tankers in Small Company's and Large Company's fleets.
3. Interview with G. Sullivan, Esq. Mr. Sullivan, in
addition to presently being a maritime attorney, was
formerly a licensed mate in the U.S. merchant marine,
where he has sailed aboard oil tankers of various sizes.
4. See Chapter IV.
5. Interview with William Koerth, Vice President of
Finance and Head of Insurance Department, Coastal Corp.
6. Ibid.
7. Funds have been heavily debated during the 97th
Congress (1981-1982) in bills H.R. 85 and S. 681; and
proposals for a fund of approximately $100 million, in
conjunction with an additional level of direct liability
against the spiller, are presently undergoing debate in
the present 98th Congress in bills H.R. 2115, H.R. 2222
and H.R. 2368.
8. Interview with M. Burdbacher, Clean Gulf
Associates Representative, Shell Oil Co.
9. See Chapter X. See also C. H. Peabody and R. H.
Goodman, "Innovative Training: Computer Assisted
Learning" , in Proceedings, American Petroleum Institute
Oil Spill Conference, 1983 (Washington: API, 1983), 244;
Leon Kazmierczak, "Major Spill Response Planning for
Tanker Operations", in Proceedings, American Petroleum
Institute Oil Spill Conference, 1979 (Washington: API,
1979); and Leon Kazmierczak, et. al., "Results of a
Surprise Test of Sun's Major Spill Response Plan", m
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Proceedings, American Petroleum Institute Oil Spill
Conference, 1981 (Washington: API, 1981) .
10. Interview with G. Sullivan, Esq.
11. Ibid. A navigation aid such as a collision
avoidance system is estimated at between $100,000-200,000.
12. See Chapter XI, and specifically the ORCA study
discussed. See Norman Meade, et. al., "An Analysis of
Tanker Casualties for the Ten Year Period 1969-1978",
presented at the 1981 Oil Spill Conference, March 2-5,
1981, Atlanta, Georgia.
13. In the 97th Congress: H.R. 85 and S. 681. In
the present 98th Congress: H.R. 2115, H.R. 2222, and
H.R. 2368.
14. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973,
43 U.S.C. Sec. 1651-1655.
15. Among the 98th Congress proposals H.R. 2115, H.R.
2222 and H.R. 2368, liability limits of as low as $30-50
million are being considered, in conjunction with a
public fund which would compensate up to $100 million for
damages from a single spill event.
16. See generally, U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Navigation, Hearings of March 11, 1981 on Oil
Pollution Liability - H.R. 85, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on
Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection, Hearings
of March 25, 1981 on S. 681 - Oil Spill Liability and
Compensation Act of 1981, unpublished stenographic
transcript, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
17. Congress in April, 1983, rejected adoption of the
"Montreal Protocols" , which would have amended the Warsaw
Convention and the Hague Convention to create a maximum
exposure of $350 million per person, composed of direct
liabilities and required insurance coverage by carriers.
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CHAPTER XIII
TRENDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
In selecting strategies for the management of
catastrophic oil spills, a final question remains. What
trends are evolving in the external environment that may
change the number or scope of alternatives for dealing
with oil spill consequences? This dissertation concludes
by briefly discussing trends in the areas of insurance,
cleanup capability, alternatives to reduce spill
frequency or severity, and prospective legislative
changes. It is important for individual companies to
note these potential changes and to adjust their
strategies. For a company to evaluate trends affecting
the company's range of alternatives, the company will
consider the following factors:
- How valuable to the company is the change
represented by the trend?
- What is the ability of the company itself to
influence or to bring about the change?
A company's examination of trends is in some ways
analogous to its review of existing alternatives as
discussed in Chapter XII. A company has ability to spend
funds on long term or speculative solutions that are
represented by trends that will change alternatives. A
company can also attempt to participate directly in the
effort to bring about a change by furnishing personnel,
expert assistance and equipment. This Chapter will first
review potential changes that will affect available
alternatives, and will then briefly discuss which of
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these trends a large company (i.e.- one that represents a
significant share of the industry) and a small company
ought to pursue.
Current Trends
Insurance and Compensation Funds
International Conventions and International Industry
Programs: In 1984 a diplomatic conference will be held
by IMO to discuss adoption of new provisions to the Civil
Liabilities Convention (CLC) and Fund Convention (FC).
(_1) The major provisions to be discussed are:
- Increasing liability limits (CLC);
- Increasing compensation fund coverage (FC)?
- Broadening the scope of coverage;
- Providing a mechanism for equitable readjustment as
necessary.
Of primary importance to companies is the possible
increase in fund limitations, liability limits and scope
of coverage. The Oil Companies International Marine
Forum (OCIMF) and the Oil Companies Institute for Marine
Pollution Compensation Limited (the Institute, which
administers CRISTAL) both strongly support revisions in
the present international liability limits. (2) These
groups propose establishing the CLC liability limit at
$50 million and setting the FC fund limit at $75 million.
(3^) This would provide a new combined coverage of $125
million, with compensation of $50 million directly from
the spiller and $75 million being provided by the fund.
OCIMF and the Institute have also proposed that both
TOVALOP and CRISTAL limits be revised upward to parallel
the changes being sought in CLC and FC, suggesting that
total TOVALOP and CRISTAL coverage also equal $125
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million. Since the oil company members and their
affiliates in OCIMF and the Institute own 43% of the
world's commercial tankers, it is likely that these
proposed revisions to limitation will occur in the
future. (_4)
Small companies in particular would greatly benefit
by this increase in coverage under TOVALOP and CRISTAL,
and also from revision of CLC and FC in the event the
United States ratifies these conventions. In effect, the
changes to TOVALOP, CRISTAL, CLC and FC provide an
increase in insurance available at premium rates that are
spread over the entire industry. Further, once the funds
are built up to the required new maintenance levels,
payments into the funds would be required only when large
spills occurred that would deplete the fund (i.e., a
"call" arrangement). Therefore, the return on Y
investment in this insurance coverage alternative would
be quite high.
P&I Club Insurance; A second trend in the insurance
area that may occur in the private sector is the
possibility that P&I club insurance coverage may increase
in the near future. Reviewing the history of P&I
insurance coverage of oil spill damages, in 1969 P&I
coverage for oil pollution damages was limited to $10
million. By 1981, only twelve years later, P&I coverage
for oil spill damage has risen to $300 million. The
progression of growth in coverage is noted below:
Year Level of Coverage
($ million)
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981,
10.0
14.4
15.0
25.0
30.0
100.0
300.0and presently (5)
395
The rapid increases between 1977 and 1979, and from
1979 to 1981, indicates that there is growing certainty
within the insurance market about assessing the risk of
spill occurrence and the probability of payout. As the
insurance market becomes more certain of its situation
and as coverage is expanded through other funds (such as
FC, and proposed U.S. domestic funds), P&I insurance will
be required only to cover the largest spills. Therefore,
because the incidence of payout of P&I can be expected to
drop, P&I vendors can be expected to show greater
willingness to expand this upper limit coverage during
the later 1980's.
For those companies that can qualify for P&I
coverage, any increase in P&I maximum levels will greatly
improve their net exposure because insurance alternatives
represent the Y investment with the greatest effect on
NET EXP. See Chapter XII.
Domestic Compensation Funds: In the present 98th
Congress, three bills have been proposed which include
compensation funds for damages from oil spills: H.R.
2115, H.R. 2222 and H.R. 2368. In H.R. 2222 and H.R.
2115, after a spiller's liability limit has been reached
(the level of liability limit under this legislation to
be discussed shortly), the compensation fund is
responsible for payment of outstanding claims without any
maximum or ceiling, ((j) Under H.R. 2368 a compensation
fund will be liable up to a maximum of $100 million for
each spill incident. (7.)
All three bills require a fee to be paid of
$0.013/bbl. on crude oil received at a U.S. refinery and
on petroleum products entering the U.S. for "consumption,
use or warehousing." (SO Such a fund in essence provides
all companies with a publicly administered form of
insurance coverage.
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The American Petroleum Institute, during hearings on
these bills, has indicated that while the industry agrees
with the concept of a compensation fund, the industry
strongly desires an upper limit on fund compensation such
as the limit included in H.R. 2368. (9^)
A compensation fund is particularly favored by the
public. This desire for an adequate and available
compensation for damages from oil pollution was expressed
at hearings held during the 97th Congress in 1981 on
bills H.R. 85 and S. 681. (10) At the time of the
hearings on H.R. 85 and S. 681, the level of the cleanup
fund created under the Clean Water Act (note: only
compensating for cleanup costs incurred by the
government) was only $5 million, with an additional $5
million owed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
(11) Further, witness testimony also noted that in 1976
the fund had actually been bankrupt and U.S. Coast Guard
appropriations had to be used to cover cleanup costs. (12)
It is generally acknowledged by both the public and
by industry that the current cleanup fund situation is
inadequate to meet the needs of major spill§. By
supporting the revisions included in pending bills,
individual companies can obtain increased "insurance"
protection for damage claims at a reasonable "cost" (the
$0.013/bbl. tax). For the public, a fund such as has
been proposed under pending legislation also guarantees a
stated level of protection for both cleanup and for
damages suffered, regardless of the spiller's ability or
willingness to pay such claims.
Cleanup Capability
Individual companies appear to be showing an
increasing interest in expanding cleanup capability
International Oil Spill Organization, a group of 14
The
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multinational oil companies proposed increasing
capability worldwide through prepositioning of three
major stockpiles (one in the Gulf of Mexico) of cleanup
equipment. (1_3) Although agreement ultimately was not
reached, one of the companies is considering the
possibility of continuing to work toward this goal. As
seen in the previous Chapter, large companies can benefit
from individual purchases of equipment. For a small
company such a purchase may not provide a large enough
benefit for the investment.
Research and development is continuing by the
industry particularly in the area of developing more
effective and less toxic dispersants. Exxon Corporation
and Shell Oil are leaders in this field. While
dispersants are rarely approved by the EPA for use on
spills in the U.S., and never in large quantities, this
lack of approval is primarily based on the toxicity of
dispersants on marine organisms. As dispersants are
improved, their use may become feasible. This would
allow companies to greatly increase cleanup capability as
dispersants are already stockpiled in many areas. The
value of individual expenditures for research and
development is also greater for the large company than
the small one due to the high cost for uncertain or long
term ventures.
In contrast, cleanup records by cooperatives (see
Chapter X) have indicated that this type of shared
resource arrangement can be beneficial to all companies
but particularly those smaller in size. Cooperatives
allow enhancement of capability at a much lower cost than
any company can achieve alone. Cooperatives with a local
focus can perhaps better meet the needs of a company
operating in a particular area as equipment can be geared
for specific needs. As the Corpus Christi Area Oil Spill
Cooperative has shown, the additional benefit of local
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coops is that experience and familiarity with a
particular area can lead to a faster and smoother
response to spills. (_14) While large companies have the
resources and generally the activity to justify joining
several regional cooperatives, small companies may find
that joining a cooperative with interests locally focused
on their activity areas is the most cost effective
decision. It was apparent in Chapter XII that purchases
of cleanup equipment can produce large benefits as most
areas do not have the capability to adequately handle
major spills.
One of the postulated reasons for the inadequate
cleanup equipment stockpiles maintained by industry is
that there has been an overreliance by companies on
projected government equipment purchases. (1_5) U.S.
Coast Guard projections in published reports up through
1979 indicated that major purchases of cleanup equipment
would occur through the mid-1980's. As the federal
government's budget was cut dramatically in the early
1980's, funds were not allocated for these purchases.
Therefore any reliance placed upon these pre-1979
projections will be misplaced. Given this situation and
the companies' awareness of need for increased
capability, individual companies can be expected to add
to cleanup capability, particularly through cooperatives.
As the Corpus Area cooperative has shown, the public
is willing to share in a cooperative effort in order to
attain their specific needs. This sharing mechanism
particularly in sensitive areas (tourist beaches,
fisheries areas) is a strategy that deserves further
exploration. A cooperative program could also act to
reduce the need perceived by states to have their own
cleanup fund. As most funds are based on taxes to the
oil industry it might be more prudent for the company to
combine equipment purchases with the state in a
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cooperative fashion rather than face an additional tax.
This is especially useful where the company plans to buy
equipment anyway.
It should be noted that states retain their ability
to create their own state level funds for damages and
cleanup. (1_6) During hearings on H.R. 85 and S. 681 in
1981, representaives from Florida, Maryland, New Jersey
and New York all agreed that the ability to maintain
state cleanup capability for their special interests was
very important. (1_7) Actively working with the state on
their special interests could be of great benefit to the
industry.
A wise strategy for companies may be to form these
cooperatives with local and state governments in the
areas of their primary exposure. This would allow the
company to increase its coverage through a shared
arrangement while also directly addressing the special
needs of an area's sensitive resources. With the public
sharing in the costs and decisions through local
governments, the demand for equipment and level of
cleanup should remain at a more reasonable level than if
there is little or no involvement. Additionally much
goodwill could be generated for the industry which should
reduce specious damage claims.
Reduction of Frequency and Severity
Lack of data on the efficiency and effectiveness of
most measures proposed for reducing the frequency and
severity of spills has been a long term problem. Even
the historical data bases that currently exist are not
felt to be of extensive predictive value for large
spills. This is a result of the changing profile of the
industry (number and size of tankers, number of trips,
etc.) over the past fifteen years and low probability of
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large spill events. Any data collection to improve
predictability will be a long term effort and fairly
costly. Given the uncertainty that surrounds predictions
of effectiveness for the various reduction options such
as crew and management training, vessel modifications and
spill simulations, companies can be expected to focus on
those options that are likely to produce a benefit with
low cost outlays. When the cost outlay is low campanies
can afford to take a chance on the unknown level of
benefit.
Those options that a company is likely to choose
are: crew and management training programs and courses;
gathering and exchanging information to eventually build
better data bases; the use of real time simulations and
surprise tests to familiarize the players with problems
likely to be encountered; and the addition of equipment
to vessels that will improve navigation, communication,
and steering, particularly when changes in international
standards requiring such additions appear imminent. Most
of these options only require outlays in the thousands or
hundreds of thousands of dollars. All sizes of companies
can participate at this level.
Major ship modifications on the other hand require
outlays in the millions for speculative results. Because
of uncertainty about the level of effectiveness of such
modifications, coupled with the large dollar outlay
required, such investments are not likely to be made in
the- forseeable future.
Areas where increased knowledge is likely to be
sought are those areas that reduce severity. Studies by
the industry, such as MIRG (see Chapter XI) , are
currently focusing on obtaining information such as
sensitive area location, value of resources and sites for
fast deployment of equipment. This type of knowledge
allows the individual company to better assess possible
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damages and to plan cleanup operations with the goal of
reducing damages.
Changes in the Legislative Regime
It is highly likely that changes will occur in the
U.S. legislative regime dealing with oil pollution.
Bills proposing change have been introduced in the last
five Congresses with none passing both houses. Change is
becoming especially likely in view of the new legislation
introduced in the 98th Congress which has incorporated
the changes and compromises suggested by both the oil
industry and the public during the hearings on H.R. 85
and S. 681 in the 97th Congress. As there has been an
evolution of the bills introduced from the 97th Congress
to the 98th Congress this discussion will focus on the
provisions in the latest bills that reflect the changes
that occurred in 1981 to 1983. Of particular interest
are the short and long term effects that could occur
should any of the new legislation (H.R. 2222, H.R. 2115
and H.R. 2368) pass in the near future.
During the hearings held on H.R. 85 and S. 681 in
1981 industry very strongly opposed the idea of unlimited
liability. The American Institute of Merchant Shipping,
the American Petroleum Institute, the American
International Group, the American Insurance Association
and the American Institute of Marine Insurance all
testified at the hearings on S. 681 and H.R. 85
requesting a liability limit because insurance to protect
against spills would not be obtainable without a limit.
(18) Because federal legislation requires proof of
financial responsibilty, without insurance many companies
would not be able to meet tis requirement and therefore
would not be able to operate. (_19) Only those companies
large enough to self-insure would be able to meet these
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requirements.
The American International Group stated this concept
very clearly in its testimony on H.R. 85:
Unlimited liability for removal costs cannot be
insured. The specific imposition of this liability
should be made with this knowledge that the incident
could force even major offshore interests into severe
financial difficulty and affect the continued
development of offshore oil and gas reserves. (20)
Companies clearly are not interested in having
unlimited liability as the exposure is very high. They
would prefer a known limit. The public on the other hand
is not favorable toward liability limits, due to a
suspicion that liabilities could far exceed the limits
with no recourse for damage compensation. A possible
compromise would combine liability limits with a
compensation fund for those damages above the limits thus
benefiting both sides. It is important that the
liability limits are set high enough to cover most spills
and the fund is large enough to cover the costs from a
major spill that exceed the limit. The newly proposed
legislation presents this compromise. The proposed
limits in H.R. 2222 are $500,000 or $400/grt whichever is
greater not to exceed $40 million. (21) As previously
discussed in this chapter there would also be a fund to
cover damages that exceed the spiller's liability limit.
This fund could either have a $100 million cap or be
unlimited depending upon which bill were to pass. While
this compromise addresses the needs of both sides a
further compromise may eventually evolve that would
increase the liability limit for the spiller and set a
limit on the fund compensation. It would provide a
higher level of compensation for damages (the public's
main interest) and would also provide set limits to
liability (the company's main interest).
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Preemption of state laws that have unlimited
liability provisions and independent funds is a corollary
issue. The industry favors preemption of state laws so
that one uniform set of operating rules can be evolved at
the federal level. Whether or not the public favors
state preemption depends on the state viewing the
legislation. Those states not heavily dependent upon the
oil industry and those with sensitive coastal areas are
strongly opposed to preemption clauses. The compromise
suggested during the H.R. 85 and S. 681 hearings was to
preempt states on liability limits but to allow retention
of state funds. (22) This compromise has appeared in the
new legislation. (23_) It is likely that this trend will
remain due to high public interest.
ew the new legi s lation, o n the
a cos t-effecti Ve measur e • It
lities provide s a fund wh ich i
urance coverage and prev e n ts
removi ng the li ability c e i ling .
now eva luate i s how the Publ ic
of chang es.
Public Perception of Change
The public view of the trends will be examined to
review those company alternatives that the public will
view favorably. The public will greatly favor additional
cleanup equipment because increased cleanup capability
acts to mitigate spill severity. Insurance and funds are
also viewed favorably as they provide assurance of the
availability of funds for damage compensation. The
public will favor any measures that act to reduce
frequency and severity as those measures act to reduce
the actual spill damage.
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The question of liability is a very difficult one not
directly addressed in most state and federal laws.
Therefore, most damage claimants currently must rely on
common law for recovery in an area where little case law
has evolved. As most claimants do not have the resources
to pursue such a case under the certain tort law many are
currently forced to abandon claims or accept small
settlements out of court. It is also possible in some
cases for the shipowner to limit liability to the value
of the ship and salvaged cargo. Note, however, that the
cargo owner continues to be fully liable. (24) While the
public does not favor the concept of a liability ceiling
(because of the potential damages uncompensated above the
ceiling) a clear definition of spiller liability and
public right to recovery for damages will be viewed as a
desirable objective.
A further question must also be asked: if these
proposed changes are passed into law will they be stable
and enduring changes? As currently proposed, the changes
will probably not last if a catastrophic spill of Amoco
Cadiz proportions were to occur, because the potential
damage from such a spill would far exceed the current
provisions for compensation. For example, under the new
legislation the spiller's liability would be only $40
million; during Amoco Cadiz, the cleanup costs alone
were $115 million. As a further illustration, the
proposed funds are ranging from $100 million to $200
million with industry favoring the $100 million limit.
If the fund were $100 million, combined with the
spiller's liability of $40 million, after a $115 cleanup
operation there would only be $25 million left to cover
other damages after cleanup (based on Amoco Cadiz costs).
In the case of Amoco Cadiz suits were filed in excess
of $2 billion. Such extremes are likely to induce the
public to immediately undo such favorable legislation
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following such an incident,. The legislation passed in
the aftermath of a catastrophic spill could be very
unfavorable to industry such as unlimited liabilities.
Such reactive changes are extremely likely based on past
history: the legislation passed after Torrey Canyon and
Santa Barbara in the U.S. and the International
Conventions passed after Amoco Cadiz.
It is very important that any legislation passed, no
matter how favorable it appears for the company, not have
the potential to greatly frustrate the public should a
catastrophic spill occur. The bad will generated by such
an event can greatly harm oil companies by carrying over
into many areas of company operation. Areas that could
be particularly vulnerable would be all petroleum
transportation, offshore oil terminals, and offshore
drilling and exploration.
Evaluating Trends
As discussed at the outset of this Chapter, a
company's perspective about trends will be affected by
two considerations: the level of value which the trend
represents to the company? and the amount of control
which the company has over the trend. It is important
for companies to realize that planning which concerns
prospective changes, like planning based on existing
alternatives, is likely to produce different strategies
depending on company size.
Value of Trends to Companies
It has already been shown in Chapter XII that small
companies and large companies have different alternatives
available for dealing with consequences of spills; and
even where common alternatives exist, a smaller company
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may derive a different level of benefit from the
alternative than a larger company.
These differences apply also to prospective changes
in the range of alternatives. Table 44, at page 407,
includes a column for a small and large company
indicating the degree of value of each trend to these
companies. For the insurance oriented trends, it can be
seen that for a large company, changes in P&I levels are
of high value, because higher P&I ceilings translate
directly into lower NET EXP. See Chapter XII. For the
smaller company, however, the value of P&I insurance
changing may only be moderate, because a small company
may not be able to gain access to a P&I club.
In contrast, for a small company, prospective
increases in TOVALOP and CRISTAL, and the possibility of
expanded compensation funds to cover damages from spills,
are of extremely high value. A smaller company, if it
cannot gain access to a P&I club, must fall back on other
insurance and on TOVALOP and CRISTAL. Therefore,
expanded coverage under TOVALOP and CRISTAL are certain
to be of use to a small company. Similarly, compensation
funds represent a form of insurance to which the small
company is assured access (i.e., because of the
reciprocal obligation to pay the $0.013/bbl. tax). For
TOVALOP, CRISTAL and compensation funds, it is the larger
company which may not experience as great a benefit.
Because a large company has extensive P&I coverage,
increases in TOVALOP, CRISTAL or compensation funds are
only a shift from P&I coverage to these other insurance
programs.
Among the cleanup oriented alternatives, it can be
seen that both large and small companies experience the
same value from alternatives. Both experience high,
direct benefits from enhancements to cleanup capability,
and both experience uncertain levels of benefits from the
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TABLE 44
EVALUATING TRENDS FROM PERSPECTIVES OF
SMALL COMPANY, LARGE COMPANY, AND PUBLIC
Alternative/ Small Company
Trend
Value to Degree of
Company Control
Large’ Company Public
Perception
Value to Degree of
Company Control
Insurance:
P&I Level
Increase MODERATE LOW HIGH HIGH FAVORABLE
TOVALOP-
CRISTAL
Increase HIGH LOW MODERATE/ HIGH FAVORABLE
Legislative
Compensation
Funds HIGH LOW MODERATE HIGH FAVORABLE
Cleanup;
Cleanup
Capability
HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGHLY
FAVORABLE
Cleanup
Training
UNKNOWN HIGH UNKNOWN HIGH HIGHLY
FAVORABLE
Vessel Nav¬
igation Aids
UNKNOWN HIGH UNKNOWN HIGH HIGHLY
FAVORABLE
Vessel
Retrofit
UNKNOWN HIGH UNKNOWN HIGH HIGHLY
FAVORABLE
Limits to
Damages:
Damage and
Cleanup
Ceilings
MODERATE LOW HIGH HIGH UN¬
FAVORABLE
FACTOR and EFF oriented alternatives such as crew and
management training and vessel equipment purchases.
Changes associated with setting liability ceilings
produce a slightly different benefit for small and large
companies. While both sizes of company benefit from a
downward movement of liability ceilings it is the large
company, with its large NET EXP potential, which derives
the highest level of benefit. A small company also
experiences an improvement in NET EXP, but on a much
lower scale.
Degree of Control Over Trends
A company must also evaluate what role it should
attempt to play in bringing about those trends which it
finds valuable. The important question is whether the
company acts as a spokesman for the industry. A review
of organizations such as the American Petroleum
Institute, OCIMF, and other industry interest groups
produces a small number of the largest companies whose
employees are the most active representatives and
spokesmen. The congressional hearings in which API and
others testify consistently produce industry witnesses
who are high management and policy employees of companie
such as Exxon, Shell, Mobil, Texaco, and other large
companies.
The question of control in bringing about trends,
therefore, can be modified to ask whether the trend is
one which requires an industry level or institutional
effort to achieve, or whether instead the effort is one
that can be realized by a single company acting in a
single company capacity. See Table 44, at page 407.
The insurance oriented trends are all developments
which require an industry level effort. Negotiations
with London P&I clubs, the multinational and industry
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negotiations which will take place in 1984, all require
industry level involvement. Similarly, legislative
changes such as H.R. 2115, H.R. 2222 and H.R. 2368, which
include trends in the area of compensation funds and
liability ceilings, require industry level witness
testimony and persuasion.
In contrast, the alternatives directly related to
controlling spill frequency and severity are within the
direct control of an individual company. A single
company can make the decision to acquire a piece of
equipment, to train a crew, or to plan a cleanup effort.
Planning for Company Role
In Seeking Changes
The dual considerations of value of the trend and
opportunity to participate in bringing about the trend
permit a final set of suggestions for small and large
companies and their pursuit of these trends.
Largest Companies: The large companies in the oil
industry can be expected to concentrate primarily on
enhancing their level of P&I coverage and on seeking
legislative limits to liability. As noted in Chapter
XII, these two alternatives provide the greatest impact
on NET EXP. Further, because the largest companies are
themselves able to speak on behalf of the industry at
congressional hearings, negotiations and conferences, the
large company interest and the industry interest are very
similar. The large companies will also, but secondarily,
be expected to focus on cleanup capabilities, because
this alternative is within their individual company
control to effect, there is a direct value to
improvements in cleanup (see Chapter XII), and the public
views such efforts with approval.
The large companies will probably not concentrate
their efforts on present efforts to improve EFF and
FACTOR, for while these alternatives are within their
direct power to implement, the value of the alternatives
is unknown.
Small Companies: Smaller companies face a different
situation in confronting trends. First, because the
small company is not likely to be an influential voice at
the industry level, the small company will play a
relatively passive role in industry level trends such as
insurance changes and legislative changes. A second
difference is that the industry perspective on
alternatives may not reflect the individual company's
needs. For example, concentration of industry resources
on negotiation of more favorable P&I coverage will not
benefit a company which cannot join a P&I club.
The small company should therefore approach the
trends discussed with three different strategies. For
the small company, there is one alternative over which
the individual company has high control and which is also
of high value: enhancement of cleanup capability. As
noted in Chapter XII, a small company may prefer a
cooperative arrangement to individual action? however, a
cooperative can be a highly flexible arrangement, and
does not have to include every member of the industry.
In pursuing this cleanup capability objective, a
small company should also focus on the particular
geographic area of its activity. This permits the
highest value per dollar expended to be achieved, and
assures that while the company cannot exert control over
spills worldwide, it can significantly control spill
damage for its immediate area. Thus, participation in
cooperatives similar to the Corpus Christi spill cleanup
cooperative serves the double objective of direct action
on the part of the small company and also a concentration
of effort in the immediate area of concern.
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The second strategy of a small company deals with
trends which have a high value for the company, but which
require industry level action. For these, including
legislative changes and TOVALOP, CRISTAL, CLC and FC
negotiations, the small company's role will be limited to
supplying its share of financial and resource
contributions to the industry representatives. The small
company thus views any benefit arising from these trends
as a windfall.
Finally, because the small company is limited in
terms of its control over alternatives, the small company
may wish to turn to those remaining alternatives over
which it has high control but whose value is uncertain.
The drawback of management and crew training, vessel
equipment and other similar alternatives is the unknown
utility of the measures. Small companies can and should
become more active in their efforts to learn about the
real value of these alternatives by conducting studies
and data gathering. Note that a small company can also
perform its research and development in a cooperative
fashion, so that this cost can be shared.
Conclusion
This work has reviewed the important considerations
that must be examined and assessed by a company in
planning a strategy for dealing with the consequences of
catastrophic oil spills. The methodology proposed in
Chapter II attempts to assist this evaluation process,
using data that is presently available.
Companies must consider their planning alternatives
in light of the cost-effectiveness of the strategy, and
also in light of public opinion of the strategy. In
terms of a purely cost-effective analysis, insurance and
legislative ceilings on damage liability are the
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alternatives having the greatest effect on a company's
net exposure. It has also been shown, however, that the
public preference is for measures that reduce spill
frequency and severity, followed by insurance measures,
and only reluctantly consideration of liability ceilings.
This work has also demonstrated that companies will
be expected to gravitate to differing alternatives
depending on company size and level of activity in an
area. Finally, there can be expected to be a number of
changes in the coming years which will require a
reconsideration of company strategies, and which will
again produce different degrees of benefit for small and
large companies facing consequences from spills.
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"Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation
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Institute Testimony on H.R. 2222, the Comprehensive Oil
Pollution Liability and Compensation Act, April 20, 1983
(Washington: API, 1983), 3-4.10.U.S. Congress, House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Navigation, Hearings of March 11, 1981 on Oil Pollution
Liability - H.R. 85, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (198i) ; and
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED
Name/Affiliation (Subject)
Robert Anderson, Policy Analysis, American Petroleum
Institute (damages).
William Ayers, Clean Gulf Coordinator, Halliburton
Services (cleanup).
Dan Basta, Office of Ocean Resources Coordination and
Assessment, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Dept, of Commerce (damages, spill
frequency).
Michael Bennett, Engineering and Planning, Exxon
Corp. (cleanup).
Robert Blackburn, American Petroleum Institute
(policy).
Lt. Jerry Brown, Marine Environmental Protection,
Pollution Incident Reporting System, U.S. Coast Guard
(spill frequency).
John Burdbacher, Clean Gulf Representative, Engineer,
Shell Oil (cleanup).
Barbara Burke, American Institute of Merchant
Shipping (tanker safety standards, insurance).
Elizabeth Carnahan, Office of Ocean Resources
Coordination and Assessment, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dept, of Commerce
(damages, liabilities, spill frequency).
Don Casey, Spill Technology, American Petroleum
Institute (cleanup).
Lt. Michael Christensen, Marine Environmental
Protection, U.S. Coast Guard (contingency planning).
Jon Conrad, Associate Professor of Resource
Economics, Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell
University (modeling oil spill risk).
Capt. Charles Corbett, Marine Environmental
Protection, U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard spill response).
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Name/Affiliation (Subject)
Ernest Corrado, Counsel, American Institute of
Merchant Shipping, formerly Chief Counsel for Civil
Liablities Convention and former Chief Counsel, House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (liabilities,
insurance).
Vincent Covello, National Science Foundation
(technological risk).
William Dahl, Advisor, Operations Coordinator, Exxon
Corp. (policy, cleanup).
Charles N. Ehler, Director, Office of Research
Coordination and Assessment, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Dept, of Commerce
(damages, spill frequency, resources).
J. P. Fraser, Senior Staff Engineer, Environmental
Conservation and Operations, Shell Oil (cleanup).
Lt. Paul Fulton, Marine Environmental Protection,
U.S. Coast Guard (spill frequency).
Donald T. Gantz, Associate Professor of Mathematics,
George Mason University (modeling).
Peter Ghee, Senior Marine Counsel, Middle East
Transportation and Supply, Mobil Oil Co. (insurance,
liabilities, policy).
Tim Goodspeed, Office of Research Coordination and
Assessment, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Dept, of Commerce (resources).
Jack Gould, Environmental Affairs, American Petroleum
Institute (damages).
Alan Grafe, Assistant Professor, Recreation and Parks
Department, University of Maryland (recreational fishing).
Lt. Hall, Regional Response Center, Marine
Environmental Protection, New Orleans, U.S. Coast Guard
(Coast Guard response, cleanup).
Walt Hajek, Finance Treasurer, Insurance, Shell Oil
(insurance).
Roy Hann, Professor, Environmental Engineering,
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Name/Affiliation (Subject)
Texas A&M University (damages, cleanup).
James Helis, Engineering, Mobil Oil Co. (cleanup).
Roy Hogan, Engineering, Phillips Petroleum (cleanup).
Robert Hooker, Manager, Marine Transportation,
Champlin Oil Co. (insurance).
William Koerth, Vice President, Finance and Head,
Insurance Dept., Coastal Corp. (insurance).
Sherry Kirchoff, National Spill Control School (spill
control training).
Robert Lagatolla, President, Water Quality Insurance
Syndicate (insurance).
Alan Mendelsohn, Partner, Ward and Mendelsohn
(insurance, liability, damages).
Robert Meyers, Oil Spill Coordinator for the U.S.,
Exxon Corp. (cleanup).
Richard Miller, Bureau of Land Management, U.S.
Department of Interior (resources).
John N. Moore, Professor, Center for Ocean Law and
Policy, University of Virginia Law School (liabilities,
damages) .
Alan Moghissi, Society for Risk Analysis (risk
issues).
Sarah Morrison, Environmental Policy/Governmental
Affairs, Conoco (policy).
Lt. Paul Murphy, Marine Environmental Protection,
U.S. Coast Guard (spill frequency).
Cmdr. Norse, Legal Counsel Office, U.S. Coast Guard
(spill damage).
Robert Phillips, Attorney, Texaco (insurance,
Fred Pressley, Attorney, Legal Division, U.S.
Department of State (liabilities).
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Name/Affiliation (Subject)
Harold Reinstra, Information Transfer Specialist,
National Coastal Ecosystem Team, U.S. Department of
Interior (resources).
William Rowe, Professor, Director of Institute for
Risk Analysis, American University (risk issues).
Dan Shipman, Clean Gulf Representative, Engineer,
Chevron (cleanup).
June Linstedt-Siva, Biologist, Environmental
Division, ARCO (MIRG, damages).
Mr. Sky-Eagle, General Manager, Corpus Christi Area
Oil Spill Control Association (cleanup, training).
Staff, Information and Analysis, Office of Merchant
Marine Safety, U.S. Department of Transportation (vessel
traffic) .
Staff, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Marine
Industry Collegium (modeling).
Staff, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works (liabilities, damages, costs).
Staff,
Marine and
U.S.Congress, House Committee on
Fisheries (liabilities, damages,
Merchant
costs).
Robert Stewart, Finance and Accounting
American Petroleum Institute (insurance).
Director,
G. J. Sullivan, Attorney, Law Office of John B. Culp,
Jr. (insurance, liability, crew training, shipping,
vessel safety standards).
William Wyland, Office of Biological Services,
Fisheries and Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of
Interior (resources).
Elizabeth Wylie, Public Affairs, American Institute
of Merchant Shipping (policy).
Capt. Kenneth Wyman, Marine Environmental Protection,
U.S. Coast Guard (vessel movement).
Harry Young, Environmental Engineering, Texas A&M
University (cleanup).
436
APPENDIX B
THE INTERVENTION CONVENTION
Three important subjects underlie the Intervention
Convention:
- Defining the
- Defining the
would apply to
- Defining the
and shipowners
M'Gonigle and
International
University of
All three subjects
sought greater lati
the consequences of
maritime nations wi
intervention rights
Convention defines
A collision of
navigation, or
external to it
imminent threa
cargo.
See: International
on the High Seas in
1969, International
II(1) .
"incident" justifying intervention?
obligations and safeguards which
the intervening nation? and
obligations between coastal nations
during a maritime casualty. See: M.
M. Zacher, Pollution, Politics and
Law: Tankers at Sea (Berkeley, CA:
California Press, 1979), 160.
are areas where the coastal nations
tude for action to prevent or minimize
an oil spill. In contrast, the
shed to carefully limit the
of the coastal nations. The
"maritime casualty" as:
ships, stranding or other incident of
other occurrence on board a ship or
resulting in material damage or
t of material damage to a ship or
Convention Relating to Intervention
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties,
Legal Materials 9 (1970), 25, Article
The inclusion of the term "material damage or
imminent threat of material damage" meant that simply
establishing the occurrance of a collision or other
incident alone would be insufficient to constitute a
"maritime casualty". This definition therefore favored
the interests of the shippers above the interests of the
coastal nations, by limiting the coastal nations'
intervention rights through the additional requirement of
proving "damage".
A further definition of an incident justifying
intervention was set forth in Article I (1) of the
Convention. This provision allowed nations to intervene:
"on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent,
mitigate or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their
coastline or related interests". The "grave and imminent
danger" refers to the threat of oil pollution and must
follow a "maritime casualty or acts related to such
casualty which may reasonably be expected to result in
major harmful consequences."
This Article recogizes the coastal nations' right to
intervention and also acknowledges that the coastal
nations have certain interests which would be affected by
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oil pollution. At the same time, the Article continues
to favor the maritime nations through the inclusion of
such wording as "grave and imminent danger" and "major
harmful consequences", because these phrases restricted
intervention only to incidents of major impact.
The coastal nations do, however, benefit from the
very broad definition of those "related interests" whose
protection justifies intervention:
Maritime coastal, port or estuarine activities
including fisheries activities, constituting an
essential means of livelihood of the persons
concerned ;
Tourist attractions of the area concerned;
The health of the coastal population and the
well-being of the area concerned, including
conservation of living marine resources and of
wildlife. See: Intervention Convention, Article II
4 (a) , (b) , and (c) .
The above definition of "related interests" is an
important acknowledgement that the coastal nations'
interests are extensive, and also recognizes that the
protection of the economic and natural resources of these
nations is at least equal to the economic interests of
the maritime nations.
The second major feature of the Convention centers
on the act of intervention, and in particular the
obligations of the coastal nations to the shipowners and
flag nations. The Convention balances the interests of
the coastal nations and the flag nations. The convention
draft required that before action was taken all parties
who might be affected by the action be notified, and that
any action taken consider the views of these affected
parties. There is a provision, Article 111(d), for cases
of "extreme urgency" allowing the coastal nation to
proceed without notification to affected parties.
The draft also required that any actions taken be
proportionate to the damage threatened, and further
stated that if any measures taken proved excessive in
terms of the provisions of the convention, the
intervening nation was required to pay compensation for
damages due to this excessive action. See: Intervention
Convention, Articles III, V, and VI.
The coastal nations are given the right to
intervene, but are required, if possible, to consider the
views of involved shipowners and maritime states.
Excessive action on the part of the coastal nation will
result in compensation to those persons damaged by the
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coastal state. Therefore, although neither group was
accorded complete latitude of action, the coastal nations
are put in the position of being able to rapidly respond
through intervention, with the attendant risk of
liability for excessive acts of intervention.
The third aspect of the Convention is the question
of obligations between the coastal nation and the private
shipowner. This question was not resolved to the
satisfaction of the coastal nations. In fact, the
Convention embodies a definite bias in favor of the
shipowner interests, because the obligations,
particularly with regard to notification and
compensation, are not reciprocal in nature.
The coastal nation has the obligation to inform the
shipowner of intended action to be taken by the coastal
nation or of action already taken. Further, the coastal
nation has the additional burden of paying compensation
for damages caused by excessive acts while intervening.
In contrast, there is no corresponding obligation on
the part of the shipowner. See Intervention Convention,
Articles III and VI. For example, there is no
requirement that the shipowner notify a coastal nation
about a maritime casualty that might cause oil pollution
damage to the coastal nation. There is also no
requirement that the payment for damages caused by the
shipowner be a prerequisite condition before there will
be any obligation by the coastal nation to pay for
damages caused by excessive intervention action. And
while Article VI provides that the coastal nation pay for
damages from actions that were excessive under the terms
of the convention, there is no mention of any payment
obligation for damages caused to the coastal nation by
the shipowner. There does exist a provision for settling
disputes over compensation in Artricle VIII of the
Convention. It provides a mechanism of conciliation and
arbitration for disputes not settled through
negotiation. Under this article a coastal nation could
challenge a shipowner's claim for damages.
The Intervention Convention clearly codifies the
right of a coastal nation to intervene on the high seas
in connection with a maritime casualty in order to
protect itself from oil pollution damage. The Convention
also represents the interests of the maritime nations by
requiring that, except in cases of utmost emergency, the
views of the maritime nations be considered and properly
protected to the extent possible. Therefore, the
Convention as a whole is considered well balanced between
the various interested parties, even though particular
provisions clearly favor one or the other interest.
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GULF OF MEXICO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SUMMARY (1954-1980)
Louisiana Texas Mississippi/ Total
Alabama/
Flocida
Exploration Permits;
1963-1969 1,417 673 188 2,278
1970-1980 2,323 1,065 332 3,710
Leases:
Number 2,202 835 143 3,180
Acreage 9,671,637 4,246,220 822,601 14,740,458
Well Status:
Total Wells 15,868 1,927 234 13,029
Wells Completed 3,618 704 70 9,392
Plugged/Abandoned 6,641 989 126 7,756
Active/Shut-in 7,641 619 66 8,326
Production/Value
Oil and condensate
(million bbls) 5,131 38 0 5,218
Gas (million mcf) 45,316 2,766 0 48,582
Gasoline and LPG
(million gal) 14,477 450 0 14,927
Production Value
($ million) 58,265 3,186 0 $61,451
Royalty Value
($ million) 9,486 529 0 $10,015
Source: U.S. Department of Interior. Geologic Survey 1981, Gulf of Mexico
PCS Activities Summary. Washington: GPO, 1981.
APPENDIX □
COMPANIES ENGAGED IN OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS
IN STATES BORDERING THE GULF OF MEXICO, 1981(*)
(* - includes most primary companies for Gulf states)
ALABAMA
Galaxy Oil Co.
Global Natural Resources Ltd.
Louisiana Land and Expl. Co.
Patrick Petroleum Co.
Peninsula Resources Corp.
Sceptre Resources Ltd.
FLORIDA
Canadian Superior Oil Ltd. Louisiana Land and Expl. Co.
Exchange Oil and Gas Corp. Peninsula Resources Corp.
Bow Valley Industries Ltd.
Carless, Capel and leonara, Ltd.
Discovery Oil Ltd.
Energy Resources Corp.
Exchange Oil and Gas Corp.
Freeport McMoRan Inc.
LOUISIANA
Adams Resources and Energy Inc.
Adobe Oil and Gas Corp.
Alaska Interstate Co.
Amax Petroleum Corp.
Amerada Hess Corp.
Aminoil USA Inc.
Apache Corp.
Aran Energy Ltd.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co..
Asamera Inc.
Baruch-Foster Corp.
Barkeley-Exploration and Prod. Inc.
Bralorne Resources Inc.
Brock Exploration Corp.
Callon Petroleum CO.
Canadian Occidental Petroleum Ltd.
Challenger Minerals Inc.
Charterhall Ltd.
Cities Services Co.
Cluff Oil Ltd.
Columbia Gas System Inc.
Continental Resources Co.
Coseka Resources Ltd.
Crystal Oil Co.
Damson Oil corp.
Delhi International Oil Corp.
Eason Oil Co.
El Paso Co.
Energy Resources Corp.
Gulf Oil Corp.
Hiran Walker Resources Ltd.
Houston Natural Gas Corp.
Hunting Petroleum Services Ltd.
Inter-City Gas Corp.
Kerr-McGee Corp.
Lear Petroleum Corp.
Leben Oil Corp.
Louisiana Land and Expl. Co.
Maynard Oil Co.
Mesa Petroleum Corp.
Mobil Corp.
Moore McCormack Energy Inc.
Newmont Oil Co.
Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.
Occidental Petroleum Corp.
Paloma Petroleum Ltd.
Panhandle Eastern Corp.
Peninsula Resources Corp..
Pennzoil Co.
Petrol Oil and Gas Co. Ltd.
Pexco NV
Peyto Oils Ltd.
Santa Fe International Corp.
Sceptre Resources Ltd.
Sonat Inc.
Standard Oil Co. o£ California
Suburban Propane Gas Corp.
Summit Energy Inc.
APPENDIX D Continued
LOUISIANA
- continued -
El Paso Co-
Energy Resources Corp.
Entex Inc.
Equity Oil Co.
Exchange Oil and Gas Corp.
First Mississippi Corp.
Fluor Corp.
Forest Oil Corp.
Freeport McMoRan Inc.
Galaxy Oil Co.
Global Marine Inc.
Great Basins Petroleum co.
Suburban Propane Gas Corp.
Summit Energy Inc.
Tenneco Inc.
Texas Gas Transmission Corp.
Tomlinson Oil Co. Inc.
TransOcean Oil Inc.
Trimac Ltd.
United Energy Resources Inc.
Stone and Webster Inc.
Weeks Petroleum Ltd.
Woods Petroleum Corp.
Worldwide Energy Corp.
MISSISSIPPI
Agip SpA
Amax Petroleum Corp
Amerada Hess corp.
Bow Valley Industries Inc.
Callon Petroleum co.
Columbia Gas Systems Inc.
Delhi International Oil Corp.
Energy Resources Corp.
Exchange Oil and Gas Corp.
Freeport mcMoRan Inc.
Houston Natural Gas corp.
Lear Petroleum Corp.
Saga Petroleum AS
Sceptre Resources Ltd.
Surburban Peopane Gas Corp.
TEXAS
Adams Resources and Energy Inc.
Adobe Oil and Gas Corp.
AgipSpA
Alaska Interstate Co.
Amax Petroleum Corp.
Amerada Hess Corp.
American Petrofina Inc.
American Quasar Petroleum Co.
Aminoil USA Inc.
Anvil Petroleum pic
Apache Corp*
Argonaut Energy Corp.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.
Baruch-Foster Corp.
Berkeley Exploration and Prod. Ltd
Bralorne Resources Ltd.
Callon Petroleum Co.
Canadian Occidental Petroleum Ltd.
Challenger Minerals Inc.
Lear Petroleum Corp.
Louisiana Land and Expl. Co.
McFarland Energy Inc.
Mapco Inc.
Marion Corp.
Maynard Oil Co.
Merland Explorations Ltd.
Mesa Petroleum Co.
Metramar Minerals Ltd.
Mitchell Energy and Dev. Corp
Mobil Corp.
Monsanto Co.
Moore McCormack Energy Inc.
Natomas Co.
Newmont Oil Co.
Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.
Norse Petroleum AS
Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.
Occidental Petroleum Corp.
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TEXAS
- continued -
Cities Service Co.
Cluff Oil Ltd.
Coastal Corp.
Columbia Gas System Inc.
Conoco Inc.
Consolidated Oil and Gas Inc.
Continental Resources co.
Crown Central Petroleum Corp.
Crystal Oil Corp.
Cultus Pacific NL
Damson Oil Corp.
Delhi International Oil Corp.
Depco Inc.
Diamond Shamrock Corp.
Discovery Oil Ltd.
Eason Oil Co.
El Paso Co.
Energy Resources Corp.
Entex Inc.
Equity Oil Co.
Exchange Oil and Gas Corp.
Felmont Oil Corp.
First Mississippi Corp.
Fluor Corp.
Forest Oil Corp.
Freeport McMoRan Inc.
Galaxy Oil Co.
Global Marine Inc.
Global Natural Reources Ltd.
Great Basins Petroleum Co.
Gulf Energy and Development Corp
Gulf Oil Corp.
Hadson Petroleum Corp.
Helmerich and Payne Inc*.
Hiran Walker Resources Inc.
Houston Natural Gas Corp.
Hunting Petroleum Services Ltd.
Inter-City Gas Corp.
Kaiser-Francis Oil Co.
Kerr-McGee Corp.
Oklahoma Oil Co.
Oxoco Inc.
Paloma Petroleum Ltd.
Peninsula Resources Corp.
Pennzoil Co.
Petrol Oil and Gas Co. Ltd.
Pexco NV
Peyto Oils Ltd.
Piet Petroleum Ltd.
Pioneer Corp.
Pominex Ltd.
Premier Consolidated Oilfields Ltd
Ranger Oil Ltd.
Royal Dutch/Shell Group
Santa Fe International Corp.
Sceptre Resources Ltd.
Standard Oil Co of California
Suburban Propane Gas Corp.
Summit Energy Inc.
Sun Co. Inc.
Sundance Oil Co.
Teck Corp.
Tenneco Inc.
Texas American Energy Corp.
Texas Gas Transmission Corp.
Tidewater Inc.
Tipperary Corp.
Tomlinson Oil Co. Inc.
TransOcean Oil Inc.
Trimac Ltd.
United Canso Oil and Gas Ltd.
United Energy Resources Inc.
Stone and Webster Inc.
Weeks Petroleum Inc.
Westburne International Industries
Woods Petroleum Corp.
Worldwide Energy Corp.
Ltd.
Source: Financial Times, Oil and Gas International Yearbook, 1982 (London:
Gresham Press, 1982).
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REFINERY CAPACITY STATISTICS
FOR GULF OF MEXICO STATES (1982)
(*) - Refinery located on Gulf Coast
Active Gulf Refineries
Company and Location Crude Capacity
(barrels/
calendar day)
ALABAMA
Hunt Oil Co. - Tuscaloosa
Louisiana Land and Expl. Co. - Saraland
Marion Corp. - Theodore
Mobile Bay Ref. Co. - Chickasaw
Vulcan Ref. Co. - Cordova
44,220
43,000
25,300
28,100
10,500
Total: 151,120
FLORIDA
Seminole Asphalt Ref. Inc. - St. Marks 13,000
LOUISIANA
Atlas Processing Co., Div. of Pennzoil
- Shreveport
Calumet Ref. Co. - Princeton
Canal Ref. Co. - Church Point
Cities Services Co. - Lake Charles
Claiborne Gasoline Co. - Lisbon
Clark Oil Mt. Airy Ref. - Mt. Airy
Conoco Inc. - Lake Charles
Cotton Valley Solvents (Kerr-McGee Ref.
Corp.) - Cotton Valley
CPI Refining Inc. - Lake Charles
Evangiline Refining Cl - Jennings
Exxon Co. - Baton Rouge
GHR Energy Corp. - Good Hope
Gulf Oil Corp - Belle Chasse
Hill Petroleum Co. - Krotz Springs
International Processors - St. Rose
Kerr McGee Corp. - Dubach
LaJet Inc. - St. James
Lake Charles Refining Co. - Lake Charles
45,000
(++)
7,858
330,000
6,500
(++)
156,500
7,800
(++)
(++)
474,000
(++)
198,900
48,000
32,500
10,780
40,000
32,000
(++) Barrels/calendar day information not available
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Company and Location Crude Capacity
(barrels/
calendar day)
LOUISIANA, continued
*
*
*
*
*
Mallard Resources Inc. - Gueydon
Marathon Oil Co. - Garyville
Murphy Oil Cpro. - Meraux
Placid Refining Co. - Port Allen
Port Petroleum Inc. - Stonewall
Schulze Processing Inc. - Talla Bena
Shell Oil Co. - Norco
Sooner Refining Cl - Egan
South Louisiana Production Cl - Mermentau
T&S Refining Inc. - Jennings
Tenneco Oil Co. - Convent
6,000
255,000
92,500
36,000
3,200
1,768
257,000
8,000
15,000
10,200
140,000
Total 2,663,856
MISSISSIPPI
Amerada Hess Corp. - Purvis 30,000
* Chevron U.S.A. Inc. - Pascagoula 280,000
Ergon Refining Inc. - Vicksburg 20,600
Natchez Refining Inc. - Natchez 20,000
Southland Oil Co. - Lumberton 5,800
Southland Oil Co. - Sandersville 11,000
Vicksburg Refining Inc. - Vicksburg 5,500
Total: 372,900
TEXAS
American Petrofina Inc. - Big Spring
American Petrofina Inc. - Port Arthur
Amoco Oil Co. - Texas City
Atlantic Richfield Co. - Houston
Brio Refining Inc. - Houston
Champlin Petroleum Co. - Corpus Christi
Charter International Oil Co. - Houston
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. - El Paso
Clinton Manges Oil and Ref. Co. - Tucher
Coastal States Petroleum Co.
- Corpus Christi
60,000
90,000
415,000
222,000
16,000
173,000
(++)
76,000
9,700
182,000
(++) Barrels/calendar day information not available
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APPENDIX E, Continued
(* - Refinery located on Gulf Coast)
Company and Location Crude Capacity
(barrels/
calendar day)
TEXAS, continued
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Crown Central Petroleum Corp. - Houston
Diamond Shamrock Corp. - Sunray
Dorchester Refining Co. - Mt. Pleasant
Eddy Refining Co. - Houston
Erickson Refining Co. - Port Naches
Exxon Co. U.S.A. - Baytown
Flint Chemical Co. - San Antonio
Gulf Oil Co. - Port Arthur
Gulf States Oil and Ref. Co.
- Corpus Christi
Howell Hydrocarbon Inc. - San Antonio
Independent Refining Co. - Winnie
Koch Refining Co. - Corpus Christi
La Gloria Oil and Gas Co. - Tyler
Liquid Energy Corp. - Bridgeport
Listo Petroleum - Donna
Longview Ref. Co., Div. of Crystal
Oil Co. - Longview
Marathon Oil Co. - Texas City
Mobil Oil Corp. - Beaumont
Phillips Petroleum Co. - Borger
Phillips Petroleum Co. - Sweeny
Pioneer Refining Ltd. - Nixon
Placid Refining Co. - Mont Belvieu
Pride Refining Inc. - Abilene
Quintana Petrochemical Co.
- Corpus Christi
Quitman Refining Co. - Quitman
Ropano Refining - Ingleside
Saber Energy Inc. - Corpus Christi
Sentry Refining Inc. - Corpus Christi
Shell Oil Co. - Deer Park
Shell Oil Co. - Odessa
Sigmore Refining Co. - Three Rivers
South Hampton Refining CO. - Silsbee
Southwestern Refining Cl - Corpus Christi
Tesoro Petroleum Corp. - Carrizo Springs
Texaco Inc. - Amarillo
Texaco Inc. - El Paso
Texaco Inc. - Port Arthur
Texaco Inc. - Port Neches
100,000
71,000
26.500
3,500
45,000
640,000
1,200
335,000
(++)
(++)
50,000
57,000
65,000
10,000
3,656
14,000
69.500
325,000
95,000
175,000
15.500
12,400
(++)
(4-+)
6,600
(++)
(++)
(++)
285,000
30,600
37,800
19,000
104,000
26,100
20,000
17,000
402,000
31,000
(++) Barrels/calendar day information not available
446
APPENDIX E, Continued
(* - Refinery located on Gulf Coast)
Company and Location Crude Capacity
(barrels/
calendar day)
TEXAS, continued
Texas Armada Refining CO. - Ft. Worth 5,000
Texas City Refining Inc
Texas Oil and Chemical
Thriftway Inc. - Graham
Tipperary corp. - Ingle
Uni Refining Inc. - Ing
Union Oil Co. of Califo
- (Beaumont) Nederland
Winston Refining Co. -
Total:
. - Texas City 119,600
Terminal - Vidor (++)
2,400
side 10,400
leside (++)
rnia
120,000
Ft. Worth 20,000
4,881,981
TOTAL CAPACITY, ACTIVE GULF REFINERIES 8,082,857
Inactive Gulf Refineries
Company and Location
Adobe Refining Co. - LaBlanca, TX
Bayou State Oil Corp. - Hosston, LA
Bruin Refining Inc. - St. James, LA
Carbonit Refining Inc. - Hearne, TX
Dow: Oyster Creek Refining
- Freeport, TX
Gulf Oil Co. - Venice, LA
Manatee Energy CO. - Palmetto, FL
Sheperd Oil Inc. - Mermentau, LA
Southland Oil Co. - Yazoo City MS
Vedette Oil Refining - Brownsville, TX
Crude Capacity
(barrels/ *’
calendar day)
5,000
3,000
19,300
11,000
190,000(on
standby)
28,700
28,400
10,000
5,500
10,000
TOTAL CAPACITY, INACTIVE GULF REFINERIES: 310,900
(++) Barrels/calendar day information not available.
Source: John McCasun (ed.), International Petroleum
Encyclopedia, 1982 (Tulsa: Penwell Publishing Co.,
1982) : 380-384 .
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APPENDIX F
TANKER FLEETS OF COMPANIES IMPORTING INTO GULF OF MEXICO IN 1982
(by Flag of Registry, 1980)
Owned Chartered
NO . Flag of Registry No. Flag of Registry
Amerada Hess n/a n/a 40 n/a
(owned or chartered)
Arco 10 u.s. 6 n/a
3 n/a (foreign)
Ashland 6 U.S.
Atlantic Richfield 10 U.S. 6 n/a
3 n/a (foreign)
Charter Oil Company 1 Liberia 9 n/a
Chevron 9 U.S. n/a n/a
2 U.K. (owns and charters
4 Netherlands 3% of world fleet)
37 Liberia
Clark Oil & Refining Co. 1 Liberia (time
charter)
47 n/a (spot
charters)
The Coastal Corporation 2 U.S.
1 Liberia 5 n/a (bareboat
charter)
2 U.K. 12 n/a (time
charter)
Coastal States Gas Corp. 8 U.S.
Conoco Inc. 10 n/a (foreign n/a n/a
(large charter fleet)
Exxon Corporation 19 U.S. n/a n/a
121 n/a (foreign) (large charter fleet
3 43,000 dwt at average daily capacity
(on $100 million of 8.6 million dwt
order) each
APPENDIX F Continued
Gulf Oil Corporation
Mobil Corporation
Phillips Petroleum Co.
Sabine Towing &
Transportation Co, Inc
Standard Oil Co. Indiana
(AMOCO)
Owned
No. Flag of Registry No
Chartered
Flag of Registry
12 U.S.
19 Liberia
1 Denmark
1 Belgium
6 U.S.
41 n/a (foreign)
7 3 at 32,500 dwt;
3 at 80,000 dwt;
1 at 145,000 dwt
n/a
49
n/a
n/a
2 Liberia
(bareboat)
3 U.S.(time
charter)
5 Liberian,
Ital., Greek,
Japanese(time
charter)
13 U.S.
1 U.S.
8 Liberia
2 U.S.
15 n/a (foreign)
9 n/a (time
charter)
Sun Company Inc. 8
Texaco 14
52
Union 8
U.S. 1 U.S.
U.S.
n/a (foreign
64 n/a
U.S. n/a Most U.S
Sources:
Seatrade U.S.A. Yearbook, 1981 (3d Ed.) (Colchester, UK: Seatrade
Publications, Ltd., 1981).
Lloyds of London, Lloyds List of Shipowners, 1981-1982 (London: Lloyds of
London, 1982).
Financial Times, Oil and Gas International Yearbook, 1982 (London:
Press, 1982).
Gresham
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APPENDIX G
INCOME AND REFINERY STATISTICS FOR OIL COMPANIES
IMPORTING/REFINING IN THE GULF STATES (FY 1980)
Company Net Income Refinery Total
($ million) Capacity Revenue
(b/d in ($ million)
thousands)
Amerada Hess 540 n/a 7,955
Amoco 1,915 1,468 27,832
Ar co 1,651 826 24,156
Ashland Oil Co. 205 475 (*) 8,365
Champlin Petroleum Co. 191 270 (*) 2,602
Charter Oil Co. 243 70 (*) 4,397 (**
Chevron 2,401 n/a 42,919
Cities Service Co. 448 191 (*) 7,898( + )
Clark Oil and Ref. Co. 75 135 (*) 1,658
Coastal Corp. 110 400 (*) 5,120
Coral Petroleum n/a n/a 1,540
(sub. Vulcan Asphalt)
Conoco Inc. 1,026 448 (*) 18,766
Continental Oil n/a n/a 521
Crown Central Petro. 19 100 1,274
Diamond Shamrock 201 n/a 3,181
El Paso Co. 109 n/a 3,543
Exxon Corp. 5,650 6,000 (*) 100,381
Getty 877 n/a 10,266
Gulf Oil Corp. 1,407 1,640 (*) 28,790
Gulf States Oil and Ref n/a n/a 2( + )
Houston Natural Gas 197 n/a 2,358
International Petroleum n/a n/a 626( + )
Kerr-McGee 182 181 3,478( + )
Koch Oil International n/a n/a 7,000 ( + )
La Gloria Oil and Gas n/a n/a 3,940( + )
(sub Texas Eastern
Corp.)
(*) - 1979 f igures
(**) - figure refers to oil group only
( + ) - sales
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APPENDIX G, Continued
Company Net Income Refinery Total
($ million) Capacity
(b/d in
thousands)
Revenue
($ million)
Marathon Oil Co. 379 588 8,754
Mobil Oil Corp. 3,272 891 63,726
Murphy Oil Corp. 151 n/a 12,726
Phillips Petroleum Co. 1,069 425 13,713
Placid Ref. (sub. n/a n/a 80 (**)
Placid Oil Co. USA)
Royal Dutch Shell 5,650 n/a 81,805
Shell Oil Co. 1,542 1,136 19,959
Sigmore Corp. 48 32 1,328
Standard Oil - Ohio 1,811 452 11,379
Summit Energy Inc. 2 n/a 6 ( + )
Sun Company 732 611 13,242
Superior Oil 334 n/a 1,497
Tenneco Oil Co. 940 100 13,624
Tesoro Petroleum Corp. 104 n/a 3,588
Texaco Inc. 2,643 n/a 52,485
Texas City Ref. n/a n/a 1( + )
(sub. Agway Petroleum)
Tosco Corp. 46 262 2,387
Total Petroleum, N.A. 48 150 1,500
Union Oil of Cal. 647 490 10,100
(*) - 1979 figures
(**) - figure refers to oil group only
(+) - sales
Sources:
Oil Daily. Oil Industry U.S.A., 1981-1982. New
York: Whitney Communication Corp., 1981.
Dun and Bradstreet, ed. Million Dollar Directory,
1983. New York: Dun and Bradstreet, 1983.
Financial Times, Oil and Gas International Yearbook,
1982 (London: Gresham Press, 1982).
APPENDIX H
GULF OF MEXICO SURFACE WINDS,
GEOSTROPHIC AND COASTAL CURRENTS
Surface Winds
SOURCE: MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT DIVISION
NOAA, DEPT. OF COMMERCE
APPENDIX H, Continued
Geostrophic and Coastal Currents
SOURCE: MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT DIVISION
NOAA, DEPT. OF COMMERCE
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APPENDIX I
POPULATION STUDIES, GULF OF MEXICO REGION COASTAL COUNTIES
Population Data, Gulf Reqion, Coastal Counties
(population figures in thousands)
Area 1960 1970 % Chanqe
1960-70
1980 % Chanqe
1070-80
Compound Annual
Growth Rate
Florida 2,522.4 3,423.3 35.7% 4,810.1 40.5% 3.5%
Alabama 363.4 376.7 3.7% 442.8 17.5% 1.6%
Mississippi 182.0 248.0 36.3% 309.9 25.0% 2.5%
Louisiana 1,780.0 2,141.9 20.3% 2,477.3 15.7% 1.5%
Texas 2,501.3 3,104.4 24.1% 4,250.0 35.5% 3.1%
Gulf Reqion 7,349.1 9,294.3 26.5% 12,245.1 31.7% 2.8%
United
States 179,323.0 203,312.0 13.3% 226,504.8 11.5% 1.1%
Net Miqration :Data, Gulf Reqion Coastal Counties
(net migration 1970-1978) (*)
Area Number
(000) '
Rate(** ) Miqration as a
Percent of Gulf
Reqion
Florida 791.3 23.1% 61.4%
Alabama 26.5 7.0% 2.0%
Mississippi 15.3 6.2% 1.2%
Louisiana 78.9 3.7% 6.1%
Texas 377.6 12.2% 29.3%
Gulf Reqion 1,289.6 13.9% 100.0%
(*) - This is the latest year for which data is available.
(**) — Rate is expressed as a percentage of the 1970 total population from
Appendix Ch. VIII, Table 5.
Sources:
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of
Population and Housing, Advance Reports (Washington: GPO, 1981)
Environmental and Socioeconomic Baseline on the Gulf of Mexico Coastal Zone
and Outer Continental Shelf.
U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census* Current Population
Reports. Series P-25, No. 873. Washington: Bureau of the Census, 1981.
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APPENDIX J
SHIPMENTS INTO GULF OF
TWO GULF OF MEXICO OIL IMPORTERS,
MEXICO BY
JANUARY-OCTOBER 1982
Large Comoanv Example: Mobil Oil Company
(tons) (tons)
Jan: 18,471 July: 20,264
41,269 84 ,278
41,439 135,371
179,154 121,537
82,650
Feb: 19,330 71,581
67,767 140,102
73,851
77,616
280,432
Aug : 19,646
99,159
Mar: 64,889 76,069
65,418 68,336
47,997
48,736 Sep : 22,543
42,643
Apr: 38,915 84,260
82,079 213,409
84,395
49,274 Oct: 62,094
75,296 63,160
May: 53,421
35,898
45,812
TOTAL NUMBER OF SHIPMENTS:
J une: 135,371 TOTAL VOLUME
121,537
71,581
140,102
SHIPPED: 3,367,082 tons
Small Company Example: Charter Oil Co.
(tons) (tons)
J an: 0 July: 27,618
36,610
Feb: 0
Aug : 72,687
Ma r: 0
Sep: 0
Apr: 0
Oct: 77,041
May: 30,249
61,243
TOTAL NUMBER OF SHIPMENTS:
J une: 47,226 TOTAL VOLUME
75,628 SHIPPED: 428,302 tons
Source:
American Petroleum Institute.
Petroleum Products. Washington:
Imported Crude Oil and
API, 1982.
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APPENDIX K
GULF OF MEXICO UNINTENTIONAL BARGE SPILLS,
1976-1980, OF 3.4 TONS (* 1,000 GALLONS) AND ABOVE
Barqe Operation - '’Underway",r "Unknown Operation"
or "No Operation Renorted"
Volume Cause Barge Operation Location:
(tons) (thous-
and tons)
(lat/lonq/)
1976:
28.6 Collision B(.5-1) Underway 2958/9246(east Lake Charles,LA)
142.9 Collision B(20-35) Underway 2958/9351(Beaumont,TX)
57.1 Grounding B(1-10) Underway 2825/9626(north Corpus Christi,TX)
18.9 Unknown B(.3-.5) Unknown 2923/9453(Galveston,TX)
1977:
275.6 Collision B(10-20) Underway 2756/8223(Tampa Bay,FL)
142.9 Collision B(1-10) Underway 2921/9448(Galveston Bay,TX)
3.6- Grounding B(10-20) None 2750/9704(Pt. Aransas,TX)
13.6 Grounding B(10-20) Underway 3010/8913(off Gulfport,MS)
1978:
859.1 Collision B(1-10) None 2914/9130(Lafayette/Grand Isle,LA)
171.4 Collision B(l-10) Underway 2930/9452(Galveston Bay,TX)
7.9 Collision B(.5-1) Underway 2919/9447(Galveston Bay,TX)
5.1 Collision B(10-20) Underway 2805/9320(off Pt. Arthur,TX)
14,285.7 Grounding B(.3-.5) Underway 2916/8958(approach New Orleans,LA)
153.1 Grounding B(.15-.3) Underway 2927/8915(Venice,LA)
13.6 Grounding B(1-10) Underway 2826/9624(north Corpus Christi,TX)
128.6 Grounding 3(1-10) Underway 2945/9505(Houston Channel,TX)
21.4 Grounding B(1-10) None 2943/9515(Houston Channel,TX)
8.5 Grounding B(l-10) None 2944/9511(Houston Channel,TX)
1979:
571.4 Collision B(1-10) Underway 2922/9451(Galveston,TX)
2,285.7 Grounding B(l-10) Unknown 2922/8911(Venice,LA)
1,857.1 Grounding B(l-10) Underway 2922/9448(Galveston Bay,TX)
2,571.4 Grounding B(l-10) Underway 2922/9449(Galveston Bay,TX)
6,142.9 Grounding B(1-10) Underway 2922/9448(Galveston 3ay,TX)
2,857.1 Grounding B(1-10) Underway 2922/9452(Galveston Bay,TX)
7,142.9 PE-Unknown B(50-100) None 2921/9448(Galveston Bay,TX)
1980:
714.3 Collision B(35-50) Underway 2717/9240(off Corpus Chri3ti,TX)
10.2 Sinking B(0—.15) Unknown 2912/8903(Venice,LA)
185.7 Unknown B(l-10) Underway 2948/9210(Lafayette,LA)
571.4 Unknown B(1-10) None 2943/9501(Houston Channel,TX)
4,357.1 PE-Inattent. B(20-35) Underway 3017/8830(off Gulfport,MS)
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APPENDIX K, Continued
Barge Operation - "All Other Operations”
Volume
(tons)
Cause Barge
(thous-
and tons)
1976:
11.7 Collision B(.3-.5)
16.7 Collision B(.5-1)
199.6 Fire/Explos. B(1-10)
46.3 Minor Damage B(10-20)
4.3 Mat'1 Fault B(10—20)
4.3 PE-Flanges B(1-10)
4.3 PE-Other B(35-50)
19 7 7:
7.1 PE-Inattent. B(.5-1)
3.6 PE-Inattent. B(1-10)
6.8 PE-Inattent. B(1-10)
4.3 PE-Inattent. B(10-20)
16.4 ?E-Valve Op. B(1-10)
1978:
21.4 Collision B(20-35)
10.7 Grounding B(.5-1)
13.6 Corrosion B(1-10)
4.3 PE-Valve Op. B( .5-1)
3.4 PE-Training B(.5-1)
6.8 PE-Other B(.3—.5)
1979:
10.2 Collision B(1-10)
10.0 Minor Damage B(l-10)
18.6 Unknown B(10-20)
5.1 PE-Inattent. B(l-10)
14.3 PE-Inattent. B ( . 5-1)
7.1 PE-Hose Twist B (35-5 0)
14.2 PE-Loading B(l-10)
7.1 PE-Other B(l-10)
1980:
3.4 Corrosion 3(1-10)
10.7 Unknown B(l-10)
3.4 PE-Inattent. B(l-10)
21.4 PE-Inattent. B(l-10)
5.1 PE-Inattent. B ( .5-1)
5.1 PE-Valve Op. B(l-10)
14.3 PE-Valve Op. B(1-10)
11.4 PE-Hose Cut B(l-10)
471.4 PE-Loading B(10—20)
28.6 PE-Overfill B(10-20)
3.6 PE-Loading B(.3-.5)
14.3 PE-Unknown B(.5-l)
Operation Location
(lat/long/)
Loading 2830/9016(north Corpus Christi,TX)
Unloading 2944/9505(Galveston Bay,TX)
Loading 2938/9056(Gramercy,LA)
Unloading 2749/9725(Corpus Christi,TX)
Unloading 2922/9452(Galveston BayfTX)
Unloading 3000/9359(Beaumont,TX)
Loading 2749/9726(Corpus Christi,TX)
Transfer 2750/9731(Corpus Christi,TX)
Unloading 2922/9454(Galveston Bay,TX)
Loading 2913/9427(off Galveston,TX)
Unloading 2944/9505(Houston Channel,TX)
Loading 2943/9507(Houston Channel,TX)
Unloading 2943/9512(Houston Channel,TX)
Transfer 2811/9651(Aransas Pass,TX)
Loading 2749/9729(Corpus Christi,TX)
Unloading 2923/9454(Galveston Bay,TX)
Loading 3008/8814(off Gulfport,NS)
Other 2754/8226(Tampa Bay,FL)
Moored
Other
Loading
Unloading
Loading
Fueling
Loading
Transfer
2922/9453(Galveston Bay,TX)
2944/9506(Houston Channel,TX)
2959/9353(Beaumont,TX)
2922/9454(Galveston Bay,TX)
2950/9357(Pt. Arthur,TX)
2922/9453(Galveston Bay,TX)
2749/9729(Corpus Christi,TX)
2922/9454(Galveston Bay,TX)
Loading
Unloading
Loading
Loading
Loading
Unloading
Unloading
Unloading
Loading
Loading
Loading
Loading
2749/9729(Corpus Christi,TX)
2923/9454(Galveston,TX)
2922/9453(Galveston,TX)
2943/9507(Houston Channel,TX)
2950/9358(Pt. Arthur,TX)
2752/8224(Tampa 3ay,FL)
3010/9318(Lake Charles,LA)
2749/9728(Corpus Christi,TX)
3002/9402(Beaumont,TX)
2943/9501(Houston Channel,TX)
2951/9350(Pt. Arthur,TX)
2749/9728(Corpus Christi,TX)
Sources U.S. Coast Guard Pollution Incident Reporting System computer data
base, 1982.
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APPENDIX L
U.S. COAST GUARD MAJOR U.S. PORT AREAS RANKED
BY SPILL POTENTIAL: PROJECTED FOR YEAR 1985
(Based on crude and heavy oil flows and spills larger than
50,000 gallons (170 tons) from 1974-1977, adjusted to 1985)
Major Port Constitutent Ports Spills/Year
NEW ORLEANS, LA 2.7052
Port of New Orleans, LA; Bay Marchand, LA;
Eugene Island, LA; Grand Island, LA;
Main Pass, LA; Ship Shoal, LA; South Pass, LA;
Timbalier Bay, LA; West Delta, LA.
PASCAGOULA, MS 1.120 5
Mobile Harbor, AL; Pascagoula Harbor, MS;
Biloxi Harbor, MS; Gulfport Harbor, MS;
Eastern Gulf, Mobile, AL region.
BATON ROUGE , LA.... 1.0660
TEXAS CITY, TX 1.0250
Houston Ship Channel, TX; Texas City Channel, TX;
Galveston Channel, TX; Freeport Harbor, TX.
PORT ARTHUR, TX 0.8801
Sabine-Neches Waterway, TX; Beaumont, TX;
Orange, TX; Pt. Arthur, TX.
CORPUS CHRISTI, TX 0.7417
LAKE CHARLES, LA 0.4160
Calcasieu River and Pass, LA.
TAMPA, FL 0.088 5
St. Petersburg Harbor, FL; Tampa Harbor, FL;
Weedon Island, FL; Eastern Gulf, Tampa, FL region.
TOTAL 8.0430
Source: A. O. Srien, et. al., Deployment Requirements for U.S.
Coast Guard Pollution Response Equipment, Vol. 1 (Washington* U.S.
Department of Transportation, 1979).
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APPENDIX M
REPRESENTATIVE LIST OF TANKER SAFETY PROGRAMS
United States
Organization: National Spill Control School, Corpus
Christi, TX; Subject: Oil Spill Prevention and Control?
Duration and Cost: 5 days, $550.
Organization: World Trade Institute, New York, NY?
Subject: Petroleum Tankship Operation? Duration and
Cost: 5 days, $890.
Organization: Oil and Hazardous Material Control
Training Division (Inland),Texas A&M University, College
Station, TX; Subject: Oil and Hazardous Material Control
(Inland) ? Duration and cost: 5 days, $575.
Maine Maritime Academy, Castine, ME? Subject:
Petroleum Tanker Safety Course? Duration and cost: 5
days, $7 50-$l,000 .
Outside United States
Organization: Leith Nautical College, Edinburgh,
Scotland? Subject: Petroleum Tanker Safety, Crude Oil
Washing? Duration and Cost: 5 days, $950-$l,175.
Organization: Institute of Petroleum, London,
England? Subject: Tanker Safety? Duration and Cost: 5
days, 490 pounds (approx. $750 U.S.)?
Grenoble, Switzerland? Subject: Training school for
piloting/captaining VLCC's (very large crude carriers)?
Duration and cost: unknown. Note: this program is a
prerequisite of most U.S. companies for piloting VLCC's.
Source: Oil Spill Intelligence Report, February 4, 1983,
4 .
459
APPENDIX N
MAJOR CLEANUP EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE IN GULF OF MEXICO
U.S. Coast Guard
Open Water Containment and Recovery System (OWOCRS)
4 Adapts Salvage Pumps
2 Units (612 ft.) high seas boom
1 JBF 1001 skimmer
1 Mobile command post
Communications equipment
Dracone barges
Zodiac inflatable boats
Viscous oil pumping systems
Companies
(Equipment Based on Lightering Vessels)
Chevron:
Dispersing equipment and small boat for applying
dispersant
10 drums Corexit 9527
1 drum Shell Oil Herder
1600 3M sorbent boom (8 inch)
400 3M sorbent pads
Coastal States:
1 support boat used to transport fenders and oil spill
control gear
1500 ft. Slickbar Mark V Boom
1 Mantaray Aluminum Head Skimmer
1 pollution pump and hoses
320 ft. Sorboil sorbent boom
Sorboil mats (no dispersants)
Conoco:
1 supply vessel (180 ft.)
2,000 gallons Corexit dispersant
1,500 ft. Uniroyal 18" boom
Exxon t
On each lightering vessel (2 in use) are:
1,000 ft. Bennet Zoom Boom
1 Clean Channel Industries 24 ft. skimmer
260 gallons Corexit 7664
2,400 gallons Corexit 7664 on each lightering ship
1 Utility boat 26x9x4 ft. with 15 hp. diesel engine
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APPENDIX N, Continued
Companies, continued
(Equipment Based on Lightering Vessels)
Gulf :
150 ft. service boat "Pike"
5,000 gallons BP 1100 WD dispersant
Permanently mounted WSL spray equipment to apply
dispersant
2 rolls 3M sorbent, 3 ft. x 200 ft.
30 gallons Shell Oil Herder and applicator
On lightering vessel - 220 gallons BP 1100 WD
Marathon:
500 ft. Slickbar boom
Small amount of dispersant
Mobil:
2,000 ft. Slickbar Boom
1,500 gallons PC 65 dispersant
110 gallons Nalfleet 9-090
Texaco:
1 supply vessel "ENDEAVOR" (185 ft.)
1 Vikoma Seapack
1,100 gallons Corexit 9527 dispersant
1 pump and hand-held nozzle to dispense dispersant
Shell International Marine:
1,300 gallons Shell LTX dispersant
1 pump, manifold, and hand-held nozzle to dispense
dispersant
Contractors
(due to numerous equipment items, only main items
such as skimmers, boom, dispersant, etc. are listed)
Oil Mop (New Orleans, Mobile, Houston):
Skimmer s:
1 self-propelled skimmer vessel (30 ft.)
Numerous oil mop skimming devices
Containment Boom:
( ) ft. 18" containment boom
( ) ft. 36" containment boom
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APPENDIX N, Continued
Contractors
(due to numerous equipment items, only main items
such as skimmers, boom, dispersant, etc. are listed)
Clean Channel Industries:
Skimmers:
2 independent vacuum skimming systems onboard "Lady Alice
3 self-propelled skimming barges
Containment Boom:
3,000 ft. 18" containment boom
Browning-Ferris Industries (Baton Rouge, New Orleans):
Skimmers:
5 Oil Mop Mark IV
Containment Boom:
9,200 ft. 18" containment boom in road vehicle
5,500 cases sorbent
Clean River Associates (Burnside, Port Allen, New
Orleans) :
Skimmer s:
3 hand wringers and 200 ft. oil mop located at Burnside,
LA; Port Allen, LA; and New Orleans, LA
Containment Boom:
3 1,000 ft. 18" continment boom in road tractors
located at Burnside, LA; Port Allen, LA; and New Orleans,
LA
200 ft. 18" boom located at Lake Charles
Peterson Maritime Services, Inc. (New Orleans, Mobile,
Houston) :
Skimmers:
1 Swiss Olea skimmer
2 Slurp skimmers
10 hand skimmers
Containment Boom:
15,000 ft. 28" containment boom
10,000 ft. disposable sorbant boom (3M)
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APPENDIX N, Continued
Cooperatives
Corpus Christi Area Oil Spill Control Association:
(equipment as of 1982)
Skimmers:
1 9* x 24' Catamoran
2 4' dia. saucers
3 4 x 15 decanters
Containment Boom:
2,000 ft. 16" Kepner Boom
1,500 ft. 20" Marsan Boom
540 ft 36" Uniroyal Boom
300 ft. 14" Slickbar Boom
400 ft. 18" Acme Boom
125 ft. 14" Corpus Christi Boom
100 ft. 10" Sorbant Boom
1,600 ft. rough water boom
1,000 ft. Acme Products boom
Sorbents:
250 bales wheat straw
Other Equipment:
1 75 barrel vacuum truck
Pumps
Light plants
Hoses
1 38' crew boat
Response van
Clean Gulf Associates: (as of May 1, 1978)
Skimmers:
1 High Volume Open Sea (HOSS)
7 Fast Response Units Model I
4 Fast Response Units Model II
Containment Boom:
1,000 ft. Bennett 72"
5,000 ft. Bennett 36"
1,000 ft. Uniroyal 36"
4 helicoptor spraying kits
96 bird scarers
1 waterfowl rehabilitation center
41 absorbant pads (bales)
1 incenerator skid
1 communication system
Boat spraying equipment
Dispersant
Source: A. O. Brien, et. al., Deployment Requirements
for U.S. Coast Guard Pollution Response Equipment, Vol. 1
(Washington: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1979) .
APPENDIX O
CORPUS CHRISTI AREA OIL SPILL CONTROL ASSOCIATION
MEMBERSHIP, 1983
CCAOSCA Contributors
Counties of Aransas, Nueces, and San Patricio
Port of Corpus Christi Authority
Cities of Corpus Christi, Aransas Pass, and Rockport
CCAOSCA Membership
Amerada Hess Corporation
American Petrofina Pipe Line Company
Arco Oil and Gas Company
Arco Pipe Line Company
Bass Enterprises Production Co.
The Belcher Company of Texas, Inc.
Champlin Petroleum
Cities Service Corporation
The Coastal Corporation
Copano Refining Company
Corpus Christi Marine Services Co.
Corpus Christi Petrochemical Company
Edwin L. Cox
Energy Reserves Group, Inc.
Exxon Company, U.S.A.
Exxon Pipeline Company
Getty Oil Company
Gulf Oil Exploration and Production Co.
Gulf States Oil and Refining Co.
Highland Resources, Inc.
Koch Refining Company
EADS Operating Service
McMoRan Exploration Co.
Mobil Pipe Line Company
Mobil Producing Texas and New Mexico, Inc.
Pennzoil Producing Company
Phillips Petroleum Company
Quintana Petrochemical Company
Redfish Bay Terminal, Inc.
Reynolds Metal Company
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CCAOSCA Members, continued
Saber Refining Company
Sigmor Pipeline Company
Southwestern Refining Co., Inc.
SunGas Company
The Superior Oil Company
Tenneco Oil Company
Texas Fuel and Asphalt Co., Inc.
The Texas Pipeline Company
TXO Production Corporation
UNI Refining, Inc.
National Marine Service
Sun Marine Terminals
Source: Corpus Christi Area Oil Spill Control
Association, brochure of operations (untitled)
Christi, TX: CCAOSCA, 1982).
(Corpus
APPENDIX P
CLEAN GULF ASSOCIATES MEMBERSHIP
EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 1978
American Petrofina Co. of Texas
Aminoil U.S.A., Inc.
Amoco Production Company
Anadarko Production Company
Ashland Exploration Inc.
Atlantic Richfield Company
Belco Petroleum Corporation
Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
Cities Service Oil Company
Clark Oil Producing Company
CNG Producing Corporation
Coastal States Gas Corporation
Columbia Gas Development Corp.
Continental Oil Company
Diamond Shamrock Corporation
Dixilyn Corporation
Exchange Oil and Gas Corporation
Exxon Company, U.S.A.
Forrest Oil Corporation
General American Oil Co. of Texas
General Crude Oil Company
Getty Oil Company
Gulf Energy and Minerals Co. U.S.
Hamilton Brothers Oil Company
Home Petroleum Corporation
Houston Oil and Minerals Corp.
Hunt Oil Company
Hunt Industries
Hassie Hunt Trust
Hassie Hunt Trust, et. al.
JFD, Inc.
Kerr-McGee Corporation
Louisiana Land and Exploration Co.
Marathon Oil Company
McMoRan Exploration Company
Mesa Petroleum Company
Mitchell Energy Offshore Corp.
Mobil Oil Corporation
Natomas Exploration, Inc.
Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co.
Ocean Production Company
Odeco, Inc.
Odeco Drilling, Inc.
Oxy Petroleum, Inc.
Pennzoil Producing Company
Pennzoil Producing - Sohio Petroleum
Pennzoil Producing Co., et. al.
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Phillips Petroleum Company
Placid Oil Company
Placid Oil Company, et. al
Placid Oil Company and Texaco Inc.
Quintana Offshore, Inc.
Quintana Petroleum Corp.
Quintana Production Co.
Quintana Oceanic, Inc.
Samedan Oil Corporation
Shell Oil Company
Southern Natural Gas Company
Sonat Exploration Company
Sun Production Company
Superior Oil Company
Tenneco, Inc.
Texaco, Inc.
Texas Gas Exploration Corp.
Texas Gulf, Inc.
Texas International Petroleum
Transco Exploration Company
Transocean Oil, Inc.
Union Oil Co. of California
Union Texas Petroleum Division
Allied Chemical Corporation
Zapata Exploration Company
Source: Information furnished by Clean Gulf Associates.
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CONVERSION FACTORS USED IN EVALUATING CLEANUP CAPABILTY
- 42 U.S. gallons = 1 barrel;
- 7 barrels (It. crude) = 1 ton;
- Evaporation rate = 40% for light crude;
- Spill mass = (oil) x 3.5 ((emulsifacation of 1 part
oil to 2.5 parts water));
- Length of boom (ft) to encircle spill =
29.1 \/foil volume-barrels)/(oil thickness-inches) ;
- Length of boom used per skimmer = 3,000 ft.
- Skimmer water:oil recovery ratio = 80% water, 20%
oil;
- Large skimmer recovery rate = 2,500 bbls./hr (ie-
2,000 bbls./hr of water and 500 bbls./hr of oil) ;
- Skimmer operation = 12 hours/day (visibility
required to operate);
- 1 drum of dispersant = 55 U.S. gallons;
- Dispersant dosage rate = 1 part dispersant:20 parts
oil;
- All dispersants EPA approved (and therefore usable
on a U.S. offshore spill);
- All measures employed are 100% effective.
Sources:
Exxon Corporation, Oil Spill Cleanup Manuals, Vol. II
Response Guidelines (Exxon Corp., 1979), p. 6-4.
R. Meyers and M. Bennett, "Marine Industry Group
(MIRG)", Proceedings, American Petroleum Institute Oil
Spill Conterence, 1983 (Washington: API, 1983), 191.
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ESTIMATING THE COST OF A COMPANY SURPRISE TEST
OF COMPANY CLEANUP EFFICIENCY
Estimated Daily Salary: $150/day (annual salary of
$40,000)
Estimated Personnel Involved
on surprise test day: 150 persons
Preplanning: 15 days x 3 employee
Equipment Use and Transporation =
Post-Test Evaluation: 10 days x 2
$150/day =
Other Unanticipated Costs =
x $150/day = $22,500
s x $150/day = $ 6,750
30,000
employees x
3,000
7,750
TOTAL $70,000
ESTIMATED COST: Between $60,000-100,000
Source: Interviews with representatives of oil companies.
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CONCENTRATIONS FOR SELECTED COASTAL RESOURCES
IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, FOR SSMO AREAS, BY COUNTY
SSMO Area/ High High Finfish Major Coastal Charterboat/
County Marine Density Hiah Shorefront Wetlands, Headboat
Productiv- Offshore Abundance Recreation forested/ F lee t
AREA 29
ity(Acres) Shellfish
(Acres)
(Acres) Beaches
(miles)
unforested
(Acres)
(± boats)
Cameron 143,601 97,623 200,523 7.8 12,509 22
Willacy 87,599 41,844 90,977 2.9 43,224 6
Kenedy 223,164 157,805 310,141 47.8 116,188 —
Kleeburg 87,993 60,868 130,889 17.6 36,836 —
Nueces 178,101 52,953 133,032 7.4 21,844 ★
San Patricio — 21,824 *75
Aransas 111,358 60,045 133,330 — 54,046 *
Refugio 20,274 — — — — --
Calhoun 248,627 237,456 237,456 — 58,287 --
Jackson 5,751 — — — — —
Matagorda 158,218 389,026 403,733 — 65,038 —
Brazoria 29,937 218,562 218,562 2.9 95,501 —
(OCS)
All of W-l — 4,646,669 5,256,350 — — —
1/3 of W-2 — 1,119,339 2,348,655 — —
AREA 29
TOTAL: 1,292,623 7,079,984 9,464,148 86.4 525,267 103
AREA 28
Galveston 164,711 355,911 355,911 47.5 68,310 27
Harris 3,582 — — — na —
Chambers 150,411 7,063 7,063 — 102,370 —
Jefferson 17,384 209,786 224,465 6.3 139,318 —
Orange — — — — — — *"* — **
Cameron 275,465 186,462 186,462 3.5 843,011 7
Vermillion 151,101 79,510 79,510 —— 296,647 3
(OCS)
2/3 of W-2 — 2,272,597 4,768,482 — — —
All of W—3 — — 441,446 — — —
All of C-l 3,279,138 5,267,001 7,938,631
AREA 23
TOTALS 4,041,792 3,378,330 14,001,970 57.3 1,449,656 37
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SSMO Area/ Hiqh HJ-2h Finfish Maior Coastal Charterboat/County Marine Density Hiqh Shorefront Wetlands, Headboat
Productiv- Offshore Abundance Recreation forested/ F leet
AREA 27
ity(Acres) Shellfish
(Acres)
(Ac res) Beaches
(miles)
unforested
(Acres)
(± boats)
Iberia 219,741 101,735 101,735 — 203,034 —St. Mary 325,309 57,426 57,426 3.1 234,891 —Terrebonne 410,416 187,237 187,237 — 565,610 —Lafourche 176,128 55,460 55,460 7.6 477,427 5Jefferson 131,156 64,344 64,344 8.7 107,692 13
Plaquemines 995,901 246,120 575,148 449,775 18
St. Barnard 1,051,693 — 672,667 — 265,025 —
Orleans 92,768 — — — 64,961 —
St. Tammany 96,609 -- — — 179,332 —
Hancock 43,329 — 37,134 5.1 29,885 —
Harrison 219,082 — 207,527 37.1 8,818 6
(OCS)
All of C-2 2,007,881 3,328,310 5,778,228 — — —
1/2 of C-3 1,054,053 203,641 1,036,520 — — —
AREA 27
TOTAL: 7,824,566 4,253,273 8,773,426 61.6 2,586,440 42
AREA 26
Jackson 204,969 — 180,299 40.8 93,840 31
Mobile 240,017 -- 101,203 6.4 65,994 37
Baldwin 253,168 -- 71,016 12.8 128,636 —
Escambia 266,654 — 268,647 27.8 37.135 —
Santa Rosa 83,028 — 18,549 2.9 66,847 —
Okaloosa 116,099 161,218 23.8 38.134 64
Walton 133,511 119,198 172,700 10.4 59,009 — —
(OCS)
1/2 of C-3 1,054,053 203,641 1,036,520 — — —
All of C-4 45,694 — 1,400,011 — — —
All of E—1 605,488 683,919 2,498,532 — — —
All of E-5 — — * — * •
AREA 26
TOTALS 3,002,681 1,006,758 5,918,695 124.9 489,595 132
APPENDIX S Continued
SSMO Area/ Hiqh Hiqh Finfish Major Coastal Charterboat/
County Marine Density Hiqh Shorefront Wetlands, Heaaboat
Productiv- Offshore Abundance Recreation forested/ F leet
ity(Ac res) Shellfish
(Acres)
(Ac res) Beaches
(miles)
unforested
(Ac res)
(± boats)
AREA 25
Bay 210,046 262,000 262,000 15.3 62,567 31
Gulf 220,528 202,566 202,566 10.1 106,731 —
Franklin 338,203 349,762 437,920 14.1 83,354 2
Wakulla 125,004 — 121,386 — 89,343 —
Jefferson 47,096 — 46,891 — 60,690 —
Taylor 268,471 — 284,635 — 190,260 —
Dixie 233,305 — 229,992 — 195,382 —
Levy 312,186 — 304,037 — 212,857 --
Citrus 217,618 — 198,050 — 107,295 —
Hernando 142,759 — 137,532 — 77125 —
Pasco 138,203 — 158,356 92,351
Pinellas 186,633 — 275,755 45.8 14,413 33
Hillborough 127,820 — 45,768 — 70,367 —
Manatee 57,839 — 91,833 14.4 42,766 5
Sarasota 41,410 — 235,284 27.8 28,090 14
(OCS)
All of E-2 1,021,267 2,759,266 4,513,198 — — —
3/4 of E-3
AREA 25
472,152 1,030,903 7,783,442
TOTAL: 4,160,540 3,790,169 12,296,640 127.5 1,433,591 85
Area 24
Charlotte 74,823 — 35,604 5.5 67,776 26
Lee 178,315 173,920 173,920 18.8 88,402 28
Collier 127,626 361,484 361,484 16.1 592,844 50
Monroe 2,294,430 2,412,000 2,506,179 308.6 367,550 20
(OCS)
1/4 of E-3 157,384 343,634 2,594,481 — — —
All Of E—4 — 2,325,812 5,164,083 — — --
All Of E-4X 1,407,567 3,133,783 4,499,148 — — —
AREA 24
TOTAL: 4,240,645 8,783,633 15,384,899 349 1,116,572 124
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SSMO Area/ High High Finfish Major Coastal Charterboa'
County Marine Density Hiqh Shorefront Wetlands, Headboat
Productiv- Offshore Abundance Recreation forested/ F lee t
AREA 23
ity(Acres) Shellfish
(Acres)
(Acres) Beaches
(miles)
unforested
(Acres)
(± boats)
Dade 151,542 — 133,522 49.7 762,701 144
AREA 23
TOTAL: 151,542 — 133,522 49.7 762,701 144
Sources:
O.S. Department of Interior, Minerals Management Service, Draft Regional
Environmental Impact Statement, 1982 (Washington: Minerals Management
Service, 1982), "Measurement Tables of Environmental Resources", Visual No.
14;and "Fisheries Resources and Recreation", Visual No. 4 (chart on back of
visual)..
D. K. Larson, et. al., Mississippi Deltaic Plain Region Ecological
Characterization: A Socioeconomic Study, Vol. I: Synthesis Papers, LJ.S. Fish
and Wiidiite Service, Office of Biological Studies, FWS/OBS-79/05 Tl980), 153.'
E. B. Liebow, K. S. Butler, and T. R. Plaut, et. al., Texas Barrier Islands
Region Ecological Characterization: A Socioeconomic Study, Vol. I: Synthesis
Papers^ Q.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of Biological Studies,
FWS7OBS-80/19 (1980), 117.
APPENDIXT
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APPENDIX U
CLAIMS ASSERTED IN AMOCO CADIZ LITIGATION
Claimants Amount Parties Claimed Against
Standard Amoco Amoco
Oil Co. Internat- Transpor
(Indiana) ional Oil
Company
Republic of France $300,000,000 X X
Conseil General des
Cotes du Nord $ 20,000,000
Communes des Cotes
du Nord $ 70,000,000
Communes du
Finistere $ 70,000,000
X
X
X
Onions and Trade
Associations $264,000,000
Societe Pour L'Etude
de la Protection de la
Nature en Bretagne $
Ligue de Protection
des Oiseaux $
Department of
Finistere $
Commune of
Plougerneau $
8,000,000
4,000,000
600,000 X X
60,000 X X
X
X
X
Bretagne-Angleterre-
Irelande, S.A., d/b/a
Brittany Ferries, for
itself and on behalf
of all others
similarly situated $200,000,000 XXX
Union Departmentale Des
Associations Familiales
Du Finistere, for itself,
its members and on behalf
of all others similarly
situated $200,000,000
Claude
t Phillips
X
X X X X
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Claimants Amount Parties Claimed Against
Standard Amoco Amoco Claude
Oil Co. Internat- Transport Phillips
(Indiana) ional Oil
Company
Chapalain Compagnie,
d/b/a Hotel Brittany,
in Roscoff, France;
Renee cadiou, d/b/a
Hotel Des Bains, Roscoff,
France, for himself and
on behalf of all others
similarly situated $200,000,000 X X X X
Gaby Beganton, for
himself and on behalf
of all others similarly
situated $200,000,000 X X X X
Alain Bizien, d/b/a/
Establissements Chevalier,
for himself and on behalf
of all others similarly
situated $200,000,000 X X X X
Yves Craff, d/b/a/ Sari
Quiros, for himself and on
behalf of all others
similarly situated $200,000,000 X X X X
TOTAL AMOUNTS CLAIMED:
$1,936,660,000 ($1,937 billion)
Source: In re Oil Spill by the "Amoco Cadiz" Off the Coast of France on March
16, 1978. Civil No. 78 C 3693, MDL Docket No. 376 (U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Illinois), Pleadings of Plaintiffs Chapalain
Compagnie, d/b/a Hotel Brittany, in Roscoff, France; Renee cadiou, d/b/a Hotel
Des Bains, Roscoff, France, for himself and on behalf of all others similarly
situated. See Schedule A.
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CALCULATIONS FOR EXAMPLES 1 THROUGH 13
Example 1 Equations
Corpus Christi Area Spill, No Y Investment
EXPOSURE = (D(i) x IMPACT x (V(i) - CLEAN)) + IND + F(k)
+ (O ( i ) x V(i) )
EXPOSURE(1) = ( (32,750) x (.35) x (200,000 - 23,142))
+ 250,000 + 730,000 + ((245) x (200,000)) =
$2,077,214,825.
EXPOSURE(2) = ((32,750) x (.35) x (55,000 - 23,142))
+ 250,000 + 730,000 + ((245) x (55,000)) =
$379,627,325.
P(i) = ACTIVITY x SPILLS(i) x FACTOR
Small Company P(l) = (.0125) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.002.
Small Company P (2) = (.0125) x (2 .0) x (1.0) = 0.025
Large Company P(l) = (.075) x (0. 16) x (1.0) = 0.012.
Large Company P (2) = (.075) x (2. 0) x (1.0) = 0.150.
2
NET EXP = ( 5 P(i) x (EXPOSURE(i) - INSURANCE)) + Y.
1
Small Company's NET EXP = .002 x (2,077,214,825 - 0)
+ .025 x (379,627,325 - 0) + 0 = $13,645,118.
Large Company's NET EXP = .012 x (2,077,214,825 - 0)
+ .150 x (379,627,325 - 0) + 0 = $81,870,703.
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Example 2 Equations;
South Florida Area Spill, No Y Investment
DAMAGES(i) = $50,000.
EXPOSURE(1) = ((55,250) x
+ 250,000 + 730,000 +
(.35) x (200,000 - 23,142))
( (245) x (200,000) ) =
$3,469,971,575.
EXPOSURE(2) = ((55,250) x
+ 250,000 + 730,000 +
(.35) x (55,000 - 23,142))
((245) x (55,000)) =
$630,509,075.
Small Company P(l) = (.0125) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.002.
Small Company P(2) = (.0125) x (2 .0) x (1.0) = 0.025
Large Company P(l) = (.075) x (0. 16) x (1.0) = 0.012.
Large Company P(2) = (.075) x (2. 0) x (1.0) = 0.150 .
Small Company's NET EXP =
+ .025 x (630,509,075
Large Company's NET EXP =
+ .150 x (630,509,075
.002 x (3,469,971,575 - 0)
0) + 0 =
$22,702,670.
.012 x (3,469,971,575 - 0)
0) + 0 =
$136,216,020.
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Example 3 Equations
Modification of Chapter II Methodology for
Companies Using 2 or More Ports
ACTIVITY(Corpus) = 10/2,000 = 0.005
ACTIVITY(S. FL) = 15/2,000 = 0.0075.
D(Corpus) = $32,750? EXP(Corpus,1) = $2,077,214,825;
EXP(Corpus,2) = $379,627,325.
D(S. FL) = $55,250? EXP(S. FL,1) = $3,469,971,575?
EXP(S. FL,2) = $630,509,075.
INS =0? Y = 0.
Small* Company NET EXP = "Corpus Christi NET EXP" +
"S. Florida NET EXP"
$5,458,047 + $13,621,602 = $19,079,649.
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Example 4 Equations
Insurance: Y Investment in TQVALQP and CRISTAL
(Corpus Christi Area)
EXPOSURE(1) = ((32,750) x (.35) x (200,000 - 23,142))
+ 250,000 + 730,000 + ((245) x (200,000)) =
$2,077,214,825.
EXPOSURE(2) = ((32,750) x (.35) x (55,000 - 23,142))
+ 250,000 + 730,000 + ((245) x (55,000)) =
$379,627,325.
Small Company P(l) = (.0125) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.002.
Small Company P(2) = (.0125) x (2 .0) x (1.0) = 0.025
Large Company P(l) = (.075) x (0 . 16) x (1.0) = 0.012.
Large Company P (2) = (.075) x (2 . 0) x (1.0) = 0.150 .
Small Company Y = ($70,000/vessel) x (25 shipments
avg. 55,000 tons) / (10 shipments/vessel) =
$175,000.
Large Company Y = ($70,000/vessel) x (150 shipments
avg. 55,000 tons) / (10 shipments/vessel) =
$1,050,000.
Small Company's NET EXP =
.002 x (2,077,214,825 - 36,000,000) +
.025 x (379,627,325 - 36,000,000) + 175,000 =
$12,848,113.
Large Company's NET EXP =
.012 x (2,077,214,825 - 36,000,000) +
.150 x (379,627,325 - 36,000,000) + 1,050,000
$77,088,677.
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Example 5 Equations
Insurance: Y Investment in P&I Insurance, TOVALOP,
and CRISTAL (Corpus Christi Area)
EXPOSURE(1) = ((32,750) x (.35) x (200,000 - 23,142))
+ 250,000 + 730,000 + ((245) x (200,000)) =
$2,077,214,825.
EXPOSURE(2) = ((32,750) x (.35) x (55,000 - 23,142))
+ 250,000 + 730,000 + ((245) x (55,000)) =
$379,627,325.
Small Company P(l) = (.0125) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.002.
Small Company P ( 2 ) = (.0125) x (2.0) x (1.0) = 0.025
Large Company P(l) = (.075) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.012.
Large Company P (2) = (.075) x (2.0) x (1.0) = 0.150 .
Small Company Y = ($140,000/vessel) x (25 shipments
avg. 55,000 tons) / (10 shipments/vessel) =
$350,000.
Large Company Y = ($140,000/vessel) x (150 shipments
avg. 55,000 tons) / (10 shipments/vessel) =
$2,100,000.
Small Company's NET EXP =
.002 x (2,077,214,825 - 319,200,000) +
.025 x (379,627,325 - 319,200,000) + 350,000 =
$5,376,713.
Large Company's NET EXP =
.012 x (2,077,214,825 - 319,200,000) +
.150 x (379,627,325 - 319,200,000) + 2,100,000
$32,260,277.
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Example 6 Equations
Insurance: Y Investment in Third Party Insurance Policy
(Corpus Christi Area)
EXPOSURE(1) = ((32,750) x (.35) x (200,000 - 23,142))
+ 250,000 + 730,000 + ((245) x (200,000)) =
$2,077,214,825.
EXPOSURE(2) = ((32,750) x (.35) x (55,000 - 23,142))
+ 250,000 + 730,000 + ((245) x (55,000)) =
$379,627,325.
Small Company P(l) = (.0125) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.002.
Small Company P (2) = (.0125) x (2 .0) x (1.0) = 0.025
Large Company P(l) = (.075) x (0. 16) x (1.0) = 0.012.
Large Company P(2) = (.075) x (2 . 0) x (1.0) = 0.150.
Small Company Y = ($210,000/vessel) x (25 shipments
avg. 55,000 tons) / (10 shipments/vessel) =
$525,000.
Large Company Y = ($210,000/vessel) x (150 shipments
avg. 5"5,000 tons) / (10 shipments/vessel) =
$3,150,000.
Small Company's NET EXP =
.002 x (2,077,214,825 - 119,200,000) +
.025 x (379,627,325 - 119,200,000) + 525,000 =
$10,951,713.
Large Company's NET EXP =
.012 x (2,077,214,825 - 119,200,000) +
.150 x (379,627,325 - 119,200,000) + 3,150,000
$65,710,277.
482
APPENDIX V, Continued
Example 7 Equations
Cleanup Equipment: Y Investment by Single Company
in Gulf Cleanup Equipment (Corpus Christi Area)
CAP = (no. skimmers) x (days) x (hrs./day) x (cleanup
rate/hr.)
CAP = (10 skimmers) x (6 days) x (12 hours/day) x (71.43
tons/hr.) = 51,430 tons.
CLEAN = (CAP(public) + CAP(private)) x (EFF)
CLEAN = (51,430 tons) x (0.5) = 25,715 tons.
EXPOSURE(1) = ((32,750) x
+ 250,000 + 811,000 +
(.35) x (200,000 - 25,715))
( (245) x (200,000) ) =
$2,047,802,813.
EXPOSURE(2) = ((32,750) x
+ 250,000 + 811,000 +
( .35) x (55,000 - 25,715) )
((245) x (55,000)) =
$350,215,313.
Small Company P(l) = (.0125) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.002
Small Company P(2) = (.0125) x (2.0) x (1.0) = 0.025
Larqe Company P(l) = (.075) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.012.
Lar qe Company P (2) = (.075) x (2.0) x (1-0) = 0.150.
Small Company Y = $260,000.
Large Company Y = $260,000.
Small Company's NET EXP =
+ .025 x (350,215,313
.002 x (2,047,802,813 - 0)
0) + 260,000 =
$13,110,989.
Large Company's NET EXP = .012 x (2,047,802,813 - 0)
+ .150 x (350,215,313 - 0) + 260,000 =
$77,365,931.
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Example 8 Equations
Cleanup Equipment; Y Investment by Coperative
in Gulf Cleanup Equipment (Corpus Christi Area)
CAP = (10 skimmers) x (6 days) x (12 hours/day) x (71.43
tons/hr.) = 51,430 tons.
CLEAN = (51,426 tons) x (0.5) = 25,715 tons.
EXPOSURE(1) = ((32,750) x (.35) x (200,000 - 25,715))
+ 250,000 + 811,000 + ((245) x (200,000)) =
$2,047,802,813.
EXPOSURE(2) = ((32,750) x (.35) x (55,000 - 25,715))
+ 250,000 + 811,000 + ((245) x (55,000)) =
$350,215,313.
Small Company P(l) = (.0125) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.002.
Small Company P (2) = (.0125) x (2.0) x (1.0) = 0.025.
Large Company P(l) = (.075) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.012.
Large Company P (2) = (.075) x (2.0) x: (1.0) = 0.150.
Small Company Y = (.05 tonnage among cooperative members)
x($260,000for additional boom) = $13,000.
Large Company Y = (.30 tonnage among cooperative members)
x ($260,000 for additional boom) = $78,000 .
Small Company’s NET EXP =
+ .025 x (350,215,313
.002 x (2,047,802,813 - 0)
0) + 13,000 =
$12,863,989.
Large Company's NET EXP = .012 x (2,047,802,813 - 0)
+ .150 x (350,215,313 - 0) + 78,000 =
$77,183,931
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Example 9 Equations
Improving Cleanup Effectiveness: Y Investment in
Training, Simulations, and Surprise Tests
(Corpus Christi Area)
Alternative A - 10% Improvement in EFF
10% improvement in EFF = (existing Gulf EFF) x (degree of
enhancement in EFF)
EFF(10 % improvement) = (0.5) x (1.10) = 0.55.
CLEAN(10% improvement in EFF) = (46,287 tons) x (0.55) =
25,458 tons.
EXPOSURE(1) = ((32,750) x (.35) x (200,000 - 25,458))
+ 250,000 + 730,000 + ((245) x (200,000)) =
$2,050,677,675.
EXPOSURE(2) = ((32,750) x (.35) x (55,000 - 25,458))
+ 250,000 + 730,000 + ((245) x (55,000)) =
$353,080,175.
Small Company P(l) = (.0125) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.002.
Small Company P(2) = (.0125) x (2.0) x (1.0) = 0.025.
Large Company P(l) = (.075) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.012.
Large Company P(2) = (.075) x (2.0) x (1.0) = 0.150.
Small Company Y = $210,000
Large Company Y = $210,000
Small Company's NET EXP =
.002 x (2,050,677,675 - 0) +
.025 x (353,080,175 - 0) + 210,000 =
$13,138,359.
Large Company's NET EXP =
.012 x (2,050,677,675 - 0) +
.15 x (353,080,175 - 0) + 210,000 =
$77,780,158.
485
APPENDIX V, Continued
Example 9 Equations
Improving Cleanup Effectiveness: Y Investment in
Training, Simulations, and Surprise Tests
(Corpus Christi Area)
Alternative B - 5% Improvement in EFF
EFF(5% improvement) = (0.5) x (1.05) = 0.525.
CLEAN(5% improvement in EFF) = (46,287 tons) x (0.525) =
24,300 tons.
EXPOSURE(1) = ((32,750) x
+ 250,000 + 730,000 +
(.35) x (200,000 - 24,300))
((245) x (200,000)) =
$2,063,941,250.
EXPOSURE(2) = ((32,750) x
+ 250,000 + 730,000 +
( .35) x (55,000 - 24,300) )
((245) x (55,000)) =
$366,353,750.
Small Company P(l) = (.0125) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.002
Small Company P(2) = (.0125) x (2.0) x (1.0) = 0.025
Large Company P(l) = (.075) x (0.16) x (1.0) = 0.012.
Large Company P(2) = (.075) x (2.0) x (1.0) = 0.150 .
Small Company Y = $210,000
Large Company Y = $210,000
Small Company's NET EXP =
.002 x (2,063,941,250 - 0) +
.025 x (366,353,750 - 0) + 210,000 =
$13,496,727.
Large Company's NET EXP =
.012 x (2,063,941,250 - 0) +
.15 x (366,353,750 - 0) + 210,000 =
$79,930,358.
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Example 9A Equations
Improving Cleanup Effectiveness
(Corpus Christi Area)
Determining the Degree of Improvement Necessary
Before a Company Will Undertake Y Expenditure
Small Company Example:
Y outlay for EFF training = $210,000.
Management decision: 5:1 ratio of
(reduction in NET EXP):(Y).
NET EXP must be reduced by (210,000) x (5) = 1,050,000.
New NET EXP must be: (13,645,118) - (1,050,000) =
$12,595,118.
New CLEAN required to generate new NET EXP:
(.002) x ( (32,750)x(.35)x(200,000-CLEAN)+2 50,000 + 7 30,000 +
(245x200,000))
+
(.025) x ( (32,750)x(.35)x(55,0 00-CLEAN)+250,000 + 7 30,0 00 +
(245x55,000))
+
210,000 = new NET EXP = 12,595,118.
Therefore, CLEAN = 26,534.5 tons.
Having determined new CLEAN, a new EFF level must be
identified:
CLEAN = 26,534.5 = (9 skimmers)x(6 days)x(12
hrs./day)x(71.43 tons/hr.)x(EFF).
Therefore, EFF = 0.588092.
The degree of improvement required from old EFF to new
EFF = 17.62%
Thus, the degree of improvement which must be
demonstrated by a vendor of cleanup oriented training to
induce a company to undertake a Y investment of $210,000
where the company seeks a 5:1 return in reduced NET EXP
is 17.62%. That is, the training must be demonstrated to
produce a 17.62% improvement in cleanup efficiency and
effectiveness.
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Example 10
Reducing Probability of a Spill - Crew Training
(Corpus Christi Area)
Determining the Degree of Improvement Necessary
Before a Company Will Undertake Y Expenditure
Small Company Example;
Y outlay for crew training = $37,500.
Management decision: 5:1 ratio of
(reduction in NET EXP):(Y).
NET EXP must be reduced by (37,500) x (5) = 187,000.
New NET EXP must be: (13,645,118) - (187,000) =
$13,458,118.
New FACTOR required to generate new NET EXP:
((.0125)x(.16)x(FACTOR)) x (2,077,214,825-0)
+
((•0125)x(2•0)x(FACTOR)) x (379,627,325-0)
+
37,500 = new NET EXP = 13,458,118.
Therefore, FACTOR = 0.984.
The degree of improvement required from old FACTOR to new
FACTOR = 1.60%
Thus, the degree of improvement which must be
demonstrated by a vendor of crew training to induce a
company to undertake a Y investment of $37,500 where the
company seeks a 5:1 return in reduced NET EXP is 1.60%.
That is, the training must be demonstrated to produce a
1.60% improvement in spill prevention probability.
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Example 11 Equations
Reducing Probability of a Spill (Corpus Christi Area)
Determining the Degree of Improvement Necessary
Before a Company Will Undertake Y Expenditure
Alternative A - Navigation Aids
Small Company Example:
Y outlay for vessel navigation aids =
$150,000 per ship x 25 shipments/10 shipments per
vessel = $375,000.
Management decision: 5:1 ratio of
(reduction in NET EXP):(Y).
NET EXP must be reduced by (375,000) X (5) = 1,875,000.
New NET EXP must be: (13,645,118) -
$11,770,118.
(lr 875,000) =
New FACTOR required to generate new NET EXP:
((.0125)x(.16)x(FACTOR)) x (2,077,214,825-0)
+
((•0125)x(2•0)x(FACTOR)) x (379,627,325-0)
+
375,000 = new NET EXP = 11,770,118.
Therefore, FACTOR = 0.835.
The degree of improvement required from old FACTOR to new
FACTOR = 16.5%
Thus, the degree of improvement which must be
demonstrated by a vendor of navigational aids to induce a
company to undertake a Y investment of $375,000 where the
company seeks a 5:1 return in reduced NET EXP is 16.5%.
That is, the navigational aids must be demonstrated to
produce a 16.5% improvement in spill prevention
probability.
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Example 11 Equations
Reducing Probability of a Spill (Corpus Christi Area)
Determining the Degree of Improvement Necessary
Before a Company Will Undertake Y Expenditure
Alternative B Vessel Retrofitting
Small Company Example:
Y outlay for vessel retrofit =
$1.5 million per ship x 25 shipments/10 shipments per
vessel = $3.75 million.
Management decision; 5:1 ratio of
(reduction in NET EXP):(Y).
NET EXP must be reduced by (3,750,000) x (5) = 18,750,000.
New NET EXP must be: (13,645,118) - (18,750,000) =
$0. (*)
(*) Conclusion: For Small Company, it is not possible to
achieve a 5:1 reduction in NET EXP through this level of
Y expenditure. NET EXP can only be reduced by
$13,645,118, achieving at best a 3.3:1 (reduction in NET
EXP):(Y investment) ratio.
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Example 12
Reducing Cost Consequnces - Legislation
(Corpus Christi Area)
Alternative A: Limiting Liabilities for Spill Damage
What Y Investment Will A Company Be
Willing To Make, Given Its NET EXP?
Objective: Generate legislation
$200,000,000 for total liability for
single oil spill event.
setting a limit of
damages from a
Question: What is the change in NET EXP that results
from having a $200 million limit rather than the present
unlimited liability regime:
A $200 million damage limit means that where
DAMAGES(i) x IMPACT x (V(i)-CLEAN) = $200 million,
then $200 million is used in place of DAMAGES(i) x IMPACT
x (V(i)-CLEAN).
For a catastrophic spill occurring in the Corpus Christi
area:
EXPOSURE(1):
DAMAGES(i) x IMPACT x (V(l)-CLEAN) = ($27,500) x (.35) x
(200,000-23,142) = $1,702,258,250.
Since $200 million is less than $1,7 billion, $200
million is used instead of $1.7 billion.
Therefore, EXPOSURE(l) = 200,000,000 +(5.250)x (. 35)x (200,000-23,142) + 250,000 + 730,000 +
(245x200,000) = $574,956,575.
EXPOSURE(2):
DAMAGES (i) x IMPACT x (V(2)-CLEAN) = ($27,500) x (.35) x
(55,000-23,142) = $306,633,250.
Since $200 million is less than $306.6 million, $200
million is used instead of $306.6 million.
Therefore, EXPOSURE(2) = 200,000,000 +(5.250)x(.35)x(55,000-23,142) + 250,000 + 730,000 +
(245x55,000) = $272,994,075.
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Example 12 Equations
Reducing Cost Consequnces - Legislation
(Corpus Christi Area)
Alternative A, continued
Small Company NET EXP and Y:
The new NET EXP(Small) if a $200 million liability
ceiling exists:
New NET EXP(Small) = (.002 x 574,956,575) + (.025 x
272,994,075) = $7,974,765.
The improvement in NET EXP(Small) is therefore:
$13,645,118 - 7,974,765 = $5,670,353.
If Small Company wants to receive a 5:1 ratio for
(reduction in NET EXP):(Y), then Small Company will be
willing to expend:
5 x Y = 5,670,530. Y = $1,134,071.
Large Company NET EXP and Y:
The new NET EXP(Large)
ceiling exists:
New NET EXP(Large)
272,994,075) = $47,848,
The improvement in NET
$81,870,703 - 47,84
If Large Company wants
(reduction in NET EXP) :
willing to expend:
i f a $200 mi 11 io n li ab i li ty
— ( - 012 x 57 4, 95 6,57 5) + ( .
59 0.
EXP ( Large) i s therefore .
8, 59 0 = $34 ,0 22 ,113 •
to receive a 5 : 1 rat io fo r
(Y), then Large Company will be
5 x Y 34,022,113 Y $6,804,423.
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Example 12 Equations
Reducing Cost Consequnces - Legislation
(Corpus Christi Area)
Alternative B: Limiting Cleanup Obligations of Companies
What Y Investment Will A Company Be
Willing To Make, Given Its NET EXP?
Obj ective: Generate legislation setting a limit of
$30,000,000 for total liability for cleanup expenses by
third parties and government from a single oil spill
event.
Question: What is the change in NET EXP that results
from having a $30 million cleanup limit rather than the
present unlimited liability regime (note: cleanup
liability is presently limited for expenditures by the
federal government, but is unlimited for expenditures by
states, counties, and private parties)
A $30 million cleanup limit means that where
F(k) + ONSHORE(i) x (V(i)-CLEAN) = $30 million, then
$30 million is used in place of F(k) + ONSHORE(i) x
IMPACT X (V (i)-CLEAN) .
For a catastrophic spill occurring in the Corpus Christi
area:
EXPOSURE (1) :
F(k) + ONSHORE(i) x IMPACT x (V(i)-CLEAN) = 730,000 +
(5,000) x (200,000-23,142) = $310,231,500.
Since $30 million is less than $310.2 million, $30
million is used instead of $310.2 million.
Therefore, EXPOSURE(l) = 30,000,000 +
(.35)x(27,750)x (200,000-23,142) + 250,000 +
(245x200,000) = $1,796,983,000.
EXPOSURE(2):
F(k) + ONSHORE(i) x IMPACT x (V(i)-CLEAN) = 730,000 +
(5,000) x (55,000-23,142) = $56,481,500.
Since $30 million is less than $56.4 million, $30 million
is used instead of $56.4 million.
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Example 12 Equations
Reducing Cost Consequnces - Legislation
(Corpus Christi Area)
Alternative B, continued
Therefore, EXP0SURE(2) = 30,000,000 +
( ,35)x (27,750)x (55,000-23,142) + 250,000 +
(245x55,000) = $353,145,820.
Small Company NET EXP and Y:
The new NET EXP(Small) if a $30 million cleanup liability
ceiling exists:
New NET EXP(Small) = (.002 x 1,796,983,000) + (.025 x
353,145,820) = $12,422,611.
The improvement in NET EXP(Small) is therefore:
$13,645,118 - 12,422,611 = $1,222,507.
If Small Company wants to receive a 5:1 ratio for
(reduction in NET EXP):(Y), then Small Company will be
willing to expend:
5 x Y = 1,222,507. Y = $ 244,501.
Large Company NET EXP and Y:
The new NET EXP (Large) if a $30 million cleanup liability
ceiling exists:
New NET EXP (Large) = (.012 x 1,796,983,000) + (. 15 x
353,145,820) = $74,535,669.
The improvement in NET EXP (Large) is therefore:
$81,870,703 - 74,535,669 = $7,335,034.
If Large Company wants to receive a 5:1 ratio for
(reduction in NET EXP):(Y), then Large Company will be
willing to expend:
5 x Y = 7,335,034. Y = $1,467,007.
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Example 13 Equations
Combining Alternatives
Large Company Example
Large Company elects the following three alternatives:
- P&I Coverage (plus TOVALOP-CRISTAL)?
- Large Company purchase of 2,000 ft. boom;
- Large Company then wishes to know what level of
improvement in vessel safety would be required to
justify spending $225,000 on crew training, where
Large Company wishes a 5:1 reduction of NET EXP for
its Y(crew training) investment.
Step 1: P&I Insurance (See Example 5 Equations) and
CLEAN Improvements (See Example 7 Equations):
INSURANCE = $319,200,000
CLEAN = (51,426 tons) x (0.5) = 25,715 tons.
Y(insurance) = $140,000/vessel x 15 vessels = $2,100,000.
Y(cleanup) = $260,000
EXPOSURE(1) = ((32,750) X ( .35)
+ 250,000 + 811,000 + ( (245)
EXPOSURE(2) = ((32,750) X ( .35)
+ 250,000 + 811,000 + ( (245)
Large Company NET EXP =
.012 x (2,047,802,813 - 319,
.150 x (350,215,313 - 319,20
+ 260,000 =
$2,047,802,813.
$350,215,313.
$27,755,529
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Example 13 Equations
Combining Alternatives
Large Company Example, continued
Step 2: Evaluation of additional Y expenditure on crew
training (See Example 10 Equations):
Y(crew training) = $225,000.
Management decision; 5:1 ratio of
(reduction in NET EXP):(Y).
NET EXP must be reduced by (225,000) x (5) = 1,125,000.
New NET EXP must be: (27,755,529) - (1,125,000) =
$26,630,529.
New FACTOR required to generate new NET EXP:
FACTOR = 0.951
The degree of improvement required from old FACTOR to new
FACTOR = 4.9%
Therefore, the company, having undertaken Y(insurance)
and Y(cleanup capability) expenditures, will require that
a further Y expenditure on crew training will require a
reduction in company exposure to spill events of 4.9%.
